

DISSENT

*A Discussion With
Richard Lowenthal*

The World-Wide

REVOLT OF YOUTH

Benjamin Schwartz

THE REIGN OF VIRTUE

The Dynamics of Mao's "Cultural Revolution"

Brendan Sexton

"Middle Class" Workers and the New Politics

Betty Goetz Lall

Missile Control: Hope or Chimera?

H. Brand

Nixon's Social Immobilism

Kostas Papaioannou

Marx and the Bureaucratic State

*Plus: Vietnam: Prolonging the Agony... "Mutiny"
at the Presidio... Political Change in India...
The Culture of Weimar... Economics of Czech Reform*

MAY-JUNE 1969

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The editors of DISSENT are pleased to announce that **JOSEPH CLARK** has joined our Editorial Board. He is a veteran of the radical movement and, over the last few years, has written a number of articles for DISSENT.

COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

"PREVENTIVE DETENTION"—NIXON'S BABY by Gordon K. Haskell	194
VIETNAM: PROLONGING THE AGONY —by I. H.	195
A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR VIETNAM? by Richard Falk	196
WHAT'S CALLED "MUTINY" IN THE U.S. ARMY —by Carl J. Strand	198
DO WE REALLY WANT A VOLUNTEER ARMY? —by Henry Rabasseire	200
BLACK LUNG REVOLT IN WEST VIRGINIA —by Jim Williams	201
THE CONGRESS SLIPS IN INDIAN POLITICS by Stanley Plastrik	202
FREE SPEECH AND THE NEW LEFT—A Documentary	206

ARTICLES

NIXON AND SOCIAL IMMOBILISM —by H. Brand	209
THE WORLDWIDE REVOLT OF THE YOUNG —A Discussion with Richard Lowenthal, Lewis Coser, and Irving Howe	214
MISSILE CONTROL—HOPE OR CHIMERA? —by Betty Goetz Lall	225
"MIDDLE-CLASS" WORKERS AND THE NEW POLITICS—by Brendan Sexton	231
THE REIGN OF VIRTUE: THOUGHTS ON CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION —by Benjamin I. Schwartz	239
MARX AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE —by Kostas Papaioannou	252
IMPRESSIONS FROM BEIRUT —by Irene Gendzier	263

COMMUNICATIONS

POVERTY AS A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM —by Lars Rydell	268
--	-----

NOTEBOOK

A RUSSIAN WRITER SPEAKS TO STALIN —A Letter from Mikhail Bulgakov	271
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BOOKS

LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI: JESTER AT THE COURT OF MARXISM—by Henry Pachter	275
ECONOMIC THEORY AMONG THE CZECHS —by Ben B. Seligman	280
MODERNISM AND WEIMAR —by Arthur Mitzman	282

LETTERS

287

Gordon K. Haskell

"Preventive Detention"—Nixon's Baby

A DRIVE in Congress to pass some form of "preventive detention" law is the Nixon Administration's first installment payment on its "crime in the streets" campaign slogan.

Proposals currently before Congress range all over the map. Senator Byrd of Virginia would allow almost unlimited discretion to a judge who is persuaded that a defendant charged with a crime of violence might commit a similar act. He could order him held in jail indefinitely pending trial, or restrict him as to movement, associations, etc. He could be compelled to report to jail at sundown and sleep there every night. Other proposals are much more limited. Under one version, preventive detention could be employed for no more than 30 days, after which the defendant would either have to be tried or released. In many places defendants now have to wait for their trials up to two years from the time of arrest. Those who can't make bail spend the whole of this period in jail. Thus, if applied throughout the country, such a "mild" scheme would seem as likely as not to result in fewer man-days spent in jail by unconvicted persons.

Most proponents of preventive detention agree that at best it can be a minor weapon in the legal anti-crime arsenal. If the proposal has any merit at all, it lies in the direction of compelling society to be frank about achieving ends that are now pursued by roundabout means. The traditional method of pretrial incarceration of defendants held to be dangerous has been to set bail so high that they can't make it. While this use of bail runs counter to the theory that its only proper employment is to assure the defendant's appearance at trial, relief against abuse of the bail power is available only through appeals to higher courts. Only the well-educated, well-heeled, or well-mobbed can usually avail themselves of appellate procedures (or have the money for high bail). This leaves the poor, free-lance, amateur

criminals, or the perpetrators of crimes of passion (the least likely to repeat their transgressions) stuck in the bail bag. The federal bail reform act, and a tendency of state as well as federal courts to recognize the inherent defects of money bail as a social tool, have reduced (and in many cases in the federal courts eliminated) the employment of this kind of "preventive detention."

Under the federal bail reform act, conditional release (as an alternative to bail) is permitted, but the conditions that may be set are related solely to assuring the defendant's appearance at trial. Some observers feel that while incarceration is too severe an invasion of the liberties of an accused person to be tolerable, conditional release pending trial might be an acceptable method of inhibiting the possible repetition of criminal acts. The kinds of conditions contemplated are similar to ones now attached to paroles and at times to suspended sentences: the accused must not associate with known criminals, must hold a steady job, etc. Violators could be summarily convicted for contempt of court by the judge who had set the conditions, and thus be effectively removed from the community without a trial subject to the normal rules of evidence.

The main arguments against preventive detention are that it strikes against the presumption of innocence in our system of jurisprudence; that it puts a powerful weapon in the hands of the state, which may be used more against political offenders than criminals; that, given usual police practices and the standards of intelligence and integrity commonly found in our police departments, police can't simply be trusted to achieve even approximate accuracy in screening the dangerous criminal from the chance misdemeanant; that preventive detention is, above all, a cheap and politically popular evasion of the measures neces-

(Continued on page 270)

Vietnam: Prolonging the Agony

A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE may not need a policy, but a President does. Nixon's election seems, in part, to have been due to his skill at gathering the support of those discontented voters who, for a variety of reasons, wanted to bring the Vietnam War to an end; but precisely because he avoided committing himself to *any* policy, he is now in trouble. For now, he must decide.

The general position seems clear. If the new Administration eliminates as realistic alternatives either a major reescalation or total withdrawal—and both the military situation in Vietnam and the political situation at home seem to require that *right now* the Administration foreclose these possibilities—then it has no choice but to persist in negotiations.

If, however, it is to persist in negotiations, these can lead to significant results only insofar, as Joseph Buttinger wrote in our last issue, as “Washington is ready to accept and, if necessary, hasten the disappearance of the Thieu-Ky government.” True; but what Buttinger provides here is the necessary formula, not yet the way of working it out. And even if the Administration accepts this formula, it still faces enormous problems.

Why so? Partly because U.S. policy has led to a grave weakening of whatever “third force” (Buddhists, etc.) might have arisen in South Vietnam to serve as an interim provisional government and/or as the balancing third in a three-sided coalition government to be established later. Partly because the Thieu-Ky regime can be expected to fight bitterly for its life. And partly because the other side doesn't propose to ease the pains of decision for Washington.

Are the difficulties, however, entirely on one side? The conflict between Russia and China must give the Hanoi regime some bad moments and tempt it to hasten toward a settlement with the U.S. in order to avoid getting caught in a squeeze between its glow-

ering “fraternal” patrons. A sober article in the London *Economist* (Feb. 22, 1969) also suggests that the North Vietnamese and the NLF are having their troubles: large-scale losses of men, break-up of political cadres, failure to overcome the hold of U.S.-Saigon troops in the large cities, and “not the faintest semblance of the popular uprising [during last year's Tet offensive or this year's fainter reproduction] the Communists had hoped for.”

Precisely the apparent stalemate on the battlefield, which each side can upon need interpret as being slightly more advantageous to itself than it was six months ago, and which can then tempt each side to keep fighting a little longer so as to gain “an improved bargaining position”—precisely this creates the ominous possibility that the war may drag on and on. Indeed, at the moment this is being written (late March), each side is launching “offensives,” in which the casualties are heavy, the results inconclusive, and the main purposes political.

ONE OF THE more “moderate” peace groups, Negotiations Now, has proposed that meanwhile the U.S. press for “a standstill cease-fire by all sides, to be followed by early elections so the people of South Vietnam can decide freely their own future.” It continues:

In the present deadlock the U.S. is asking acts of military deescalation and seeking mutual withdrawal of troops. . . . *Hanoi and the NLF refuse to discuss military questions outside the context of a political discussion* [italics added].

The idea of a cease-fire has its overwhelming attraction: nothing seems more dreadful in this dreadful war than thousands of boys being killed simply to gain “advantages” in Paris. Yet there is the serious question as to what a cease-fire could mean in the kind of war being fought in Vietnam (or, for that matter, what free elections could mean). And

as the sentence I have put into italic indicates, the other side refuses to discuss a cease-fire unless and until political questions are considered. It recognizes that a cease-fire would be a political boon to Nixon and is not willing to grant him that without some major concession being made in turn. It also regards a cease-fire as a boon to Saigon, since that would leave ARVN and the Thieu police as the only legitimate source of "order" in the country.

Unless Nixon makes the choice Buttinger has indicated, he will sooner or later face a repetition of the disasters that brought down his predecessor. Once he has made that choice, the U.S. might then gain, through a major concession, some new resources in the negotiations. William Pfaff, a strong critic of the war, writes in *Commonweal* (Feb. 14, 1969):

. . . we, and South Vietnam's non-Communist majority . . . may still have some luck. A political settlement could emerge which represents a reasonable compromise of the still very complicated array of forces at work within the South. A localized partition . . . or a genuine coalition with a reasonable life-expectancy could still come out of this. Re-escalation of the war may be an unreal alternative to the U.S.—but can the Communists be quite sure? And the Communists must buy our way out. More than 500,000 Americans are in Vietnam. A political price can, if we wish, be extorted for their complete removal. The majority of people in South Vietnam must still be reconciled to the NLF. For all their fratricidal struggles of the last 20 years, and their devastating inability to compromise with one another, the majority of South Vietnamese give no evidence of unalloyed enthusiasm for NLF rule.

In other words: the U.S. would have bargaining power after accepting the idea that South Vietnam is to be governed either by a) a regime imposed through agreement between Washington and Hanoi, perhaps also Moscow; or b) a government somehow determined by "the South Vietnamese themselves," which means a struggle for power by the local forces after a withdrawal of troops by Washington and Hanoi. The first alternative is of course the more likely one. The second, in principle, is one that democrats and socialists ought to favor, though it would be blinking the reality to deny that it could lead to a large-scale slaughter of Vietnamese by Vietnamese.

•

The Administration would be making a great mistake if it took the relative absence of Vietnam protest as evidence that it has a free hand.

One problem the Administration faces is that its decisive move must be made surreptitiously, through diplomatic avenues; and even a clear signal to Hanoi about its readiness seriously to negotiate over a new government in South Vietnam will not remove all its problems, though it might bring momentary easing of the war itself. But a decision to reescalate the war or to drag it out on the present level would almost certainly mean to tear this country apart. Surely the Administration must know that more than a militant "extremist" peace movement is at stake; surely it must know that the war has lost credibility with a large segment, perhaps a majority, of the American people. The one thought Nixon and his friends ought to keep steadily in mind is that of the last days of Lyndon Johnson.

—I. H.

Richard Falk

A Political Solution For Vietnam?

THE POOR PROSPECTS for peace in Vietnam arise directly from the military and political situation. Militarily, the war continues to be a stalemate, neither side being capable of winning, but both being able to deny victory to the opponent indefinitely. Politically, there is no stalemate; the NLF remains, as it has for more than ten years, the only national presence with the organization and capability to rule South Vietnam. The Saigon regime more or less controls a large army and somewhat manages a corrupt bureaucracy, but it has no base in Vietnamese society that would allow it to survive peace and withdrawal. Third-force leaders with any actual or potential political following in South Vietnam are treated as criminals by Saigon; they are mostly in jail or hiding in the countryside. These third-force

groups seek a negotiated settlement of the war that would entail some degree of territorial and political sharing of power with the NLF (i.e., the presumed objective in Paris).

The Thieu-Ky government has no incentive for such an outcome of the war. As soon as the American forces leave, the political dominance of the NLF would assert itself throughout the countryside, the junior military leadership of ARVN would be likely to defect or at least to remain aloof, and some kind of takeover in Saigon would likely deprive the present rulers of their power, and possibly of their life. Everything about the behavior of the Thieu-Ky group indicates its acceptance of this assessment: its opposition to the Paris negotiations, its policy of imprisoning all non-Communist political leadership that favors a compromise-ending of the war, and its continuing commitment to and promise of victory over the NLF on the battlefield. If the United States goes along with Saigon's wishes, then the military stalemate seems virtually certain to persist for an indefinite period. The high casualties will continue, and the official mood in Washington will oscillate meaninglessly between optimism and pessimism, neither phase being responsive to the persistence of NLF control at the village level. Vietnam is largely a country of villages. Prolonging the agony in Vietnam cannot, as Irving Howe says, be expected to work for long in the United States.

But then what? No American President is likely to announce at this stage that the war has been lost and to commence toward a process of unilateral withdrawal. The humiliation of ratifying an NLF victory, followed possibly by a heavy round of reprisals and even by a quick Pathet Lao takeover in Laos, would be a cost that the Nixon Administration could not be expected to risk.

But reescalation is at least as unattractive. It involves senseless destruction that will not alter the basic battlefield situation, and it would create even less flexibility for American policymakers than exists now. The typical proposals to blockade or bomb Haiphong and to resume heavy bombing of North Vietnam may increase the difficulties of supplying the main force units of the DRV, but it will not seriously diminish the fighting capabilities of the NLF.

The NLF relies almost exclusively on local resources and captured equipment. It is dominant in many "secure" parts of South Vietnam, but obscures its presence to avoid American bombing. The one reward of "liberation" is to become "a free bombing zone." Such reescalation would certainly re-adrenalize the peace movement in the United States and generate a wave of censure and revulsion the world over. Nixon's chances to restore American prestige in the world depend on finding new policies for Vietnam that involve neither doing nothing nor doing too much.

We are left, then, with the persisting challenge of finding a formula to convert the military stalemate into a political compromise. We must not be deceived by President Thieu's offers to negotiate directly with the NLF. These offers seem designed to placate Washington and to create the impression that Saigon is doing all that can reasonably be expected to end the war. The only tangible evidence that the Thieu leadership really seeks a compromise to end the war would involve a shift in its attitude regarding third-force politics in Saigon. As recently as March 15, Tich Tien Minh, one of the most important Buddhist leaders in the country, was arrested with 50 of his student followers; he was sentenced to 10 years of hard labor for seeking a compromise peace. So long as those groups that would alone be able to support a political compromise in South Vietnam are treated as criminals, it is impossible to believe that the Saigon regime seriously seeks a negotiated end to the war. It is essential that the Nixon Administration not be deceived by these tactics, or else the war could drag on for several more years.

Can we find a policy to change the situation? The essence of such a policy is the creation of some greater leverage over the Saigon government, specifically some way to induce that government to release most of the 20,000 non-Communist political prisoners ("conservative" estimate of a "White Paper" on political prisoners prepared by the Fellowship of Reconciliation) and to find some means to protect third-force politics in Saigon from undue harassment, especially the leaders of the Buddhist Struggle Movement and of student groups, and such prominent political figures as Truong

Carl J. Strand

Dinh Dzu. The United States now is probably not in a position to dictate these terms to Saigon, but it might be able to exert such an influence if it began acting as if the alternative to opening-up South Vietnam to the politics of compromise and coalition was the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The initiation of a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces at the rate of 50,000 per two months would begin to generate pressure on the Thieu-Ky regime leading it to topple or to grow more compliant to U.S. political demands.

Such a posture of slow withdrawal might be appropriately accompanied by two secret communications:

(1) inform Hanoi that the process of withdrawal was conditional on no increase in the level of combat of DRV main force units;

(2) inform Saigon that withdrawal would give way to the search for a negotiated compromise as soon as third-force politics were given free play in South Vietnam and a co-operative role was played in Paris by the GVN. In the interim, Paris negotiations should be continued, but without any hope for breakthroughs until the posture of withdrawal begins to have a political impact in Saigon.

These policy recommendations may not produce the intended results, but they will produce some dynamism to move the American position beyond the present impasse.

The course I am proposing is that the U.S. withdraw all of its troops if Saigon refuses to change its attitude toward third-force politics or if it should collapse under the pressure of the new American policy.

Taking this course, Nixon would be trying something new to achieve peace, taking a constructive risk in the direction of deescalation and decommitment, a risk that can be reappraised over a fairly long time span, and one that nevertheless is coordinated with the responsibility America has for doing what it can even at this stage to give South Vietnam a counterstructure to the NLF. Perhaps such a proposal can at last end this agony that we have hitherto so largely inflicted on Vietnam and ourselves through the blindness of our politicians and the stubborn pride of our generals.

What's Called "Mutiny" In the U.S. Army

TWENTY-SEVEN YOUNG SOLDIERS have been standing trial for "mutiny" allegedly committed in the Presidio, an army installation in San Francisco. The issues raised by this trial extend far beyond the immediate events.

The Presidio, headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Army, sits on the Northern tip of San Francisco, within a bazooka's shot of the Golden Gate Bridge. It is a beautiful spot, noted for its Officers' Club, golf course, winding drives, and cypress trees. It also contains a stockade. Since Haight-Ashbury, the graveyard of the Love Generation, is still a Mecca for very young soldiers gone AWOL, the stockade population tends to run to men charged with going AWOL. The stockade is extremely crowded, the fog-chill from the nearby Golden Gate is often bitterly cold, and what passes for food would constitute an insult to a Berkshire hog. The guards have a reputation for brutality. Prisoners complain that certain guards have a habit of chambering a shell in their shotguns while daring prisoners to escape. (Anyone who knows the U.S. or any other army will find all this quite believable.)

It was supposedly during one of these latter exercises that a nineteen-year-old prisoner, Pvt. Richard Bunch, was killed. After the killing, on October 14, 27 prisoners formed a circle, sat down, and sang protest songs for two hours. During the sing-in, they refused to obey a direct order to disperse. The average age of the singers was nineteen; their average educational level, tenth grade. All but one are from small-town backgrounds and have no record of previous protest. Most have been imprisoned for desertion, and almost all had previously been classified by the army as psychologically unfit for duty. One had a history of suicide attempts. Yet all were charged by the army with mutiny, despite the fact that an Army court-martial investigator recommended that the charge be reduced to "willfully disobeying an order."

The defense of the men has been under-

taken by several civil libertarian and pacifist groups. They have publicized the case, demonstrated at the Presidio, and raised money for civilian lawyers.

An apparent result of all this outside support was that Pvt. Nesrey Sood, the first prisoner to be tried, received fifteen years at hard labor. As the protests mounted, so did the sentences, up to sixteen years for the second, and fourteen for the third man tried. A change of venue, requested by the defense, had been denied. The fourth trial was moved by the prosecution to the Mojave Desert to escape the mounting demonstrations. This trial resulted in four years for the fourth defendant.

By early March, pressure for leniency was building up both in Bay area papers and in Congress. Congressman Jeffrey Cohelan (D. Calif.) and others supported the prisoners' claims that stockade conditions were bad enough to justify the kind of demonstration that took place. Senator Alan Cranston (D. Calif.) demanded an investigation of military prisons.

As of this writing, the Defense Department has begun reducing the harsher sentences to two years at hard labor and dishonorable discharge. Trials for the next five prisoners were moved to Fort Lewis, Washington, where they too have been found guilty.

The main arguments used by the defense have rested on the inappropriateness of the charge; the right to free speech of every person in this society; and the extreme severity of the sentences. The military seems to have disregarded its own precedents in trying these men. Although Article 94 of the Military Code defines mutiny as "conspiring to override lawful military authority," it is generally interpreted as the refusal of men *under arms* to carry out an order. Since the men were prisoners they could not be considered under arms; they can only justly be charged with disobeying an order. This charge carries the much smaller sentence of six months. In reducing the sentences, the Defense Department has tacitly admitted not merely that sixteen years for singing is an unjustified punishment but that the whole charge of mutiny was unwarranted. Why did it occur?

WESTERN SOCIETY has developed certain con-

cepts and rules concerning the administration of justice. These extend, or should extend, to everyone. One concept is that a trial judge should be impartial. Another is that a defendant can be tried only for a specific charge, not for beliefs or political connections with persons outside the courtroom. It is clear that the way the trials were conducted and the severity of the sentences violate these fundamental concepts. For the trials were held not to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants. They were used by the army for political purposes.

Unlike civil judges, military ones are not expected to maintain a totally detached attitude toward the case they are trying. But the difference between the sentences handed out to those tried at the Presidio, and the one prisoner tried outside the range of the demonstrators, indicates that these external activities strongly prejudiced the judges against the defendants. The defendants were used as "examples" to others.

The basic structure of an army, and the manner in which authority is exercised within it, has remained largely unchanged for 500 years. There is no place within this structure for democratic dissent. The spectacle of enlisted men protesting in a peaceful manner outraged some authoritarian minds dominating the Army and prompted the court to make "examples" of the Presidio 27, with the hope that further organizing along this line would be headed off.

But repression has bred more, not less, dissent. Soldiers' protests, mainly confined to leafletting, are increasing at the Presidio. Punishing soldiers for the exercise of what would be regarded as ordinary civil rights in the society is not new. What is new is the scope of the problem. Never before have we had such a large "peacetime" army. Never before have the youths entering it been so aware of the faults besetting the society they are sworn to defend. In suppressing young protesters, the Army is denying basic values of the larger society.

Part of the reason for this lies in the rigid structure of the Army. Part lies in the nature of recent protest activity. The domestic protest over the Vietnam War is viewed by a segment of the officer class as responsible for undermining the war effort. The military does

not want to see an alliance between young enlisted men and leftist campus groups.

The question is not whether such an alliance should be forged. The question is: should military courts be allowed to commit such tragic injustices, should they wreck young lives in retaliation for such pitifully small, such gentle acts? Obviously, there must be a reform of the system of military justice. More important, there is a serious need for a more searching examination of the nature of civil rights in the military. But most important of all, our society must deal with the new phenomenon of a large standing army. How long can such an authoritarian institution continue to exist unchanged in this society?

Henry Rabasseire

Do We Really Want A Volunteer Army?

RECENTLY the idea of a volunteer army, as a substitute for UMT or the draft, has gained adherents among pacifists and opponents of the Vietnam War. The following "theses" have been circulated among *DISSENT* editors and have received favorable as well as unfavorable comment. Readers' reactions are invited.

(1) A "Volunteer Army" is only another word for a mercenary army—the most despicable form of defense establishment ever imagined.

(2) A volunteer army means: pressing into service those who have no other means of making a living; next to prostitution it is the most humiliating form of using people's bodies for commercial purposes.

(3) A volunteer army would, in practice, be an army composed of "niggers," i.e., it would be based on racial exploitation.

(4) A volunteer army would be a will-less instrument in the hands of its commanders, capable of beating down insurrection or whatever a reactionary government might so term.

(5) A voluntary army is especially capable of being used in colonial wars, independent of the morale of the citizens and independent of any war aim or idea.

(6) While a volunteer army may be useful, and competent to deal with the specialized cases of insurrection and colonial uprising, it is utterly useless as an instrument of pure defense of national territory and for purposes of collective security affecting other countries in legitimate self-defense. Unless one wishes to rely on "massive (nuclear) retaliation," the deterrence of major aggression requires mass armies in preparedness.

(7) A volunteer army requires organizational structures which in turn encourage further development in the direction of "push-button war"—an intrinsically more dangerous instrument in international crises.

(8) Democrats and socialists from the earliest times on to the present—Pericles, Machiavelli, Jean Jaurès, Paul Levi—have advocated the militia as the only means of assuring citizen control over the military establishment.

Karl Marx, as is well known, favored a universal labor service. It is imaginable that specialists can be recruited from this service without undoing the basic militia structure of the army.

(9) The notion of a volunteer army has become popular in some pseudo-left circles because they wish to avoid a confrontation in case of a conflict of loyalties or of conscience. It's the easy way out. Instead of opposing the continuation of the war in Vietnam, as they do now, those who are afraid of going could then sit it out.

(10) If the idea of a volunteer army were pursued to its logical conclusion, it would have to be admitted that we would be still better off by farming defense out to commercial enterprise. The military art was perfected first by the *condottieri* of the 15th century and then by the leaders of mercenary armies during the Thirty Years' War, or by piratical queens who combined business with conquest.

And now Nixon is for it.

Jim Williams

Black Lung Revolt In West Virginia

NEARLY 40,000 West Virginia soft-coal miners returned to their jobs March 4 after conducting a political general strike in support of a state bill to make "Black Lung" a compensable ailment under the state's workmen's compensation system.

The walkout began February 18, when about 2,000 miners in the Beckley area—rank-and-file members of the Black Lung Association—struck in support of a bill they had introduced into the state legislature in Charleston (West Virginia). By the end of the month, the number of striking workers had risen to include nearly all of the state's 42,000 miners who mine about 50 percent of the nation's soft coal.

The legislature, which passed a bill on March 8 that partially met the workers' demands, became a battleground between the rank-and-file miners, the United Mine Workers and AFL-CIO officialdom, and the Coal Operators' Association which termed the workers' demands "galloping socialism."

The strike was the first *political strike* in West Virginia labor history (and the largest since 1921, when a great number of miners had staged an armed march against Logan county officials, which was eventually broken up by troops and air force bombers commanded by General Billy Mitchell).

The strike of February 1969 was also a protest against the UMWA officials, whom the rank-and-file miners criticize for not fighting hard enough for adequate mine safety. At a mass rally in Charleston (West Virginia), on February 26, about 2,500 miners marched through the streets in white miners' helmets decorated with black skull and crossbones and the figures "78—4." The numbers represent the 78 miners who were killed in an explosion at a Mannington (West Virginia) mine last fall, and 4 miners died in a mine accident at Hominy Falls last year.

There were no top UMWA officials at the miners' rally, but the mention of UMWA President "Tony" Boyle set off a chorus of

jeers and catcalls and, in a speech, a miner referred to the Black Lung Association as "your local union away from your local union."

The miners have been upset for some time. There is widespread discontent with the way the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund operates, and most towns in West Virginia's coal counties boast groups of disgruntled miners who feel they have been cheated out of hard-earned benefits. There is discontent with the perennial lack of democracy in the UMWA (presidents of union locals are still appointed by higher-ups, who in turn are appointed by Boyle).

The Black Lung Association introduced a bill into the state legislature, but the UMWA teamed up with the state AFL-CIO to offer what was, in the miners' opinion, a much weaker bill.

"BLACK LUNG" was unheard of a few years back. No one really knew much about it, about how it was caused, or what its long-term effects were. Many people have heard of silicosis, and many think that existing safety and health measures against silicosis are adequate.

But this is not so, according to Dr. Loren E. Kerr of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund, who says "pneumoconiosis [black lung] is the most important occupational dust disease occurring in the United States today." The disease is caused by the breathing of coal dust—tiny particles measuring less than a ten-thousandths part of a millimeter in diameter. This became a major problem when mines began to be automated and huge machines were introduced. These new machines ripped out coal seams at a highly accelerated rate and saturated the air with superfine dust. This dust causes black lung.

Studies by both the Department of Mines and the UMWA show that one in ten workers in the mines, and one in five of the former miners in Appalachia has had X-ray evidence of black lung. Doctors representing the Black Lung Association, Dr. I. E. Buff and Dr. Donald Rasmussen, say that black lung doesn't always show up on X-rays. They say that having black lung is like drowning, and that it is permanently crippling.

The Black Lung Association is a spontaneous movement, but sparked in good part by Dr. Buff and Dr. Rasmussen, who have been holding meetings in most of the mining towns throughout the state to discuss black lung with the miners. The contacts between the doctors and the miners were forged by antipoverty workers—primarily the Appalachian Volunteers. The president of the Association is Charles Brooks of Kanawha City. He is a Negro, but no one seems to care. The movement includes black and white miners who work together.

The Black Lung Bill, which finally became law, contains some concessions to the miners' demands: Black Lung is now compensable under workmen's compensation (which pays about \$45–\$50 a week in maximum benefits), and the Bill has a presumptive clause which presumes that a miner got Black Lung if he worked in a mine for at least two out of the last ten years. But the Black Lung Association said the final bill was deficient in seven areas, and it vowed to continue to press for its demands.

The eruption of the black lung movement portends difficulties for the UMWA leadership, many of whom are in the \$35,000-a-year category, and who may draw as much income from the UMWA-owned National Bank of Washington as from dues. State political leaders are also shaken by the movement which indicates the UMWA leaders can no longer "deliver" the miners' votes.

Black lung, as the many other serious problems facing miners, receives scant national attention. Usually it requires some catastrophe—like the Mannington explosion—or a general strike, for the miners' problems to receive attention.

But as the UMWA's Dr. Kerr states, black lung "is a man-made disease that can be prevented." Britain, for example, since the early forties, has taken measures to ventilate mines, provide protective masks, and to keep down dust levels. Black lung now has become almost nonexistent in Britain, and also in West and East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

It seems odd that America's miners, who produce so much wealth for the nation, should still work under degrading and dangerous

conditions that all but vanished in most of the other advanced Western nations over two decades ago. The power of the coal barons remains largely unchecked, and is even growing as the result of new mergers, which are producing coal-gas-oil "conglomerates."

The man who enters the mines knows that if he isn't killed or maimed outright by an accident, he stands little chance of living a full, healthful life in the face of national apathy about his plight, which is a continuing blot on the conscience of America. And what is especially notable here in West Virginia is that, despite the sluggishness of the union officials, the miners themselves now have finally moved into action.

Stanley Plastrik

The Congress Slips In Indian Politics

INDIA IS CELEBRATING this year the 100th anniversary of its modern "saint," Mahatma Gandhi. Saints, as George Orwell once pointed out, are difficult people. We like to believe that the Mahatma would have looked with disdain upon the idolatrous ceremonies now taking place throughout India. If Gandhi's life ended in defeat (the tragic partition of India), the struggle for possession of his "image" in the country he created is a still more depressing spectacle. One is reminded of Kautsky's chapter "The Struggle for the Image of Jesus" (in his *Foundations of Christianity*), where he writes about the period after the death of the Messiah:

... a crown of legends began to form about this character, into which pious spirits would weave whatever they wished their model to have spoken or done. But as Jesus thus came to be regarded more and more as a model for the entire sect, the more did each of the numerous contending groups, of which the sect had consisted from the start, attempt to assign to this personality precisely those ideas to which each group was most attached, in order then to be able to invoke this person as an authority. Thus the image of Jesus ... became more and more the image of a superhuman

personality, the incarnation of all the ideals developed by the sect, but it also necessarily became more and more full of contradictions, the various traits of the image no longer being compatible with each other.

To this we need merely add: the party that claims the Gandhian heritage, India's ruling Congress party, no longer pretends to be carrying out its fundamental doctrines: nonviolence, popular mass rule, decentralization, etc. The last bit of serious advice offered by Gandhi to the Congress party on the eve of independence in 1947 was the suggestion that the party disband so that new movements could form within the new India. Twenty-two years later the leaders of Congress, not a few of whom grew up under Gandhi's leadership, devote themselves exclusively to a desperate—and losing—effort to retain the monopoly of political power they have exercised over the years.

Like all peoples, Indians suffer from a strong reluctance to "give up" the past. The many failures and disappointments of India's two decades of independence have only reinforced the myths one might normally have expected to see destroyed in this post-Gandhian period. In his essay "In Search of Gandhi" (in the Summer 1968 issue of *Daedalus*), Erik Erikson aptly comments:

Every item of the great man's life becomes or is reported like a parable; those who cannot commit themselves to this trend must disavow it with destructive fervor. I, for one, have almost never met anybody of whatever level of erudition or information, in India or elsewhere, who was not willing and eager to convey to me the whole measure of the Mahatma as based on one sublime or scandalous bit of hearsay. Then there are those whose lives have become part of a leader's and who have had to incorporate him in their self-image.

That is why the wearing of the Gandhi cap and homespun cotton cloth are today associated in most parts of India with corrupt politics, the unwillingness to yield power to others, dishonesty and violence. This man, whose strategy was to elicit our latent capacity for militant and disciplined nonviolence, inadvertently produced a crop of bureaucrats whose very presence in many an Indian village will touch off violence among the villagers.

Among younger Indians there is a growing

movement to reexamine "the Gandhi story" in the hope of finding a relevant image of the man. I suspect this will be discovered not so much in his ideas as in his example—his courage, his conquest of fear, his integrity. In a word, in the example of his life.

IN THIS CENTENNIAL YEAR a significant election has just taken place. Before analyzing its results, one ought to underscore the fact that democratic elections still help bring about social and political change in India. A rough but basic democracy prevails. Whatever the shortcomings, it compares favorably with neighboring Pakistan and its "guided democracy," a euphemism for military rule.

It will be recalled that as a result of the 1967 general election the Congress party lost control of approximately half the state governments of India, precipitating an apparent disintegration of the parliamentary process. Congress retained, and still retains, a shaky control of the country at the center. In a series of states (West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, etc.), uneasy coalitions made up of the strangest of bedfellows then fell apart so that New Delhi was forced to take over the temporary administration of a number of states. This is the background against which interim, mid-term elections were held during February in four states (Bihar, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and the Punjab). India's fifth general election since its independence is scheduled for 1972.

In all, over 100 million voters—40 percent of the total national electorate—were called upon to vote. This included 6 million new voters who had come of age. A substantial majority of these votes, approximately 60 percent, went against the Congress party which, while still the biggest vote-getter, continued to suffer a general decline. Congress remains the party of the middle, of the commercial peasantry in the countryside and the small middle-class businessman in the city. It also remains the party of caste associations and religious (Muslim) minorities, a loosely-defined, non-ideological grouping; but as a national movement, its day seems to be over. At the same time, *no other all-India party is yet emerging to replace Congress*. This fact underscores the

sense of breakup many observers stress in examining Indian affairs.

The people were voting for state legislative bodies, not for members of the national parliament. In the Punjab, there were 470 candidates for 104 seats; in Uttar Pradesh, 2,870 candidates for 425 seats; in West Bengal, 1,019 individuals contested 280 seats, and in Bihar, which is the most politically confused of all Indian states, 2,141 candidates contended for 318 seats. Seven all-India parties and 42 regional parties took part in the elections, in addition to the usual independents. It would require a computer to sort out the many electoral groupings, blocs, alliances, and combinations that made their appearance. Congress took part in the elections as a coalition of contending factions and interest groups; no one party could have won a majority, and Congress least of all.

Once again the Indian voters, who have grown more discriminate and independent with each new electoral experience, have upset most calculations of political analysts, most of whom foresaw a narrow Congress victory in the key elections in West Bengal. It was there that Congress took its worst drubbing in Indian electoral history. Beaten now by the Left coalition, which was headed by the (Left) Communist party of India that is the party's Marxist, Maoist Left wing, Congress was reduced in West Bengal to a second-rate opposition party.

Results in other state elections reinforce the view that *India is changing fast into a multi-ideological and experimental nation*. From this central fact three points follow:

(1) Political definitions of parties have temporarily lost their significance; all parties, including Congress, are in the fire.

(2) India will not and cannot follow a Western pattern of political development: India is going her own way, unclear though that may be; but it does not follow that India is "falling apart."

(3) In this new situation, improvised patterns of accommodation will be worked out by political organizations. The first test of this need to readjust will be faced in West Bengal which, like Kerela, is now effectively in the

Award for Humphrey

THE following DISSENT editors who are also members of the Board of the League for Industrial Democracy—Emanuel Geltman, Irving Howe, and Stanley Plastrik—wish to make this statement:

For its Spring 1969 Conference the LID has chosen to give its annual award to Hubert Humphrey. We believe the LID serves valuable purposes as an educational society of the democratic Left, and especially as an agency maintaining relations between trade unionists and intellectuals; we intend to continue participating in its activities; but we must express our dissent in regard to this award. We cannot concur in the choice of Hubert Humphrey because he has recently been notable as a major spokesman defending what we regard as the indefensible, reactionary Vietnam War.

A Statement by Bayard Rustin

I AM deeply disappointed with Irving Howe's unfortunate and ill-conceived attack on the League for Industrial Democracy for its decision to give its annual award to Hubert H. Humphrey. In the 1968 elections Hubert Humphrey rallied the overwhelming majority of those who are the foundation of social progress and a democratic Left in the United States—the labor movement and the Negro people. Against great odds and with admirable courage, he fought the conservatism, racism, and reaction represented by the Republican and Wallace candidacies, and he even brought to his side those dissenters, including Mr. Howe, who until the last moment had repudiated him. Our main job today is to reunite the democratic Left, not to splinter it or disdainfully exclude those who eminently belong within it. I was very happy to note that people like Senators McCarthy and Kennedy and McGovern, and Arthur Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith, who are also critical of some aspects of Hubert Humphrey's position, have unhesitatingly consented to sponsor the luncheon which will honor him. Anything less would have been a manifestation of unworthy vindictiveness.

hands of the "Left Communists." For the moment, and conceivably for the next few years, leaders of the national parties must face the fact that regional issues (language, borders, economic development, etc.) will assume much greater importance than do national issues.

Other consequences of the election:

- As a vote-getter, Indira Gandhi proved a failure, she is not an effective national leader.
- The voters, in their stumbling way, are looking for an alternative government: either a new largely regional party, or a broad front of many parties; or a charismatic political figure.
- The Communist party (Left)—Marxist—as contrasted with the Communist party (Right)—the Communist party of India (CPI)—is on the move.
- Socialist, social democratic, and (liberal) "third-force" movements suffered severe setbacks and must reexamine their positions or expect to vanish.
- Parties and movements based primarily on *communalist* views (Jan Sangh, Muslim League) received no encouragement from this election. Indians still are secular, democratically oriented, and tolerant. But they do want "bread" (economic growth) and a lessening of the strains of poverty.

THE STARTLING ELECTION RESULTS in West Bengal demand further comment. The United Front swamped its opponents: 210 seats (of which the CP-Left bagged 80 and the pro-Russian CP-Right obtained 30) went to the United Front; the Congress party dropped down to 55 seats! Bear in mind that after the Chinese attack on India in October 1962 the already split Communist movement had virtually disintegrated. The failure of the Congress party in Bengal, where it had ruled for years—with inefficiency, corruption, and insufferable arrogance—resurrected Bengali Communism in a new, quasi-insurrectionary and totalitarian form. The Bengali electorate yearned for change, repudiated Congress, and turned to others. Calcutta, the most revolutionary city

in India, is now firmly in the hands of the Left-Communists.

In Bengal 13.5 million people voted. Congress received 5.5 million votes or about 41 percent of the total, approximately the same percentage as in the 1967 elections; the United Front ticket received about 44 percent. Yet Congress lost 72 seats, while the UF gained 95 seats. Examination of the popular vote tempers the victory of the Communists considerably. The differential popular vote of the two major parties (more accurately, the Left *bloc* and Congress) moved barely 2 percent in two years; there was no great landslide of actual votes. What accounts for the sweep by the UF is the fact that in many districts the Congress vote was split up by a multiplicity of parties, so that the UF carried many elections by margins of a few hundred votes.

Nevertheless, the prospect in West Bengal at this moment is a dismal one. There can be no doubt that all democratic parties, including Congress, have suffered a disaster. Hundreds of thousands of Calcutta residents poured out into the streets under CP-Left leadership to celebrate the victory; in the new state government the Communists have the Home Ministry (control of the police), and CP party leader Jyoti Basu, now Deputy Prime Minister, is a more dynamic and forceful leader than the actual Prime Minister. Left Communists now command two of the most significant states in India: West Bengal and Kerala. Their programs in both areas are stridently anticapitalist and antilandlord, with emphasis on the latter, and it remains to be seen whether the expected Left militancy will hamper the process of production in industry and agriculture. West Bengal is a poor state with enormous economic problems, beginning with a great food shortage. The Communist leadership knows all this; above all, it fears provocative actions by the central (Congress party) government, which might lead to a military occupation of West Bengal by the army. Therefore there is reason to believe that the Left militants will proceed with extreme caution.

In this delicate situation there is the possibility of total alienation of the Bengali people from the rest of India. Insurrectionary ele-

ments in considerable number are on the scene. They are known as Naxalites, after an insurrectionary peasant movement that was active in Naxalbari some years back and had been led by a Left-Maoist Communist minority group. These people are ready to plunge the subcontinent into chaos. But parliamentary

democracy demands that the verdict of the Bengal electorate be taken at face value, which means that for now the policy of the democratic forces can only be one of live-and-let-live. The Bengalis are a sophisticated and political people, and they must be allowed to act according to their own political decisions.

A Documentary

Free Speech and the New Left

1) The SDS at New York University

THE FOLLOWING appeared in a leaflet distributed by Students for a Democratic Society at New York University the day after it broke up a meeting at which James Reston was scheduled to speak, as well as another meeting at which the Ambassador from South Vietnam was scheduled to speak.

Last night the Ambassador from South Vietnam, Nguyen Huu Chi, and James Reston, Executive Editor of the *New York Times*, were scheduled to speak. . . SDS members interrupted, and both of them left.

What was the purpose of the confrontation?

The Ambassador from Saigon came to NYU to urge the American public to continue America's pursuit of the war in Vietnam. *No man and no government has the right to propagandize for a policy of genocide. . . .*

James Reston of the *New York Times* came as a spokesman for one of the most influential newspapers in the country. . . . By restricting its criticism and limiting its reportage of government policies, the *Times* works to contain opposition within manageable channels.

We have the same obligation to prevent Ambassador Nguyen Huu Chi and James Reston from speaking. . . . [Emphasis in original]

It should be noted that not only does the NYU SDS take to itself the right to break up meetings of those who support the Vietnam War but also meetings of those, like Reston, whose opposition to the war it finds politically unacceptable. Exactly whose meetings would thus be invulnerable is not clear. As far as we know, national SDS has not repudiated this position.

2) A Word of Caution from David Dellinger

The following appeared in an article by David Dellinger, national spokesman for the Mobilization against the war, in *Liberation*, October 1968:

the problem of having an increasingly cruel and irrational enemy . . .
is the danger of becoming cruel and irrational oneself . . . Because

"they" are vicious and wrong and "we" are humane and right, it is easy to conclude that whatever we do is justified . . . One has only to talk to some of the [Chicago] participants—and to read some of the reports in the underground press which exaggerate and extol the violence of our side while forgetting to mention the reasons for our being there—to realize that it can happen here.

Some people are saying that the time has come when we must fight "by any means necessary." But some means that seem necessary at the moment end by degrading and corrupting the Movement. Tactically they provide the enemy with ready-made excuses for its most repressive actions.

"The future of our struggle is the future of crime in the streets," says an article in *New Left Notes* (September 16) by people intoxicated by the Chicago victory and eschewing a sober analysis of aims and tactics. "A new manifesto: There are no limits to our lawlessness." But there must be limits.

. . . "The streets belong to the people." Of course. But the streets—like the factories, airwaves, the immense resources of the universe—belong to ALL the people, not just those who would seize them for their elitist clique, as the corporation magnates have seized them in this country and the Party bureaucrats have seized them in the Soviet Union. To stop a doctor on his way to the hospital or a worker on the way to his job or family, to overturn or burn the cars of those who chance by when a protest is in process—this is not to take over the streets for the people.

3) *And a Word of Anguish from Corliss Lamont*

The item below appeared as a letter in the *New York Times*:

The attempted or successful disruption of public affairs meetings from coast to coast has become a dangerous threat to American civil liberties and democracy. In New York State in the week of March 1, rude and noisy demonstrators invaded three important symposiums and seriously interrupted the proceedings.

These symposiums consisted of a distinguished panel on the drug problem held on campus March 1 under the auspices of the State University of New York at Buffalo; a panel on "The Challenge of Building Peace" on March 5 at the Hilton Hotel in New York City sponsored by the Fund for Education in World Order; and a panel on "The Crisis in Democratic Institutions" on March 7 at the New York Society of Ethical Culture.

At Buffalo the poet Allen Ginsberg was routed from the platform by shouts and the beating of tom-toms. At the Hilton Senator J. W. Fulbright, one of the most effective opponents of the American war in Vietnam, was unable to conclude his address.

At the Ethical Society a band of self-styled Crazies marched in and might well have broken up the meeting had not the police intervened. I was present at this meeting and was greatly shocked at the actions of the intruders and by their denunciation of all the speakers as "fascist pigs."

A situation is developing throughout the United States in which it

COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

is becoming increasingly difficult for speakers freely to express their views, for teachers to lecture and for audiences to listen. The young dissidents primarily responsible for this situation are flagrantly violating the First Amendment "right of the people peaceably to assemble."

I am deeply sympathetic to the idealistic concern and militant spirit of today's youth in confronting such major evils as the Vietnam war, the plight of our Negro minority and poverty amid an affluent society. But our young people ought to realize that the Bill of Rights is a precious thing for all Americans, young or old, and for everyone from left to right politically.

Violation of free speech and the right of assembly, from whatever source, undermine the democratic process by making democratic dialogue impossible. And such cases as I have mentioned are bound to provoke a backlash that strengthens the reactionary forces of this country.

CORLISS LAMONT
Chairman,
National Emergency Civil
Liberties Committee
New York, March 9, 1969

The editors of **DISSENT**

join with

his many friends

to congratulate

PHILIP A. RANDOLPH

to his eightieth

birthday.

Nixon and Social Immobilism

NOT ONLY HAS President Nixon failed to tackle any major problem, he has not even defined one. As Max Frankel has written:

By this stage in their administrations John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were forging new designs for European organization or urban transportation and tax reform and slum removal to boot. They were combining the budget and eyeing new revenues to pay for what they wanted done, with freedom and justice and ballyhoo for all. Mr. Nixon, by contrast, begins skeptically with questions about what can be done. . . . At home . . . [he] intends to wait to see how much spare cash his budget will yield before he begins to "move in the direction of our very difficult problems." . . . [He has] betrayed a certain eagerness to hold the middle of the road.

—*New York Times*, March 19, 1969

Kennedy and Johnson, too, were finally compelled to hold to "the middle of the road," but they were a bit restive under the compulsion. Their restiveness arose from the need to sustain Democratic majorities. Since Roosevelt, Democratic presidents have, in order to secure their rule, accommodated, even encouraged, new claims to social integration by disadvantaged groups. Labor's political ascendancy was furthered by Roosevelt; the Southern Negro's by Kennedy and, more energetically, by Johnson. Nixon has not reached out to such groups, nor is he likely to. By his lights, he will not need them since the elections of 1968 proved that there exists a quasi-conservative majority in the U.S. which, though still narrow, can perhaps be enlarged. But this belief presupposes that it is possible to entrench social immobilism in a period of deepening social conflict.

For the time being, Nixon's electoral victory has settled the question as to whether a conservative majority exists. But is it a stable majority? Electoral arithmetic does not give a conclusive "yes" to this question, but even if it did, it would slight the deeper problem of the constraints that will limit Nixon just as they did the Democrats. These constraints include the enormous claims made by military expenditures upon economic resources; the difficulties in trying to broaden the fiscal base; the weakness of central public authority relative to private and local public interests. If Nixon is even to begin resolving domestic problems, he must attempt to loosen these constraints. The very fact that Republicans now shoulder national responsibilities compels him to act—on the urban crisis, the draft, high employment levels, monetary soundness, enforcement of federal guidelines. Yet, if his actions are to go beyond token gestures, they are bound in time to open up all the old fissures in the Republican party, threatening to fragment it as fiercely as the Democrats have been.

In 1968 Nixon received 3.3 million *fewer* votes than in 1960; Humphrey, 3.6 million fewer than John Kennedy. Wallace attracted the "protest" vote from both parties in roughly equal proportions; he also accounted for the entire *increment* in the number of votes stemming from the rise in the voting-age population over the previous eight years. Offhand, the Wallace vote seems to have changed nothing in the basic alignment of two-party power. Nine southern states, which accounted for 13 percent of the total national vote for all three candidates, delivered 40 percent of the vote for Wallace. Yet the

Wallace vote was not merely sectional. In only three of the major states (Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania) would the Republicans require *more* than half of the vote cast for Wallace to gain a majority in future national elections. And the small margins by which Nixon won in New Jersey and Illinois could be increased by appealing to only a segment of the 1968 Wallace vote. The Republicans' assumption that a conservative majority exists and can be expanded has a measure of validity despite Nixon's loss in votes since 1960 and the likelihood that only part of the Wallace vote can properly be termed conservative (*all* of it must be considered racist).

These calculations imply that the Wallace vote represents a temporary aberration, a rejection of the two-party system, and that by quasi-rightist policies, the Republicans can in the future capture a large portion of Wallace supporters. But it would be out of character for them, as well as impolitic, to appeal to the degraded populism of Wallace supporters; if they did they would lose, as Goldwater lost in 1964, a good part of their liberal wing. It follows that Nixon will steer a careful "centrist" course so as to rally the "moderates" of *both* major parties. His decision to continue the antiballistic missile project initiated by Johnson, but to have it "protect" second-strike nuclear-attack capabilities rather than population, may be regarded as an example of this "centrism." The decision weakened the opposition while making concessions to it; but it also conciliated the military, which promptly obliged by modifying its stand in favor of a "thin" ABM network.

IF the ABM decision typifies Nixon's approach, it also suggests that by and large he will move within the same limits that were so severely tested under Johnson, and that have caused disintegration of the two-party system. Remember that the majority which carried Johnson into office in 1964 was so

huge, one might have thought it would permit him wide latitude in interpreting his "mandate." Yet he proved unable to come to grips with social crises at home or to end the Vietnam War. Michael Harrington, in attacking the Republicans for wanting to give business a key role in antipoverty, has documented the perverseness of this approach (DISSENT, January-February 1969). Yet in fact the Johnson Administration initiated it and emphasized it as an alternative to the massive federal programs proposed by labor and leftist liberals. For all the welfare programs the Democrats initiated, and the support they gave to the demands of labor and the poor, they did not, under Kennedy or Johnson, change the constellation of social and economic forces whose resistance to reform lies at the root of our recurrent crises.

It cannot be excluded, though I think it very doubtful, that by uniting the "moderates" of both parties, Nixon can impose his own version of such reforms. Such politics would accord with his appointment of Patrick Moynihan. Thus, as against Harrington's hope for a "dynamic" Democratic majority in 1972, consisting of the working masses, the poor, and of liberal intellectuals, there looms the possibility of an "immobilistic" Republican majority, composed of small-town and suburban middle classes, better-off workers, and corporate liberals. But beyond either of these possibilities there lies the question of constraints within which the Democrats operated and which the Republicans now experience, and which even the largest electoral majorities seem unable to weaken. Paramount among these constraints is the world role in which the U.S. finds itself, a role now perceived as a burden by many in the "Establishment." But it cannot be escaped and perhaps not even be lightened. Why?

I would suggest three reasons:

(1) American corporations have a vast stake in world trade and investment. Their

plant and equipment spending abroad is equivalent to 16 percent of similar domestic outlays, and their sales from their foreign factories amount to an equivalent 8–10 percent of domestic sales. The American economy is intertwined with a world economy that has been shaped by the Cold War and the American presence abroad; 10–15 percent of tangible (i.e., transportable) U.S. output is exported, and roughly the same proportion of the labor force is employed in export industries. Maintenance of foreign investment outlets and markets, as well as their continued expansion, depend on political stability and military security abroad, which are increasingly expensive to buy.

One measure of this expense is to be found in the outlays budgeted for General Purpose Forces which, according to the budget authored by former Secretary of Defense Clifford (and largely concurred in by his successor), “consist of those land, sea and air units on which we rely for all military actions short of strategic nuclear war.” Expenditures for General Purpose Forces have been projected at \$32.1 billion in fiscal 1970, a sum slightly lower than in 1969, but higher by \$12 billion than in 1965. True, the Vietnam War has accounted for most of the increase, but it is precisely the Vietnams which have become a yardstick of preparedness since the need for strong “conventional” forces was reemphasized by John Kennedy.

... [the] overall requirement for General Purpose Forces rests on two very fundamental policy judgments: that the security of our nation is inextricably bound up with a forward defense and, thus, with the security of our allies; and that the strategic nuclear forces in themselves cannot be relied upon to provide a credible deterrent or a reasonable response to the entire spectrum of aggression which we must be prepared to face.

—*Defense Industry Bulletin*, March 1969

(2) In the course of establishing its “forward defense,” the United States has incurred

commitments to numerous nations, which could only be dissolved with great difficulty, if at all. Attempts at even reducing them entail a threat of instability in many of the countries concerned.

(3) As a concomitant to America’s world role, the defense establishment has become a power in its own right, sustained by clientele of industrial, scientific, and regional interests. In resisting cuts or shifts in defense programs, these interests will adduce the technological imperatives that require ever new “generations” of weapons systems and therefore an escalating investment in ever more destructive, if useless, armaments. They can also point to the economic stake which regions such as the South and West have in the large-scale defense employment, thus assuring themselves of ample support in Congress.

Whatever its significance in broad historical terms, the world role of the U.S. is of benefit not merely to America’s ruling classes, but to tens of millions of ordinary people as well; therefore, it represents a great *domestic* political force. There are also many less visible interests which restrict the availability of service resources. One of these is the big farmers. Farm income stabilization is projected at \$3.9 billion in fiscal 1970, and total aid to agriculture at more than \$5 billion. Charles Schultze, a director of the Bureau of the Budget under Johnson, estimates in *Agenda for the Nation* that “roughly two-thirds of the \$3.5 billion Federal price support costs (in 1966) accrue to the benefit of the top one-sixth of farmers who have average incomes of \$20,000. Very little of the benefits . . . go to farmers earning less than poverty income.” By enhancing farmers’ financial solvency, price supports have contributed strongly to the rapid rise in agricultural productivity, and thus have been a key factor in displacing workers from rural areas. It seems improbable that the Nixon Administration, any more than its

predecessor, will redirect funds now expended on farm-price supports to more urgent needs; or to provide the special facilities—offered by all advanced countries other than the U.S.—for rural migrants' transition to urban living.

IT MAY BE ARGUED that Nixon, who accepts the prevailing balance of political forces, is not likely to believe that they limit him in establishing programs of social amelioration. On the contrary, he shares their optimistic belief in enlightened capitalism and America's world role. But Nixon's degree of awareness is not at issue here. The hard facts are that ghettos are rotting, that poverty has become intolerable, that, in general, the moral authority of the government has been undermined, not only by its impotence in settling—and rationally defending—the Vietnam War, but also by its inability to cope with such elementary problems as hunger at home.

The Nixon Administration has shown some awareness of these dangers; Paul McCracken, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has spoken of the "narrow social tolerance" within which economic policy (particularly as it affects employment levels) must move in the current period. But Nixon's economic policy rests on conventional Keynesian conceptions of regulating the business cycle: thus, the budgetary surplus projected by President Johnson for the fiscal years 1969 and 1970 is to be enlarged in order to combat inflationary trends more effectively. Obviously, that will restrict already sparse funds for socially meliorative measures. It will impinge only marginally on the patterns of resource flows between the private and public sectors. Now there are but two ways of dealing meaningfully with the problem of financing social reconstruction. Military outlays can be cut sharply (a way of doing this has been proposed by Carl Kayser in *Agenda for the Nation*). Or taxes can be raised—but that is not only politically

unfeasible, it is also resisted on well-established grounds of conservative ideology.

But will not the continued rapid growth of American productivity generate rising federal receipts, which in time will exceed federal expenditures even after allowing for unavoidable increases? Will not a growing "fiscal dividend" enable Nixon, as it would have enabled a Democratic President, to deal with intractable social problems? In a technical sense, the answer is yes; in the political sense, the answer is no. *For the fiscal dividend is likely to be preempted by the claims of those closest to influencing budgetary decisions.*

Since the early sixties, liberal economists have held out the hope that the "fiscal dividend" would pay for the added goods and services required for large-scale social reconstruction, although admittedly the dividend might also be applied to reducing taxes or the public debt. There has always been the implication that the dividend would not be subject to the pressures that established claimants exert on budgetary decisions—it would painlessly finance needed reform. It has also been assumed that the substantial shift in spending, which a rising dividend would bring about from the private to the public sector and, within both, from fixed-investment outlays to consumer goods and services, would not slow the rate of economic growth—and that the producer interests likely to be affected by that shift would not view themselves as threatened by it. These assumptions cannot be analyzed here; suffice it to note that they are not well-founded. It has yet to be shown that a high economic growth rate assuring full employment can be sustained without heavy defense spending. What is more, any cut in such spending made possible by the end of the Vietnam War will encounter powerful resistance.

Economists' erstwhile optimism about a growing fiscal dividend has given way to measured pessimism. Charles Schultze, in

the essay mentioned, figures that "after Vietnam" and beginning sometime prior to the mid-seventies, an annual fiscal dividend of \$35-40 billion would become available. But he adds,

If the military budget in the early 1970s is not substantially lower than the level implied by current policy . . . it will quite possibly grow—well beyond that level in subsequent years. . . . [The] future budgetary consequences of present strategic policy may prove to represent an unstable equilibrium. Either decisions will be made to reduce those expenditures or they may themselves create a situation in which further expenditure increases will occur. . . . [The] post-Vietnam fiscal dividend will either be significantly increased by policies that reduce military spending or it will be significantly eroded by further additions to that spending. There may be no intermediate position.

Otto Eckstein, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, noted a year ago that it would be difficult to reduce defense spending after the Vietnam War—a prognosis now widely shared, chiefly because that is what the Pentagon wants. Eckstein also thought that the costs of *traditional* civilian government outlays would continue to rise unabatedly, in line with population growth and demand for expanded public services. In this, too, he has proved right: the sum of so-called relatively uncontrollable civilian outlays under present laws, exclusive of Social Security and Medicare, will go up by \$5.7 billion in fiscal 1970—equivalent to more than half the "calculated" fiscal dividend. Eckstein further postulated that much of the prospective growth in revenue must be used to reduce (or avoid) budget deficits, so as to slow inflationary trends. The budget proposed by Johnson projects surpluses for the current and coming fiscal years, and while the magnitude—even the attainment—of the actual surpluses

remains uncertain, the Nixon Administration is bound to harden the line of fiscal conservatism anticipated by its predecessor. In sum, following Eckstein, *the fiscal dividend will be nearly or wholly absorbed by "conventional" requirements.*

The preemption of the fiscal dividend, like the claims crystallized in the federal budget, indicate some of the constraints within which Nixon will have to operate if he proves unable or unwilling to contain the pressures of military-industrial interests or to refrain from military "solutions" abroad. Those constraints will tighten their grip upon what freedom of action he has. In time that might compel him to reduce welfare-state expenditures and curb labor, perhaps even to sanction repression of basic liberties. Nixon would surely prefer the status quo, since that is a condition for the Republican party's retaining and expanding its electoral majority. But the status quo is a philistine illusion, resting as it does on the assumption that social relations remain static and that inequities do not get worse if allowed to persist. Nixon is surely aware of the dilemma before him—a dilemma Johnson was unable to resolve and which, in the form of sharpening conflicts over the distribution of social resources, has confronted politicians the world over.

It is unlikely that the deterioration in the condition of the poor, in the cities, and in the physical environment will halt; or that the decline in living standards in Asia, Africa, and Latin America can be reversed without massive counterefforts. Nixon's immobilism will obstruct such counterefforts, thus making them all the more urgent. The struggle for social priorities is therefore likely to move into the center of the political arena in the years ahead. Its outcome is not predictable, but its success hinges upon the recognition that it is inseverably linked to the struggle for peace and a reduction in armaments.

The Worldwide Revolt of the Young

A Discussion with Richard Lowenthal,
Lewis Coser, and Irving Howe

Richard Lowenthal is a veteran of the German socialist movement. As an exile from Hitler's Germany he worked for many years as a political journalist in London. Now a professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin, Lowenthal is also the author of numerous studies on European Communism. At present he is working on a book about modern totalitarianism. His most recent contribution to DISSENT was his article in the Winter 1965 issue on "The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism."

LOWENTHAL: We face here a worldwide problem, an apparent breakdown of communication between the generations. A significant part of the younger generation seems not to accept the beliefs, values, and institutions that have been handed down to them. This degree of secession of the young is, of course, a familiar phenomenon in pre-revolutionary situations. We have had revolutionary student movements in various countries, in Russia in the nineteenth century, the fascist student movements in our time, and the revolutionary nationalist movements of the Third World—all *preceding* a political and social upheaval. The difference in this present student secession is that it takes place in apparently functioning societies, societies with full employment and steady economic growth, without stagnation or obvious political repression, not suffering from alien rule, etc. So we have a quasi-revolutionary attitude of the young in a situation that is not thought of as revolutionary by society as a whole.

I would look for the explanation on four different planes, two of which are political and two not. To begin with, this is the second generation of the Cold War. By that I mean that these young people have not lived through the formative crises that created the present division of the world into antago-

nistic blocs. They have not seen Stalin bestriding Europe; they have not seen the Berlin blockade. These are things they read about in books—books they doubt. They do not believe that this is a conflict between a blood-stained tyranny and freedom; they feel it is a rather boring contest between a boring bureaucratic one-party system in the East and a boring bureaucratic two-party system in the West; and they don't see why anyone should take a serious interest in it. Yet, if they don't see any sense in the conflict, they have to live with its consequences. They have to live with the arms burden, the nuclear risk, the partition of Europe, the partition of Germany; they resent being the victims of burdens that seem to them senseless. It is in this context that Vietnam has acquired such enormous importance *outside* the United States. The Vietnam War is the one sector of the contemporary East-West conflict to which young people can attach emotional and moral importance; here they feel strongly that the U.S., and therefore the West in general, is wrong.

HOWE: You are right in saying they live with the disastrous consequences of the Cold War. At the same time, to tell them they also live with some of its more advantageous consequences cuts very little ice. For example, if containment in Western Europe had

not succeeded they would not even be in a position to fight against the unfavorable consequences of the Cold War. This is, surely, a historical argument that is not going to persuade them very much. Consequently, the anti-Stalinist tradition in which we have been brought up seems to them at best outmoded and at worst a form of acquiescence to the status quo.

LOWENTHAL: People are not "grateful" for something that—thanks to the efforts of their fathers—did *not* happen.

HOWE: That's right: all they can see is what *did* happen. And the sense we had that Europe averted an absolute catastrophe during the immediate postwar years—this means almost nothing to them.

LOWENTHAL: Similarly, they are not grateful that they do not have mass unemployment. The enormous progress that free Western societies have made without the general abolition of capitalist property in the last few decades is something they don't feel because they haven't known the world as it was before.

HOWE: Do politics and "gratitude" ever have much to do with each other?

LOWENTHAL: Of course not. But let me turn to my second plane of causation. The very concept of democracy appears to them a sham. They don't believe democracy in our society is real because it has become too remote—because they feel they have no chance of participating in political decisions. The real decisions, in their view, are made behind the scenes, in compromises between interlocking bureaucracies. This is the sense of utter political frustration that was effectively expressed in C. Wright Mills' *Power Elite* and has now been taken over by all New Left ideologies. True, this is not a completely new phenomenon. In studying the origins of Italian fascism I found that, at the root of the frustration of the young

before 1914 in Italy, there was precisely that same sense of political frustration induced by the compromises of Giolitti and other parliamentary leaders. At any rate, our political system seems to have become too remote for people to believe they can influence it. A kind of negative test of this feeling was the Eugene McCarthy phenomenon in the U.S. Suddenly there seemed to be a chance to make a direct impact on the "system," and a lot of young people forgot about their ideologies and tried to do something about the Vietnam War.

COSER: All this hangs together with the general rejection of the idea of representative democracy and an attempt to go back to a model of direct democracy somewhat like that proposed by Rousseau, in which the citizens have to get together and make decisions on a small scale. Hence, the withdrawal from bigness generally—a big political entity cannot be handled. And therefore we have to create some kind of small-scale communities in which our voices count.

LOWENTHAL: But this is not quite Rousseauism any more. The Rousseauian ideal, contrasted with the reality of our time, leads not to the early Rousseauian belief in a plebiscitary democracy, but to a reversion to various forms of anarchist utopia. They are really going back to Bakunin.

HOWE: Without, of course, knowing that that's what happened! Most of us of a certain generation from the socialist world tended to have a theory of bourgeois democracy, very simple-minded and Leninistic. It's not as if Lenin thought it all out by himself—in some of Marx's writings there is also the idea that democracy is merely a function or an accompaniment of one stage in the development of the bourgeoisie, etc. At considerable emotional and intellectual cost to ourselves, we abandoned that notion for a more complex and satisfactory theory of democracy—one that is affected by but

not limited to particular social and class relationships. Some young people today, however, seem to begin their political careers by absorbing the crudest Leninist notions without being Leninists or without having read Lenin. How does this happen?

LOWENTHAL: It happens out of their sense of inability to influence the democratic process. They feel they can't control either the political parties or the modern bureaucracy. The mass media are viewed as governed by a conscious or unconscious conspiracy to keep people stupid; they do not see that a considerable element of stupidity in entertainment is the result of capitalist competition geared to the lowest common denominator—they think of this mainly as a political plot.

COSER: The notion of conspiracy is quite interesting because you find it both at the extreme Right and extreme Left of the political spectrum, in both cases probably among people who feel they are not geared into the political process.

LOWENTHAL: The kind of paranoia you describe used to come from the outcasts of society, the failures, etc. But now it is much broader. We are dealing not just with failures but with people who, if they had a chance to succeed, would refuse to. They have a will to fail, or think it morally better to fail.

HOWE: We are dealing with an elite that sees itself as outcasts or struggles to become outcasts. That's historically new. As the welfare state, bourgeois democratic society achieves a certain stability, there is a tendency for the major parties to move closer together in their programs; that is, you have what somebody, talking about Europe, called the one-and-a-half-party system, with Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Germany becoming less and less distin-

guishable. The students then feel there are no significant choices.

LOWENTHAL: They felt as much even before the coalition in West Germany. But partly they were wrong; partly what they felt was based on experience. Apologists for the system often say that a lot of the decisions involve not real choices deriving from opposing value-systems but are inherent in the conditions of modern existence, and that the power of bureaucracy expresses this compulsion. If the dominant mode of thought keeps emphasizing this idea of the inherent limitations of choice within the system, the only option for the young, as they see it, then becomes revolution.

HOWE: If the main choices are less and less distinguishable, you have to try and achieve a marginal differentiation on the outskirts of society. But let me ask whether the traditional social democratic parties in Europe are partly responsible for, or are victims of, this situation. That is, to the degree that they have become more and more absorbed into the system and fail to put forward radical alternatives—by which I don't mean "revolution" but significant radical alternatives—to that degree they fail to attract the rebellious young.

LOWENTHAL: I sometimes surprise my radical students who complain about the "betrayal" of the Social Democrats by telling them that the German industrial working class refused for years to accept the Social Democratic critical slogans against a society still largely based on capitalist ownership, so that the Social Democrats more and more came to terms with it. It was the working class that became satisfied with the status quo, more than the Social Democrats. But the real fault of the Social Democrats is that they have not sufficiently identified some of the new problems troubling people today. The old problems they were used to

dealing with (distribution, employment, etc.) have come closer to solution in our society; about new problems, however, they have not had much to say. Problems of education are central for the coming generation, partly because it's an increasingly technological and scientific society in which the gulf between people who have the scientific training and those who haven't is getting to be a very serious one. Access to the chances for acquiring knowledge is becoming the central *class* issue. There are related cultural problems: education in connection with leisure, education in connection with democratic control.

HOWE: But parties not merely have to identify problems, they must work out slogans, programs, solutions. If you feel workers are being outrageously exploited, slogans are easy. "Raise the wages, cut the hours. . . ." But if people suffer from malaise, are alienated, or are falling out of the bottom of society, it may very well be that the Social Democratic parties have seen the problems but don't know how to express them in political terms. Mills used to call it the difference between a trouble and an issue. We don't know how to transform troubles into issues.

LOWENTHAL: This is true for some intellectuals. But the European Social Democratic parties have not even been sufficiently troubled. Thanks to the student revolt, they are beginning to be. For the issues we face go beyond the political plane; they have to do with the development of our civilization. A free, a pluralistic society can maintain its cohesion only if it keeps adjusting its institutions and values to changing conditions. If not, its proclaimed values will seem no longer relevant and even hypocritical, and then the transmission of the values to the new generation will fail.

HOWE: In addition to identifying the feeling students have about the recalcitrance and sluggishness of society, which various

ideologues both express and exploit, let's ask whether this is a legitimate criticism or a mere form of false consciousness, or both? I feel it embodies a legitimate criticism but also has a certain authoritarian potential in the way plebiscitary democracy can always slide into totalitarianism.

LOWENTHAL: The real complaint about the structural rigidity of our parties is this feeling that new minorities don't get a hearing, that the two-party system tends to make the parties converge toward the center, and that the entrenched bureaucracy becomes comfortable and inert. Better opportunities are needed in public discussion, in the press, and in the political parties for new problems and new demands to be heard—without their advocates feeling they first have to throw bombs.

HOWE: In other words, then, if you have a minority of the young acting as if it were in a prerevolutionary situation in a society that is not in a revolutionary situation, it may be that one can see this (optimistically put) as part of a long-range process of social adjustment. Perhaps this will even itself out as a hopeful, democratic transition.

LOWENTHAL: That depends on our response.

HOWE: I was fascinated by the fact that Professor Habermas, who had been the grey eminence of the radical students in Germany, wrote a very sharp attack on them in which he even used the word "Left-fascist"; he saw "fascist" elements in the German SDS. Can you tell us anything about that?

LOWENTHAL: I think he was shocked by the growth of the cult of violence for its own sake. If you asked the people of the German SDS, especially the more serious-minded ideological people, they would be terribly insulted by what Habermas said; they would be sincere in rejecting the fascist label. Their

conscious motivations are, of course, quite different from those of the fascists. But their critique of existing society has many basically antiliberal elements, which in Germany take on an anti-Western undertone—it all goes back to a German romanticism they have in common with the critics from the Right. That is, the rejection of pluralism as a sham, the rejection of democracy as a sham, the contempt for the material values of a consumer society, the rejection of a parliament and of interest groups. In their kind of Marxist criticism there are these antiliberal and anti-Western elements from the German tradition of romantic cultural pessimism, which you also find in Marcuse. Marcuse, after all, started with Heidegger, not with Marx. A second point is—and here we have something that is not Marxist at all—the idea of “waking up” a sleeping and inert society by minority violence, shock tactics. Now this has certain unforeseen consequences. The people who start this kind of minority violence, say, Dutschke, are sincere, quasi-Marxist ideologues who believe that in their Marxist scheme of things minority violence has an indispensable tactical function. But it doesn’t fulfill this function; on the whole they don’t get anywhere. In particular, they don’t get the masses on their side. After a time, however, they *do* attract somebody: they attract the lumpen-proletariat. And then they reach some school kids who don’t know anything yet, and to some extent what in Germany is called *gammeler*, unemployables or people unwilling to work.

HOWE: Will you spell that?

LOWENTHAL: *G-a-m-m-l-e-r*. It’s a contemptuous word used by squares. But the *gammeler*s are not really the equivalent of hippies; there’s less sub-culture, less ideology to them. They’re often close to a slightly criminal element, juvenile delinquents or semi-delinquents, what is called the “Rockers” in

Germany. And then, the movement changes gradually as the ideology becomes less important, fewer people read, and the violence becomes more important. Some of the students who are instrumental in starting this kind of movement are quite friendly, quite civilized in their personal relations with liberal professors. But those who come after them have the idea that it’s a wonderful revolutionary feat to insult professors, if not to beat them up. It all becomes less intellectual, less ideological, rather more “violence for its own sake,” more a purely destructive thing. This is indeed somewhat related both to the experience of Bakuninism and to early forms of fascism. (Bakunin and Richard Wagner were friends on the barricades of the uprising in 1849.) I don’t mean that it’s a fascist movement. But it has developed certain features similar to those of fascism in their antirational destructiveness. While Marcuse hasn’t been as publicly critical as Habermas, on his last visit to Berlin he too was shocked.

HOWE: What one hears most among New Left students in America is a version of Marcuse’s idea that the people are not responsible political actors because they have been brainwashed, manipulated; their heads are chockful of propaganda; they have been atomized. Consequently, they cannot make significant choices politically. There is an element of truth in this, but it is also snobism, elitism.

LOWENTHAL: Where does this feeling of universal brainwashing come from? A few years ago, in Germany, the constructive elements among the rebel students were much stronger than they are now—they started with interesting, well-thought-out proposals for university reform, which are now being accepted. But, meanwhile, several student generations have passed through the university in growing frustration, and their subjec-

tive experience is that society is not listening or taking up their proposals—except when they smash windows. That sense of a brainwashed, manipulated, inert society comes from this feeling that nobody is listening. The elitist segment finally concludes that it will be heard only when it resorts to violence, and the historical precedent is the Bakuninist current in the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. Violence is seen as the one way to “wake up” society—and how inadequate this course is in our time we all know.

But let me turn to another cause of the present generational crisis. The family is the elementary basis of what the sociologists call socialization and what I call the transmission of the values of a civilization. Now, there is a general crisis of the basic family in our time. In its extreme form, in Germany, many of the students are literally fatherless—either their fathers were killed in the war or the marriage of their parents broke up immediately after the war. So that what appears as a revolt against authority is really a revolt against the lack of genuine authority, of credible and acceptable moral guides. It is an anti-authoritarian revolt behind which one senses a longing for authority.

In the United States, the “weakened” role of the father has a somewhat similar effect. The weakness of the parental role is due to the acceleration of social and technical change. There is so much new in respect to which the parents can’t really guide the young. In Sweden, for instance, an enormous percentage of the population lives in towns, whereas their parents grew up in the countryside. Finally, there is a very specific American form of the problem: the effect of ultra-permissive childhood education in many families and schools, which is then followed by a steep jump into the pressure of learning and competition in college and university. Hippiedom and dropouts are a reaction to this—a way of refusing the obstacle, the transition from ultra-permissiveness to severe pressure. And then there is still

another variant. Often the leaders of the student revolt are from liberal families, and they have accepted the liberal values but charge society with not living up to them.

COSER: This is the main difference between the situation in Germany and in America. One aspect of the German student revolt is against the father or family: generally the father is identified with the Nazi system or with conservative and reactionary values. In America that aspect is relatively minor. By and large—look, for example, at the story of Mark Rudd at Columbia—many of these kids have relatively good relations with their parents. In Rudd’s case, Momma brought him sandwiches while he was sitting in at Columbia. There is much more feeling in the American case, at least with the white kids—I’ll say a few things about the Negroes in a moment—that our parents are all right. We look back to our early childhood as a rather happy age; that was the age of permissiveness.

Our parents’ values are fine. *Only*, (a) they don’t live up to these values, they don’t defend them, and (b) they expel us from paradise when we’re in high school. Then suddenly the parents shift their orientation, dropping all their permissiveness and asking us to be highly competitive. It’s not so much a revolt against parents as against the whole oppressiveness of competition.

LOWENTHAL: I wasn’t suggesting that it was a revolt within the family, but that the family was not fulfilling its function. If, along with the values of love, freedom, and truth, the family cannot also inculcate the values of work and effort, it is partly failing in its job. But there is something else which puzzles me: the enormous role of sex in this present revolt—there’s something phony about it. After all, sex wasn’t *all* that repressed before. I don’t think that in the reality of the lives of these people sex plays such an enormous role as it does in their

talk. Perhaps what we now have is the inversion of the classical Puritan idea that you must repress sex in order to work hard. Today you must take sex as a substitute for work.

HOWE: You repress work in order to have good sex.

COSER: There is a difference between the talk about sex fifteen, twenty years ago and the talk about it now. Now it is not so much an expression of the sexual urge as it is a going back to some kind of Adamite innocence. Sex means rejection of society with its repressive rules. In California there is lots of talk about touching people, quite apart from sex as such; talk about coming close to people, feeling warm—as if you have to *learn* to touch.

HOWE: Apart from the Adamite tendency, there is a tendency to break down the couple, the whole dating system in America, which was extremely rigid among adolescents. Among the more rebellious kids, the hardening of a relationship between a young boy and girl seems to be replaced with running in packs of eight or ten at a time—it's not nice to leave someone out.

LOWENTHAL: Couple-forming is premature growing-up, and that's just what is not wanted.

COSER: The Negro kids' relations with parents are quite different from the whites', especially in the lower class. They often have no role model, being trapped in an essentially matrifocal family. Sometimes there isn't even a substitute father. There's a faint parallel between these black kids and the fatherless generation in Germany.

HOWE: Approximately a million people in America belonged to one or another of the radical parties in the 30s; now their children are in college. Many of the parents sup-

pressed their own radical past in their consciousness, they tried not to tell their children about it. Nevertheless, it got through to the kids. Now the latter are picking up the lives of their parents, so to speak, at the point where they gave up—including not only the idealism and militancy but also the half-baked thought and sectarian rigidities from which the parents struggled to escape. We have a friend who was one of the top leaders in the American Communist party. At great personal effort, he broke from the party in 1956 after the Khrushchev events. He now has roughly a social democratic position, and it isn't easy to make this kind of change. But there is his own son who is right back, intellectually speaking, where he was in 1936. This is, of course, a case where a man did not suppress his past. But both the parents who did suppress their past and those parents who were proud of it told their children romantic stories about their radical past: in both cases, it seems to me, what you have is a reappearance, a recurrence, of the power of Marxism. A great intellectual system takes a long time to die, assuming that Marxism, even in the narrow traditional sense, is going to die—although many elements of Marxist thought will surely survive. And if you look at the "death of Christianity" in the nineteenth century, you know that in some sense it really didn't die. It went through troubles.

COSER: It lost vitality.

HOWE: It lost vitality and it had recurrences, but still in the actual experiences of the people living at that time, Christianity had recurrent waves of influence and power. I think, in a way, the same thing is true of Marxism today, because Marxism after all has been the only major new system in the twentieth century.

COSER: One additional thing on the relation between the radical sons and the formerly radical fathers: I think you could slo-

ganize it by saying, "It's the return of repressed radicalism." And the interesting thing is, as far as I can judge, very often the fathers are extraordinarily proud of the excesses of their sons, even though they themselves have become relatively square. In some way they enjoy the fact that the young have the rebelliousness that they themselves have lost; as a consequence—and here I come back to the fact that fathers and sons in America are not as far apart as in Europe—the sons are finding, if you wish, subconscious approval on the part of the fathers.

LOWENTHAL: If I may say so, that is a much more harmless phenomenon than most of the things we've been talking about, because in time the children will take up where their radical fathers left off. They will really be much closer to our basic values than many other youths. If the kids are *really* Marxist, well, they have a lot of the conditions for doing a good job of political criticism in this society. Most of them are not really taking over the *substance* of the Marxism of their fathers. They're taking over the secular religious need for Utopia, but very much less the critical intellectual discipline of Marxism. And this is what worries me.

COSER: And even if they were to take over some of the values of their fathers, they take them over thirty or forty years later—when the conditions of society no longer correspond.

HOWE: Those who after all are taking over some element of the Marxist tradition may be expected to go through—that is, with some inevitable modifications—at least some of the history of that tradition.

LOWENTHAL: This is a family problem in a slightly different sense from the one I have raised. It is a problem of "our" families.

HOWE: Yes, but it turns out there are more of "our" families than you might suspect.

LOWENTHAL: Still, it's a bit esoteric. I really mean less this kind of problem than the problem of a deep failure to transmit part of the values. And this seems to me to occur above all in the failure to transmit the values of work and effort, the need for certain disciplines, even for certain frustrations that are an elementary part of every socialization. If you read Marcuse, you find there the ideology of this demand for immediate gratification, the belief in a society without compulsion. Now this is, to put it very bluntly, the end of civilization, if people try to live up to it. It has nothing to do with political revolution, it's not even a cultural revolution: it's a cultural counterrevolution, a dissolution.

HOWE: It also takes the form of opposition to rationality.

LOWENTHAL: Rationality is also a form of discipline—intellectual discipline.

HOWE: Suppose, however, there was a young person here who said: *Well, obviously, we recognize that there has to be some work, and even Marcuse says that he's not against all repression, only against what he calls "surplus repression."* And suppose he said: *The trouble is that you people are still caught up with the values and assumptions of the industrial age, while we are already part of the postindustrial age. You people—you're trapped in the ethic of work, in fact, you can't live without working; whereas we are more liberated than you, or at least we have a different style of life, and we find it much more possible to live while doing much less work; we're less puritanical than you are.* We have to consider the possibility that there is something to this in terms of social change.

LOWENTHAL: If we assume they have in mind the boring, repetitive menial work of society, then anything done to reduce that sort of work is to the good—provided that

people learn at the same time to do something sensible with their leisure. And that is a big problem, that is where education comes in. What we are getting in our society is in fact a growing distinction between people who do boring work in order to live, and therefore do as little as possible, and people who do interesting work and like it. This is the reality, and everything else is a pipedream. So you still need, in order to adapt to that, some puritan ethics.

HOWE: I've talked to students about this, and they say, "We go to college, and the college just trains us to be part of a machine, you know, to take our jobs as executives in some pointless institution, etc., etc." "Sure," they say, "I understand that *you* like your work—you write articles, you make speeches—or a doctor likes his work; but most of us are not going to do that kind of intellectual or professional work. Most of us are going to be in the corporations, in the government bureaucracies, things of that sort, and we will be doing essentially not only boring work, but what we feel is valueless work."

LOWENTHAL: That brings us to what in my scheme is fourth—the crisis of education. The student revolt is by no means primarily a revolt against the university system. It is that only among other things. And this is also very different in Europe from here. In Europe, the two main complaints against the universities are, first, that society is not spending enough money, thought, and energy on making them modern, big, accessible; second, that the universities are too authoritarian, that the old sticks-in-the-mud prevent new people with ideas from doing anything. In Italy this is particularly striking, rigid, and absurd. It was almost as bad in France, a bit better in Germany, in England much better. But, on the whole, this is not the problem in the American university. You have enough money for it, you do a lot for it, and the style is very relaxed and nonauthoritarian.

The other problem—more prominent in the U.S.—is: education for what? This is exactly the question Irving just raised: what is the good of getting the technical training in order to be a cog in the machine? Now this is closely connected with the original romantic revolt against specialization; specialization involves a degree of self-mutilation that is inevitable in a modern industrial or, if you want, postindustrial society. It can't be avoided, but it can be accepted only if you retain some sense of the link between your specialty and society as a whole. Now the old way of retaining the link, the humanistic, all-around man, is no longer attainable. And the question is: Is there an alternative way of getting a sense of the relation between your specialty and society as a whole, a sense of purpose in society as a whole? And here is where the attraction of Marxism comes in.

HOWE: It gives the sense—or illusion?—of unity.

LOWENTHAL: It gives a sense of an overall picture of where society is going and what you are doing in it. In *that* respect all these new anarchist inclinations have *not* replaced Marxism. That is what people are looking for—if you like, a substitute religion. And unless we find a way of developing our education so that this sense is given a realistic expression, I doubt that we'll overcome the crisis. The common denominator of the education crisis is this feeling: "Education for what?" Now this is a terribly difficult problem because a pluralistic society has no single, avowed purpose. You *can't* say, unless you have a very dogmatic Communist or Catholic university, that we educate for a certain *Weltanschauung*. At the same time, you have to give people a sense of the wider value of their specialty. And some sense of the overall connection of things has to be given: this is also required by the inwardness of modern science itself. If you remember, a few years ago a great stir was made by

a little pamphlet by C. P. Snow on "The Two Cultures"—about the gulf between the humanistic approach and the natural-science approach.

The fact is that the development of the sciences tends to bridge that gulf—cybernetics, information theory, etc. are creating intellectual structures that give a common approach to these fields. I think it is very important to give people who really study at the university and who do not just want to get technical training this sense of universality into which their specialty fits.

COSER: But we have to take it together with a theme we discussed earlier. It's not simply the question of making something whole again that has been fragmented into parts. The other aspect is control. The young have the feeling that even if there were this integrated whole, who are we and how can we control it? One rather important aspect of student culture in America is what I would call "the artsy-craftsy aspect": enormous concern with handicraft, with leatherwork, pottery, etc. These seem precisely the kinds of activities where the individual involved does have the sense that he's not a cog in a machine, that he creates something whole. You can graduate from college in pottery and leatherwork, and then open up a little shop in Greenwich Village or in Provincetown and as an adult "live happily ever after" an "unalienated" life.

HOWE: I want to try something out, though I haven't the faintest idea whether it's true or not. I more and more feel that the greatest prophet of the modern era, apart from Marx and maybe Freud, was Dostoyevsky. Dostoyevsky, when he argued against socialism said, "All right, everyone will get his bellyful and the machine, the society, will run rationally, but people will go crazy. They'll go crazy with boredom, they'll go crazy with resentment." They won't have what he called the image of the Golden Age, the idea of the Second Com-

ing, the sanctions and values and comforts and hopes that follow from religious belief. He predicted, in effect, that the system would either turn into an authoritarian dictatorship or would come apart simply because there would no longer be the binding values that can keep people living and working together. It seems possible that in some ways he is being vindicated as a great prophet. Thirty or forty years from now people looking back upon our subject may not even discuss it primarily in political terms. We used to believe when we had a kind of totalistic vision—I don't mean totalitarian—that socialism was the society in which problems, by definition, were solved. Consequently, there was no need to worry. (I'm simplifying, but not terribly much. If you look into the literature of the early Social Democrats, I think you'll see there's a lot of warrant for saying this.)

Now, while we want a socialist society, we certainly don't believe that you can define it as one in which problems have been *ipso facto* solved. On the contrary, we begin to see now that a socialist society would be one which in some ways would have *more* problems and more difficult ones, because they wouldn't be open to easy material or political solution. Just as Dostoyevsky saw that sometimes the yearning for Christ is manifested through images of Antichrist, so very often what's happening among the kids today, though they haven't much awareness of this, is that they are trying to express through political channels desires and impulses which are essentially not political at all but are religious or quasi-religious. This is one reason for their frustration. You can organize a movement in behalf of better working conditions, or to give the vote to the Negroes, or for any concrete objective. But it is very hard to organize a movement to abolish alienation. You can't pass a law. And so it seems to me that there is a built-in frustration and disappointment in their activity—and this may be one of the reasons for their

rage, namely, that what they really want is a transcendence, or even a mystical experience, which is not available through either reform or revolutionary politics.

LOWENTHAL: What you're saying is, in other words, that we're having a basic crisis of our civilization, and Dostoyevsky prophesied this because he was a religious man. But he didn't really mean that we would get social decay or a flight into absolute power simply because economic problems would be solved. He thought it would happen because faith would be lost. To put it in another way, I talked about the transmission of values. Values solve certain basic problems in the life of a society. For the sake of values people are prepared to accept sacrifices, and sacrifices remain necessary whatever problems have been solved. No society can live if some people are not prepared sometimes to die for it. So that's one aspect: the need to accept frustration, sacrifices for the sake of something. Then there are certain problems of human life which by their nature are not soluble: death, sickness, old age, etc. And these are the problems for which all great civilizations find answers in terms of religions. Now we have never yet had a civilization that was not based on a transcendent belief. And what we are trying to do is to maintain our values and move upon the momentum of these values originally created by religion—but after the transcendent belief has gone. The question is: will we succeed?

HOWE: If you were hostile about it, you could say we are parasitical on the traditional religions.

LOWENTHAL: And so we are. Incidentally, one reason why a certain type of Jewish intellectual seems to manage a little better than many of his contemporaries in maintaining a sense of direction and duty is that in the Jewish religion the strictly transcendent ele-

ment was less important; so that the immanent element can be retained a little more easily once the transcendent belief has gone. Toynbee would say that the Jews survived the decay of our civilization because they are of another one. But the fact is that the question of the survival of our civilization without the original religious belief is on the agenda of our century as a central problem, and of course, a lot of people are conscious of this.

COSER: The problem is even older. It starts really with the rise of secularism in the eighteenth century. It's from then on you have again and again fundamentally secular types who, nevertheless, think in terms of some synthetic religion. You find it with Robespierre in the cult of reason, you find it with the "religion of humanity," etc. And as Carl Becker and others have shown, even the eighteenth-century belief in the perfectibility of man still had essentially religious aspects. About this terrestrial mission, the best comment can be found in a passage Goethe wrote in *The Italian Voyage*: "A good society is one which will look like a huge hospital where we all minister to the needs of each other." But is that a good society?

LOWENTHAL: I am quite convinced that a secular religion is the worst solution. If you invest particular institutions with a religious expectation, then you are in for hell on earth.

HOWE: Now here we are—three people who grew up in the Marxist movement and who have retained at least some elements of it—speculating on the question of whether civilization can survive in the way we want it to survive without the recurrence of some religious impulse. Now isn't that an extraordinary thing? I mean, who would have thought of that twenty-five years ago?

LOWENTHAL: It just shows that we may have learned a little from these terrible years.

Missile Control—Hope or Chimera?

Background to Negotiations; the ABM Controversy

NOT SINCE the early days of 1946, before the Cold War became a reality, has the climate for controlling the nuclear arms race been so propitious. Both the United States and the Soviet Union talk (but do not yet act) as though they want to negotiate limitations on strategic offensive and defensive weapons. What does this apparent simultaneous willingness signify?

IN 1964, AT A TIME when disarmament negotiations between the two superpowers were all but dead, the United States proposed a freeze on the production and deployment of strategic offensive and defensive missiles (long-range bombers, long-range land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and antiballistic missiles). The freeze was intended by the U.S. negotiators to curtail the arms race and improve the climate of international relations, so that later reductions in existing stockpiles of these weapons could be realized. But the Russians never warmed up to the U.S. proposal. Officially, Soviet negotiators said that the proposal was not comprehensive enough (general and complete disarmament was still the goal, they argued, and at least there should be reductions in weapons if the United States was going to be allowed to send inspectors to the Soviet Union). Unofficially, at Pugwash (the conference of scientists held once or twice a year with physical, biological, and social scientists from the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries), Soviet scientists said this was an interesting proposal but that the time was not yet ripe for negotiation.

What that meant was then not completely

clear; but what it probably meant—and subsequent events reinforce this interpretation—is that the Soviet Union was far behind the United States in strategic offensive missile strength (neither side had done much with the production and deployment of defensive weapons systems except in the anti-aircraft field), and, when the Soviets would catch up with the United States, the time would be ripe for negotiation. For the next few years, U.S. intelligence recorded a steady build-up of Soviet offensive strategic strength, not unlike what the United States had started in 1961.

Today, U.S. and Soviet weapons experts affirm that a relatively stable situation has been reached. Each side has enough power to destroy most of the population and industrial capacity of the other, even after absorbing a first strike by the other on its own territory. However, this stability is tenuous.

By its nature, the arms race contains a certain momentum. No sooner has one weapons system been placed into production when others appear on the drawing boards of military and industrial developers. They look for improvements in accuracy, in destructive capacity relative to weight of warhead, and in ability to penetrate another nation's defenses. Since it may take three to seven years, at a rough estimate, before weapons conceived become weapons deployed, the development process goes ahead almost without regard to the political and military situation of any given moment.

If an expert in 1969 is exploring on his drawing board the weapons to be deployed in 1973, how can he anticipate whether the

international political climate will be good or bad four years later? Since he cannot know, he goes ahead with his design. And his industrial superior and his military clients in the Pentagon urge him to use his creative talents lest the U.S. fall behind the U.S.S.R., and now maybe even behind China. But it is just this long lead-time, from the conception of modern weapons to their deployment on land or on submarines, which helps create the momentum of weapons deployment. For once weapons are developed and money has been invested in their eventual production and deployment, it is immensely difficult to halt or subject them to negotiation in an arms-control agreement.

By now it is clear that of all the types of arms-control agreements two are the most successful—and one more so than the other. The most successful arms control agreement is one controlling weapons *before* they have been developed, or controlling a particular environment before weapons have been deployed in it. The various treaties designating Antarctica a weapons-free area and stipulating that no weapons of mass destruction be stationed in outer space are examples of arms control before weapons have been installed. The partial test-ban treaty is an example of another successful type of agreement, in which the major powers have exhausted most of the benefits they can derive from the acts to be controlled by agreement, and hence they are prepared to stabilize development in the area. The nonproliferation treaty is to some extent an example of the first type—limiting the part of the world where nuclear weapons can be produced or possessed.

Finally, the proposed treaty under discussion at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference to prohibit mass-destruction weapons in the sea bed is an attempt to remove another environment from the arms race.

A main reason for the present great interest today in an agreement to prevent the

further production and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) is that this weapons' system has not yet been produced and effectively deployed. Hence, there now seems to be an opportunity for progress in this aspect of arms control before decisions become irrevocable and the momentum for deployment too powerful to stop. Some strategic offensive weapons are in a comparable situation; they are mainly the MIRV's, a nuclear warhead with multiple nuclear explosive parts, each being targeted separately. The MIRV's (technically the initials stand for multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles) might contain many individual warheads to be sent en masse on a mission of destruction. These new weapons, once produced and deployed, would also mean a destabilizing of the nuclear power position of both the United States and the Soviet Union; therefore, both countries are now seeking to determine whether an arms-control agreement at least to freeze deployment and perhaps production of strategic offensive and defensive weapons may be possible.

IN LATE 1966 the United States suggested to the Soviet Union that negotiations begin on limiting the deployment of antiballistic missiles. The Soviet Union also rejected this proposal on the ground that offensive weapons were more dangerous than defensive ones and, therefore, negotiations would have to include both types of weapons. The United States responded in early 1967; it accepted the Soviet modification of its suggestion and was prepared to agree that both types of weapons be the subject of negotiations, but it was not until 1968 that the two countries set a date for opening negotiations.

The United States and the Soviet Union were to begin their discussions in the form of a Summit Conference between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin in Geneva. These discussions were to pave the way for detailed negotiation at the ambassadorial

and technical levels. This meeting was to take place in late August 1968, but on August 21, 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, producing a convulsive reaction throughout the world. President Johnson had wanted to pursue his Summit Conference regardless of the invasion, arguing that a limit on the strategic arms race was necessary despite the Soviet aggression; but he was subjected to tremendous pressure, evidently from Western European capitals, to postpone a Summit. Once President Johnson reluctantly decided that a Summit Conference was out, he refused to sanction any meeting at a lower level. The failure to hold United States-Soviet missile talks between September 1968 and January 1969 is not only unfortunate. It could be tragic. Such discussions must be carefully prepared; arms control is a delicate issue of national security, and there are many agencies in the executive branch of government which must participate in its formulation. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency must devise a preliminary position, which is then sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, various State Department bureaus, the Atomic Energy Commission, the President's Science and National Security advisers, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Once the office of the Joint Chiefs receives a proposal, it must in turn send it for review to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and certain other special offices. Each of these agencies prepares its own position on the ACDA proposal, and then negotiations within the government take place. The final decision as to the content of the U.S. position is made by the President.

Such a process may take anywhere from a month to a year. It is safe to conclude that in this case, because the military stakes are high, it took a long time to develop a U.S. position. Once it was decided not to negotiate until after the change in administrations, the result was certain to be a protracted delay. Obviously, President Nixon and his

new appointees want to develop their own position, and this means that the whole internal negotiating process within the government has had to be cranked into motion once again, so as to reach a new consensus on a negotiating position. But with the instability of the world political situation, it would not be at all inconceivable that a new crisis will be used by one or the other side as a pretext for postponing negotiations.

THE UNITED STATES possesses 1,710 long-range land-based and sea-based offensive missiles; plus about 500 long-range bombers. The Soviet Union now has about 945 long-range offensive missiles, 125 sea-based missiles, and 150 long-range bombers. Numbers are but one factor in the strategic balance; others are payload of the delivery vehicle, its accuracy in landing on target, avoidance of defensive missiles by means of penetration aids and other devices, and the density and location of population and industrial facilities. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are in a kind of strategic balance; neither can destroy the other without itself being destroyed. Deterrence against an attack is thus said to be maintained.

An arms-control agreement would attempt to freeze the strategic "balance." No new offensive or defensive missiles could be deployed. If both sides agreed to freeze their deployment of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, this would be about the simplest kind of agreement to execute. There is great urgency for a favorable conclusion of the negotiations. For, even while they continue, both sides are likely to pursue their weapons development programs and if one side gains an advantage this could endanger the success of even continuance of the negotiations. For example, it would be desirable if the freeze could go into effect before there is further deployment of ABM's on both sides, before the United States moves ahead of the Soviet Union in the strategic offensive field by deploying

MIRV's, and before the Soviet Union goes too far in perfecting its fractional orbiting-bomb system whereby missiles can be placed in orbit briefly and then released to descend down to earth on a mission of destruction.

A simple freeze on deployment can be verified without undue intrusion on Soviet or U.S. territory. The reluctance of the Soviet Union to accept inspection on its territory continues, and so the United States, by proposing a simple deployment freeze as a first step, may be able to avoid the requirement of on-site inspection. Verification by satellite may be sufficient, but in this case the Executive branch will have to release more information than it has to date about the capability of the U.S. satellite inspection system. It must do this in order to persuade two-thirds of the U.S. Senate to consent to ratification of an arms-control treaty that does not provide for on-site inspection. If the deployment freeze includes a freeze on the number of ballistic missiles on submarines, the satellite inspection system may have to be supplemented by other verification measures, perhaps by some kind of reporting system as to the number, size, and approximate location of submarines.

A simple deployment freeze would still permit research, development, and even production of strategic offensive and defensive delivery vehicles. In this sense, the arms race would go on. The spirit of such an arms-control agreement as I have described, however, should pave the way for a production freeze and later an attempt to reduce the number of strategic missiles on both sides. For such an agreement the verification requirements would be greater, and the on-site inspection problem might again emerge. There is some faint hope that if a freeze on deployment works and if the international atmosphere is not heated up by political crises involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the confidence gained would permit such additional arms control. Russians state unofficially that increased confidence

between the two superpowers would help to overcome the opposition of those in the U.S.S.R. (mainly the military and some in high party posts) who hold out against inspection under any conditions. Some Russians have gone as far as to suggest a series of meetings between U.S. and Soviet military officials, so that the level of confidence gained at the diplomatic and scientific levels might in time be transferred to the military sphere.

Both the policy-makers in the U.S. and in the U.S.S.R. seem to desire the same type of agreement in limiting the arms race. This is indeed a favorable development.

In the past, both sides usually approached negotiations so differently that months and years went by before the positions narrowed sufficiently to permit serious negotiations. For example, it took from 1958 to 1963 to negotiate the partial test-ban treaty, and from 1962 to 1968 to negotiate the nonproliferation treaty. While it is not certain that the positions of the two countries are close enough to make an agreement possible within a year or two, the need to preserve and freeze the balance before it is undone by weapons developments may act as a spur to successful negotiations.

Another reason why at least a minimal agreement might be reachable is the change in the climate within both countries. In the Soviet Union there is an unmistakable interest in a mutual slowing-down of the arms race. After having weathered over the past seven years several serious confrontations with the United States on four continents, there is now a recognition at some high Soviet policy levels that it is in the long-range interest of the Soviet Union to evolve peaceful relations with the United States.

In the U.S. a significant change of view has emerged in Congress. The widespread opposition to seeing the Executive branch go ahead with further preparations for the deployment of a so-called thin antiballistic missile system, the Sentinel, is an example of the change in Congressional attitudes. The

Sentinel system would have placed missiles around some 15 cities to guard against ICBM's dispatched from the Soviet Union or China, and this would be supplemented by a Spartan missile system in the outlying areas of the country to knock out incoming missiles outside the atmosphere, thus preventing radioactive fallout from raining down on the local population. A good proportion of the Senate and a growing number in the House believe this system is certainly ineffective against the Soviet Union and possibly against China when that country may be deploying offensive missiles in the mid-1970s. The Senators also are reluctant to pay the multiple billion-dollar cost of the system, particularly in view of its questionable effectiveness. Finally, and perhaps most important, to deploy the Sentinel system during negotiations for a freeze in deployment may jeopardize prospects for agreement.

FOR YEARS the Congress has been pictured as being against negotiating with the Soviet Union; now, for the first time since World War II a possible majority in Congress may be urging the Administration to go slowly in deploying a new weapons system, partly because this may endanger forthcoming arms control negotiations. The Congressional challenge of the proposed antiballistic missile system was undertaken on several occasions during 1968 when various appropriation bills came before Senate. Although the opposition to the ABM lost each time, an important educational process continued to spread doubts about the wisdom of going ahead with deployment plans. Seldom have so many members of the Senate become so informed about a weapons system, its effectiveness, and its relationship to foreign policy, such as the potential of arms-control agreements. The thoroughness with which senators of the opposition presented its case almost silenced those senators who advocated deployment, but a significant aspect of

the latter's concern relates to the Army's effort to preserve its primary strategic mission. The Pentagon is not united in wishing to preserve the ABM. The main advocate of ABM is the Army; the ABM is its only important strategic mission. The Air Force, with its large numbers of strategic offensive weapons (the Minutemen particularly and its proposed modernization program to equip them with MIRV's), and the Navy, with its several hundred Polaris missiles which now are being replaced with Poseidon missiles (similar to MIRV's) are not in the forefront of the ABM struggle. But if members of Congress are beginning to consider a freeze on the further production and deployment of MIRV's and Poseidon, with the consequent threat to Air Force and Navy interests, the debate is likely to change.

Advocates of the ABM are seemingly assisted by pointing to the presence of some kind of an antiballistic system around Leningrad and Moscow. But Senator Cooper, in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1969, reminded Secretary of Defense Laird that the Soviet system was not considered by U.S. military and scientific experts to be much good:

that these were the ABM systems that have been deployed: the Leningrad system which has been dismantled as obsolete; the Tallin system which in the best judgment of the intelligence is not an antiballistic-missile system but an anti-aircraft system . . . and the Galosh system began in 1962 which has been slowed down. . . . Secretary Clifford said the Galosh had about the same capabilities as the old Nike-Zeus which was abandoned. . . .

The Soviet Union in a sense affirmed this dim view of its system when it appealed, on March 13, 1969, to the United States not to move too fast lest the U.S. gain an advantage and upset the precarious balance. The Soviets may be right; but the difficulty their position presents lies in their refusal to release information on the progress of

their own system. They seem content to leave the publicizing of such information up to U.S. Intelligence and the U.S. Executive branch.

Unfortunately, President Nixon in his March 14 statement took the advice of those who feel that a complete halt in deployment plans would hurt the defensive system and would not jeopardize negotiations. He shifted from defense of cities to defense of offensive land-based strategic weapons, but his statement implied a slower pace of deployment around missile sites than the previously projected pace around cities. Whether this is so will require careful observation of Army deployment activities; hopefully, this can be done by a watch-dog committee appointed by Congress. It is a pity that the President could not have used his statement as an opportunity to announce when his Administration would be prepared to enter into missile talks with the Russians.

Let us recall that President Kennedy in 1961 actually entered into negotiations with the Soviets for a nuclear test-ban agreement two months after he took office.

To summarize: if the negotiations for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapons eventually succeed, this could in turn improve the prospects for later agreements for a production stoppage and still later for reductions of stockpiles. To bring this about, the government will have to revise its present strategy of deterrence. Deterrence is now based on the United States' ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, even after absorbing a first strike. To be able to inflict such destruction on over half the population and two-thirds of the industrial capacity of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. maintains a large fleet of relatively invulnerable strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Should subsequent agreements provide for reductions in the existing arsenal of these weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union, a point might be reached where neither side could inflict unacceptable damage because the number of weapons needed

to do this would be destroyed. There is no consensus among weapons experts as to what this level would be; the suggested number ranges from 100-150 strategic delivery vehicles. At the lower end of the range an argument can be made for the installation of an antiballistic missile system to protect the remaining missiles, and that such a decision would be a substitute for the present concept of deterrence. But before improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union reach this point, there is likely to be ample time for decisions about deploying such an ABM system.

The most interesting question in this discussion is whether the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are now prepared to enter into arms-control negotiations on the premise that the outlook for success is greatest when the parties are in relative balance. Previously, the United States had proceeded from the premise that it must have a clear superiority of military power before it can enter into negotiations and expect success from them. To negotiate from a comparative balance of military power rather than a position of superior military strength, could mean that the United States now accepts the Soviet Union as an equal in world politics. If this were so, it would indicate another departure from past policy. Previously, the containment policy of the United States was designed to prevent the encroachment of Soviet influence anywhere in the world. And in the United Nations U.S. policy had been directed to amassing majorities to prevent the Soviet Union from winning political victories.

If these are the emerging bases of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, it probably bodes well for the potential success not only for arms control negotiations but also for talks in the political realm, despite the bemoaning of this development by some pessimists and strong anti-Communists. The next question is whether the two nuclear giants will have the wisdom to negotiate properly with less powerful countries.

Brendan Sexton

"Middle-Class" Workers and the New Politics

A veteran American trade unionist since the founding of industrial unionism, Brendan Sexton is now Director of Education Activities for the United Automobile Workers.

MUCH OF MY LIFE has been split between two worlds: blue-collar unions and the intellectual-academic arena—a sort of long-haired working stiff, or at least an uncommon marginal man.

Born in a tough Irish working-class neighborhood and reared on Catholicism, Irish rebellion, and later socialism, I fell into the life of an organizer during the great depression and the early days of the CIO. As a reader of everything in reach, I have followed with great regret the growing schism between organized labor and middle-class liberals during the past decade. Like others, I was stunned to see the old liberal coalition finally fragment during the Presidential election under the separate discontents of workers (out of sight and mind to most observers, but not, alas, to George Wallace) and the middle-class liberal antagonists of LBJ. What the consequences of the fragmentation will be only Nixon and Agnew may know.

Yet I continue to believe, in my old-fashioned, radical-populist way, that a broad alliance between these two groups at their center remains the best hope for reconstructing our society along democratic-humanist lines.

Many issues need clarifying if we are to halt a national move to the Right. I wish to explore only one here: the assumption that blue-collar workers are "middle-class" and sitting pretty. I'd also like to suggest some of

the political consequences of both the assumption and the reality of workers' lives.

IN DECEMBER of 1967 the "average production worker" with three dependents took home \$90.89 for a full week's work. Measured against the previous year, his dollar income rose about \$2.34 a week. In fact, however, his actual purchasing power *declined by about 6¢ per week*. He was worse off in 1967 than in 1966, and probably even more so in 1968.

Now \$90.89 take-home is not "middle-class," especially if you are an "average" family head with three dependents. If such a man puts aside \$25 a week for house or rent payments (a modest enough sum), he's left with a little less than \$66 a week to pay for food, clothing, medicines, school supplies, etc. for two adults and two children. That comes to roughly \$2.37 per day, per person, for a family of four—about the amount a big-city newspaper reporter (or any of us in the real middle class) is likely to spend for lunch.

These figures are distorted a bit by the inclusion of Southern, and largely unorganized, workers. But in 1967, *manufacturing* workers (most of whom are organized) with three dependents averaged only \$101.26 in take-home pay. As against the previous year, they also experienced a slight dip in real income and purchasing power.

In New York, the locale of many observers who write so expertly about "middle-class" workers, manufacturing workers averaged a gross income of \$114.44. Only in Michigan, among all continental states, where the weekly gross was \$145.78, could an average manufacturing worker come close to the national family median (about \$8,000) with a full year of work.

At the other end of the scale, retail workers averaged just slightly less than \$71 per week during 1967. The retail worker, if he worked a full year, earned a gross income high enough to lift him barely above the "poverty line" of \$3,000, but low enough to leave him with less than half the national family median income. This is the extreme example. Still, there are more than 8 million workers in retail trade. Even when they wear white collars, they can't, at this rate, be factored into the middle class.

Skilled workers are the aristocrats of labor, yet the median earnings of male craftsmen who were employed full-time in 1966 was only \$6,981.* Of course, a good many of the elite and highly organized urban craftsmen—electricians, typographers, lithographers, etc.—rise to and above \$10,000 a year. For a blue-collar worker, this is really "making it." For the new college professor, fresh out of graduate school, it's just so-so.

Where affluence begins and ends no one knows, but it must be above the levels cited. In late 1966, the U.S. Department of Labor said that an income of \$9,191 would enable a city family of four to maintain "a moderate standard of living." Only about one-third of *all* American families reach that now dated standard. Certainly, the typical production worker is much better off than a Mississippi farm tractor driver or a city mother living on welfare, but he hardly lives opulently. He treads water, financially and psychologically.

The myth of the "middle-class" worker is kin to the Negro of folklore who "lives in

the slums but drives a big new Cadillac." He's there, alright, but his numbers are grossly exaggerated.

Workers with small families and two or more paychecks coming in each week may be able to make it. Among all American families with incomes of \$10,000, the multi-incomes are twice as numerous as the single income. Still, millions of families combine two or even three paychecks and yet earn less than \$5,000 a year.

The young worker is hardest hit and hence most discontented. He often holds down the lower paid and more onerous jobs. He is somewhat less likely to work overtime at premium rates and more likely to be caught in temporary layoffs, though in some union contracts he is now protected against loss from the latter.

No less than others of his generation, the young worker expects more. Why not? He belongs to a generation with rapidly rising expectations. As long as he's single, his first paychecks may give him more money than he's ever seen before. He dresses well, owns a new car, and generally lives it up.

But once married, his problems multiply. He furnishes a home, perhaps buys it. He does it "on time." He pays more for furniture and appliances than anyone ever did before. The house that cost his father \$12,000, with a mortgage at 5 percent, now may sell for twice that and be financed at 7 percent. The young married worker age 25 or 30 will probably carry twice the burden of debt as the worker age 40 or 45. When children come, the wife of the young worker will probably drop out of the labor market leaving him as sole support for perhaps 15 or 20 years. In these years, his financial needs increase with the size of his family, but his paycheck does not respond to need.

These economic realities confront workers with a long list of harrowing problems. How, for example, do they provide equal opportunity for their children? How do they shelter them against the draft for four years

* Gaps of a year or more sometimes occur in government statistics. In all cases, I have used the most recent annual reports available.

when the cost of sending a son to the state university now averages nearly \$2,000 a year? *Perhaps less than a quarter of all high school graduates who are children of factory workers enter college.* (The myth that something like half of all young Americans go to college is very nearly unshatterable. Actually, 46.3 percent of the 18- and 19-year-olds, but only 19 percent in the age group of 20-24 are “in school.” U.S. Office of Education reports are so unclear here that I suspect the agency of misleading us regarding the accessibility of college opportunities.)

Children of workers are overrepresented in the mass of those excluded from college. Working-class kids make their trips abroad as members of the armed forces, while some middle-class youths, student deferments in hand, spend a junior year at European universities. While the college boy steps on an escalator that moves rapidly upward, the worker’s son may step on his father’s assembly line and into a job without much promise.

Relatively few colleges, social agencies, schools, or other public institutions mount programs to meet special needs of workers. In many places, even the services provided by “Red Feather” agencies seem more closely geared to middle- than working-class needs.

Inevitably, many workers come to feel they are being dunned and taxed for the benefit of others. Considering the notorious imbalance of our tax structure, they have a point. *In general, the rate of taxation declines as income rises.* This is most obviously true of the state sales taxes. It is almost as true of the federal income tax, under which, in the most extreme cases, some individuals and corporations pay little or no tax at all, though their incomes may exceed \$5 million annually. Estimates of total tax loads indicate that 33 percent of the income of those earning \$3,000 to \$5,000 goes to taxes, and only 28 percent of those earning \$15,000 or more.

SO WE HAVE the case of the “invisible” and aggrieved worker. Many of his breed are even found among Mike Harrington’s invisible poor. In fact, about one-third of all heads of impoverished families hold down full-time jobs. They are generally not organized, but they are workers. While millions of workers live in poverty, millions more barely escape it. Most are in income brackets between \$3,000 and \$10,000 (which includes some 56 percent of all American families), with probably more workers near the bottom than the top.

Reporters often talk about the sweeper who “makes more than a teacher.” True, a sweeper in an auto plant in Michigan or New Jersey probably earns more than a teacher in a backwoods school in Mississippi, but his pay is hardly a pot of gold. The sweeper seems to fit a set of hidden assumptions according to which the society is divided, at a magical line, between rich and poor. The premise of this stereotype is that our class structure is a dualism—rich and poor. In this simplified pseudo-Marxian schema, organized workers are seen as part of the richer half, along with bankers, businessmen, professionals. They are, it is assumed, well-fed, well cared for, up to their hips in “things,” and all-around partners in an open and affluent society.

According to this hidden assumption, all or nearly all the poor are black. They are mostly mothers of large families living on welfare in big city ghettos. The rest (except for a few Appalachian whites) are young blacks who can’t find jobs because they are school dropouts or because they are excluded from unions by corpulent and corrupt union bosses. So goes this version of things, especially popular in some college circles. But in fact about 80 percent of the poor are white, and a startling proportion of them work full-time.

In real life the typical worker has lived on a treadmill, except where union contracts have protected him from rises in the cost of

living. Everyone else—including the poor and the militant blacks (at least as their image was cast by the media)—*seemed* to be moving forward, while only *they* stood still, waiting in a twilight zone somewhere between hunger and plenty. Some comforts came to them through expanded consumer credit, but the credit exacted high costs in tension, insecurity, and interest rates. They gave increasing taxes to the government, their sons to the army. They seemed to get little in return: only conflict, and sometimes mortal combat with the emerging black poor over jobs, neighborhoods, and schools.

Here is fertile soil for the growth of resentment. For a time, it grew like a weed under the cultivation of George Wallace. A turning point in the Presidential campaign may have come when Hubert Humphrey began to see something Wallace always understood: that while many “experts” said the “old issues” were dead, millions of American workers angrily disagreed and wanted a better life. Many workers were ready, in short, for a campaign resembling Harry Truman’s historical effort of 1948, a hell-raising campaign about the “old” economic issues (social justice, more and better jobs, more opportunity, good schools, health care, etc.).

The trap almost sprung by Wallace was set by those “opinion-makers” who dismissed all Wallace supporters as red-necked bigots and opponents of Negro aspirations. Fortunately, they were mistaken. While many workers have no doubt been shook up quite a bit by the black revolt, they have been even more shaken by their own failure to get on in life. Being far wiser than we think, they knew this was not the fault of blacks.

Sadly, some of the Wallaceite resentment was, of course, turned against the poor and the black. Yet it is possible that Wallace’s exposed bigotry finally did him in among Northern workers. Industrial workers generally have closer relations with Negroes than any other class, and the big factories in steel,

auto, rubber, glass, etc., are probably the most integrated work places in the society. Most workers who were drawn to Wallace because he spoke their economic language must have had problems of conscience about blacks with whom they worked and had friendly relations. As Wallace’s campaign became more violent in tone, many of them probably grew uneasy and fell away from his camp.

When “opinion-makers” bothered to talk with workers, they found to their surprise that not all were racists. After talking with Wallace supporters in Flint, Michigan (said to be a hot-bed of Wallace sentiment), Mike Hubbard, a student editor of the *University of Michigan Daily*, wrote:

Certainly these Americans do not identify with red-necked racism. . . . No one ever taught them Negro History, but they grew up with blacks. . . . They don’t dislike blacks, they just feel black men shouldn’t be given a bigger break than anyone else. The white UAW members as a whole do not believe Wallace is a racist. All they know is what he told them, and he never said he hated blacks. Even the most militant Negro workers I talked to didn’t feel there was large-scale prejudice in the Union. They dislike Wallace, but not the men who are voting for him.

Others found many Wallace supporters who would have preferred Robert Kennedy, and some even Eugene McCarthy. *Time* found many such in its 150 interviews across the country, and Haynes Johnson of the *Washington Star* reported this comment from a leader of the Wallace movement in Duluth, Minnesota: “The reason I got into this actually was when Robert Kennedy was shot. . . . That assassination—plus that of Martin Luther King—pointed up for me just how sick it was in this country, and I decided to do something for my country.”

THE “NEW ISSUES”—the war on poverty and bureaucracy, the struggles for racial justice and world peace—can be lost unless

they are paralleled by campaigns on issues that are important to those millions who are often ignored except by demagogues.

The mythology that obscures the realities of working-class life derives in large part from the success story of unions and what various observers have made of that story. Unions have made great gains in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, politics; but they started from very far back, and they are still very far from the millennium. Since our society has been late and miserly in providing social insurance, unions have had to push hard in collective bargaining for benefits that don't show up in pay checks. Their focus on such goals has had some negative side effects. Fringe benefits mean more to older than to younger workers—and it is the young who are drawn to men like George Wallace.

Unless unions were to act irresponsibly toward the aging (one of the most impoverished and helpless groups among us), pensions had to be won. Pensions cost money, and that money was subtracted from the wage package won at the bargaining table. Also, older workers need and make more use of hospitalization, medical and sickness insurance. These too came out of the total package, leaving less for wages. It was humane to help the older worker, and it helped him retire and make way for younger workers. But it was costly. *In the UAW alone, more than 200,000 members have retired and received pension benefits of over \$1.5 billion.* Unions sometimes may have overresponded to the older workers, as in seniority and vacation benefits, etc., but one can hardly look at the life of the aging worker and say he has too much.

Unions need to make a new beginning, paying more attention to the needs of the young. An aging and sometimes feeble union leadership needs to refresh itself with activists and new leadership recruited among younger generations. Unless the young become partners in the union movement, they

may end up wrecking it. The dramatic rise in the rate of rank-and-file rejection of union contract settlements is a clear signal of distress among workers. Usually, veteran unionists report, the increased rejections result from organized opposition among young workers.

Unions need to do a lot of things, far more than I can mention in this brief piece. I come from a union that has split from the AFL over some of these issues, including foreign policy, interest in the poor and minorities, and general militancy. I have opposed the Vietnam War, and I think labor should have. I have been involved in the war on poverty, along with many other unionists—though it is remote from many others. Still, one observer says, “If the labor movement in this country moves to the Right, it's not least the fault of those, like Sexton, who will not say a word of criticism of its policies.” I leave nothing to the imagination of readers, for we are all deeply aware of the shortcomings of unions. I do not dwell on these flaws for another reason: whatever their blemishes, unions have given workers the only support and attention they have had—and they needed a lot.

Unions are, however, limited in what they can do for members. They are limited by their own willingness and that of their members to go into battle, to strike. They are limited by the public's willingness to accept strikes. The middle-class liberal himself is often offended, sometimes outraged, by strikers. He may say, “They're selfish and out for themselves.” When the desperately poor hospital worker strikes, the liberal will see only the patient as victim; but he will offer no clues as to how else the hospital worker can win a measure of justice. When subway and sanitation workers in New York strike for a modest \$3.50 or so an hour (to perform some of the most disagreeable jobs known to man), many middle-class liberals complain bitterly, without also noting that New York's affluent can afford to pay men

decent wages to do hard, often dangerous, always unpleasant work.

Many liberals dismiss as unimportant, if not irrelevant, every claim workers make for their attention and support. In few cases do they distinguish workers from union leaders, for some of whom their contempt may be warranted. It is not surprising, considering their mentors, that so much of the young New Left seems to despise the working class.

Not since the early and dramatic days of the CIO have liberals and intellectuals (with some honorable exceptions) shown much sympathetic interest in workers or unions. Now workers come sharply to their view only when they threaten to make life inconvenient or dangerous. A subway strike, shutdown at *The New York Times*, a large vote for Wallace may do the trick—momentarily.

I BELIEVE THAT LIBERALS and moderate leftists—in whose circle opinion-makers are heavily represented—are out of touch with the reality of American working-class life. Many of them live at rarified levels where almost everyone's income is at least \$15,000 a year. *Less than ten percent of the nation's families earn that much*; still, they form a mass of between 18 and 20 million people. Those who live within it can easily come to think that all Americans, except the poor, are living just about as they and their colleagues and neighbors do. Having little contact outside their own circles, and having heard so much about the great gains of unions, they may naturally assume that workers have made it too.

Many of these opinion-makers are men of my generation or near it. Forgetting the ravages of inflation, they may think of \$6,000 a year as a fairly substantial income. They may remember maintaining a modest existence on even less. I recall that I was 35 years old when I first earned \$5,000 a year as president of the nation's second largest local union. Now when I hear that auto workers gross more than \$8,000, I too some-

times forget the dollar's decline and assume they've got it made. Relative to most other workers, they have; but they are still far from well-off. These opinion-makers greatly influence what appears in periodicals and dailies, and what is said on TV and radio. They often draft political platforms and write candidates' speeches. When they don't, their readers do. They think of themselves as open-minded and sensitive, and sometimes they are. But too often their politics are introspective—concentrated only on issues that touch them, plus a now fashionable interest in the poor.

Their political attitudes are sometimes expressed in the kind of thin-lipped and vinegary liberalism that found its ultimate expression in Senator McCarthy's endorsement of Hubert Humphrey. To the dismay of at least one early supporter—me—McCarthy urged in that endorsement that the rights of honest draft dissenters be protected but said nothing about the draft's discrimination against Negroes, the poor, and the working class, and made no significant comments about other social and economic issues. The Senator's failure to ignite fires outside the middle class can easily be understood in the light of that arid statement. In the primary campaign his speeches (at least in the printed text) were often unexceptionable; but, notoriously, he often left unsaid what decent liberals and radicals on his staff wrote into those speeches. Later in the campaign, and in the Senate leadership fight, the warts on that handsome liberal façade grew larger.

Senator McCarthy, like some who supported him, had to subdue his conscience before endorsing Hubert Humphrey, yet he has always seemed comfortable with Senator William Fulbright, a man whose record on civil rights almost duplicates George Wallace's except for greater gentility of expression.* (A friend explained to me that he

* I don't wish to downgrade Senator Fulbright's obvious courage. We are all in his debt. Some young Americans may owe him their lives. I do wish to point out that liberal and radical intel-

could support Fulbright because the Senator had “style,” a matter of overriding merit to many liberals.) Finally, petulance and spleen seemed to consume this hero of the middle-class liberals when he chose Long over Kennedy.

THE CHEMISTRY of the Kennedys has been different. The contrast is highlighted in Senator Edward Kennedy’s appeal to supporters of his two slain brothers to reject the “dark” and “extremist” movement of George Wallace.

Most of these people [Kennedy said of Wallace supporters] are not motivated by racial hostility or prejudice. They feel that their needs and their problems have been passed over by the tide of recent events. They bear the burden of the unfair system of Selective Service. They lose out because higher education costs so much. They are the ones who feel most threatened at the security of their jobs, the safety of their families, the value of their property and the burden of their taxes. They feel the established system has not been sympathetic to them in their problems of everyday life and in a large measure they are right.

If a meaningful New Politics is to work in this country it must be based on the kind of empathy expressed in these words.

Too few liberals realize that millions of workers and voters fit Ted Kennedy’s description. Young workers outnumber all college students, and there are perhaps 15 or 20 of them for every one disaffected youth upon whom various advocates of a New Politics are counting. The big three in auto alone employ about 250,000 workers who are 30 or under. Total UAW membership of that age group may reach 600,000, with perhaps half of these under 25. Among organized workers, possibly 5 million are young people under 30.

lectuals of principle are also capable of compromise, though their evaluation of issues may differ from the trade unionists or even the black militants.

Young workers seem to be tougher and to have more staying power than students. Their stake in social change may turn out to be greater and more compelling. Most will never experience the softening effects of well-paid, high-status jobs in the professional, academic, artistic, or business worlds—jobs to which most student rebels are on their way. Knowing they’re unlikely to escape individually, workers can grow desperate when denied political hope.

One pollster puts many workers in the “no change” coalition. He misunderstands. Workers simply oppose changes that benefit or seem to benefit others while increasing their own burdens.

The auto industry average wage of \$3.80 per hour, though the highest in manufacturing, still does not mean affluence. The UAW (like many other unions) has won comprehensive medical protection, including coverage for psychiatric care of a million members. Its contracts now provide tuition remission plans for members who wish to take classes that may help them escape from dead-end factory jobs. In December of 1968, the hourly wage system came close to ending for perhaps a million UAW members; thus, in one industry, workers have almost scaled an important barrier between them and the middle class; they will be salaried rather than hourly workers. UAW contracts have moved toward the guaranteed annual income and retirement with decent security. Gains have been made, yes; but even auto workers still have far to go.

ONE FRIEND TELLS ME, “intellectuals still cling to a hopeful and perhaps incorrect view, idealizing the union members as an instrument of class struggle.” What members and their unions try to do, at best, is not class struggle in any classic sense. Their conscious antagonists are the employer and the conservative legislator, not the “capitalist system.” Yet their efforts have profoundly influenced American life. And

unionists have tasted enough of victory so that they generally do not believe in the "final conflict" for which the "prisoners of starvation" must arise.

Those publicists who seek such an apocalypse will not find unionists mounting the barricades with the swiftness and pleasure of student rebels or black militants. Unionists have learned a hard lesson after almost a century of fierce blood-letting on the picket line: *that combat is the last, not the first, resort*. Unionists have possibly been too moderate in this respect, for open conflict sometimes is the only way to rally people and get what you want. But they have learned many other good ways to get on with it. They will not be found burning down their own neighborhoods to prove a point, or otherwise sacrificing their own ranks in unproductive, self-destructive conflict. In this respect, interestingly, some black militants seem to be taking a rather active interest in labor studies.

Most militants, coming from poor families, are interested in the "old issues" (opportunity, jobs, etc.) and in ways of organizing people for effective action. A similar interest in unions has not come to the campus, thanks to the myth of the middle-class worker and other academic folklore. (My wife and I taught a graduate sociology course at NYU last year in Labor and Society. So far as I know—outside the narrow limits of labor-and-industrial programs—it is the *only* such course taught in the country.)

Workers and their unions have many problems and they need lots of help. On the other side, the middle-class Left may find itself isolated if it accepts the standard mythology about workers. If they are to create a New Society, liberals and radicals need to become aware of socially excluded workers and find avenues of communication with them, as well as with Negroes, Latin Americans, and the oppressed poor generally.

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The Reign of Virtue

Thoughts on China's Cultural Revolution

"When societies first come to birth," says Montesquieu, "it is the leader who produces the institutions. Later it is the institutions which produce the leaders."

Whoever would undertake to give institutions to a people must work with full consciousness that he has set himself to change, as it were, the very stuff of human nature, to transform each individual who, in isolation, is a complete but solitary whole, into a part of something greater than himself, from which, in a sense, he derives his life and his being, to substitute a communal and moral existence for a purely physical and independent life with which we are all of us endowed by nature.

—J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book II, Chapter VII

 ONE OF THE MOST arresting aspects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been the confrontation between Mao Tse-tung (or the Maoist group) and the Chinese Communist party. There is, to be sure, an area of vagueness and uncertainty concerning this whole matter. Have the Maoists attacked the party as such? What indeed is the party as such? The party may be conceived of as the sum total of its actual members—of its human composition. It may be conceived of in terms of its organizational structure—its "constitution," rules, and established mechanisms. To any genuine Marxist-Leninist, it is, of course, more than its cells and anatomy. It is a metaphysical organism which is more than the sum of its parts. The "soul" of this collective entity incarnates all those intellectual and moral capacities which Marx had attributed to the industrial proletariat.

Now there can be no doubt whatsoever that the Maoists have carried out a frontal assault on the human apparatus on the highest,

the middle, and perhaps even the basic levels of party organization, at least in urban areas. There is also considerable evidence that party structures and mechanisms are in a shambles and that even where they survive, as in the rump Central Committee and army party branches, they have ceased to be an important vehicle of decision-making. The whole discussion of "party building," which was a prominent theme at the end of 1967 and the early part of 1968, indicates the degree of party wrecking which has been going on. The area of uncertainty is the third miasmic area of the party as an ontological category—as a whole which may persist, whatever the fate of its parts. In this area, it does not appear likely that the Maoist group is prepared to jettison the sacred label.

It is interesting to note that in another sector of what is still vaguely called the Communist world, the possibility of eliminating the role of the party as such has emerged. In Régis Debray's book *Revolution in the Revolution?*, which is now regarded as a textbook of Castro ideology, we find the following striking assertions:

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Fidel says simply that there is no revolution without a vanguard but that this vanguard is not necessarily the Marxist-Leninist Party.¹ . . . The effective leadership of an armed revolutionary struggle requires a new style of leadership, a new method or organization.² . . . Parties are never anything but instruments of class struggle. Where the instrument no longer serves its purpose should the class struggle come to a halt or should new instruments be forged?³ [Debray suggests that] an end be put to the plethora of commissions, secretariats, congresses, conferences, plenary sessions, meetings and assemblies at all levels—provincial, regional and local. Faced with a state of emergency and a militarily organized enemy such a mechanism is paralyzed at best, catastrophic at worst.⁴ . . . There is no exclusive ownership of the revolution.⁵ . . . Eventually the future People's Army will beget the party of which it is to be theoretically the instrument. Essentially the party is the army.⁶

Debray, to be sure, is discussing the period of revolutionary struggle, and his doctrine is not incompatible with the view that after the victory a party of the Communist type may be established. In some ways, however, M. Debray's assertions seem most applicable to China's Cultural Revolution. The Maoists insist that China is in a permanent state of revolutionary class struggle and that the party both in terms of its human composition and as a structure has gone radically astray. Is it not possible that the Maoists are also ready to eliminate the party's role in history as an instrument which "no longer serves its purpose?"

As against this possibility, however, one must note the fact that the concept of the Communist party is now part of Chinese Communist sacred history, and that in press-

ing their own canonized revolutionary experience as the exclusive model for the Third World, the Chinese must inevitably stress the role of the party in the revolutionary struggle. In Latin America, indeed, this brings them into direct collision with the Castro-Debray line which tends to express a studied contempt for the "pro-Chinese" groups in Latin America. The Maoists are constrained by their own history to reject Debray's elimination of the party in the revolutionary struggle.

There is also the need to refute the current Soviet line on events in China. The Soviets have flatly asserted in their polemics that the "Maoist group" is bent on the destruction of the Chinese Communist party.⁷ The Chinese party has, to be sure, always been defective, we are told, given its woefully weak proletarian base, but it was after all born under the inspiration of the October Revolution and for many years was guided by the directives of the Comintern. Even after 1949, it received much sound guidance from Moscow. Unfortunately, the petty bourgeois Maoist group was able to establish its ascendancy and is now bent on destroying it. One may still hope, however, that the bulk of party leaders now in opposition will ultimately be able to restore the party to its legitimate role and also, hopefully, recognize Moscow's spiritual hegemony. In their discussion of the Cultural Revolution they have also dwelt at great length on the Maoist violation of party constitutionality.

In the face of these Soviet efforts to identify themselves with the "legitimate" CCP heritage, the Maoists must deny Moscow's claims. In a statement attributed to a "Stalin group"—a revolutionary organization in the Soviet Union⁸—we find a condemnation of "Soviet revisionist calumnies that China's

¹ Régis Debray, *Revolution in the Revolution?* (Grove Press), p. 78.

² *Ibid.* p. 101.

³ *Ibid.* p. 104.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 102.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 125.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 105.

⁷ See for instance "Gel'bras o stanovlenii voennoburokrazticeskoi diktatury v Kitae" ("On the Establishment of a Military Bureaucratic Dictatorship in China"), *Narody Asii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1968.

⁸ NCNA Service in English, May 14, FBIS No. 95, Vol. 1.

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is 'directed against the Chinese Communist party.' . . . The fact that the broadest masses of the people are taking part in the cultural revolution together with the party does not in the least impair the prestige of the CCP."

What is more, unlike Castro and Debray, the Maoist group (including such people as Ch'en Po-ta and Kang Sheng) cannot but be profoundly conscious of the weight of the concept of the "Communist party" in the history of Marxism-Leninism since 1917. Far from being a dispensable element, it lies at the very heart of Leninism. It was Lenin who insisted after 1917 that only Marxist-Leninist parties could act as the vanguard of the proletariat. It was Lenin who insisted that the party structure be imposed on all "vanguards" abroad. It was Lenin who insisted that no revolution could be called socialist unless led by Communist parties and it was during Lenin's lifetime that the ultimate authority of the international Communist movement became lodged in one center on the basis of a logic inherent in Communist party organization. The Maoist group in China is still bent on capturing for itself this transnational Marxist-Leninist authority, and it is most difficult to see how it can do so if it abandons the very concept of the Marxist-Leninist party.

And yet, the uncertainty of the Maoist attitude toward party organization in China can be most graphically illustrated by the uncertainty of Peking's relations to its own Maoist followers in Belgium and France. In Belgium, the so-called "Rittenberg case" has thrown a glaring light on some of the issues involved. Sidney Rittenberg, an American Maoist of long standing residing in Peking, in the summer of 1967 wrote a pamphlet excoriating Jacques Grippa, the recognized leader of the Belgian Maoists, for his defense of Liu Shao-ch'i's "How to be a Good Communist." Grippa has, in turn, vehemently attacked Rittenberg and whoever may stand behind him, for attacking the Leninist prin-

ciples of party organization in the name of a "cult or idolatry with regard to a leader."⁹ Grippa (a former Stalinist) is committed to the party not only as a moral entity but as a Leninist structure. He is able to cull many telling citations from Lenin stressing the importance which Lenin attached to organizational principles and party rules. The essence of those quotations is that the forms of party organization are part of the very essence of what the party is. One would gather that Grippa's standing in Peking is now very much under a cloud.

In France there are at least three "Maoist" groups, only one of which has constituted itself as a Marxist-Leninist party of the conventional type, while at least one of the other groups has refused to acknowledge that the older party structure is any longer valid. It is apparently unclear whether any of these groups has as yet obtained Peking's official sanction. In all this, however, the issue is not necessarily whether the term "party" is to remain in use, but whether the old structure is to survive, or whether structure as such is to play a central role in a Maoist political universe.

WHEN WE TURN our attention to recent developments in China itself as they are refracted through the murky media of the Cultural Revolution, one notes that at the end of 1967 and at the beginning of 1968 there are many references in the literature to "party building." It is significant that even this literature hints that the party will somehow be restructured. We also note, however, some discussion of the convening of the Ninth Party Congress, an act which would presumably once again place the seal of party "legality" on whatever state of affairs would prevail at the time of its meeting. Chou En-lai is alleged to have asked, on November 11, a delegation of proletarian revolutionaries from Canton: "Haven't you

⁹ See *Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)* 44, 204, January 31, 1968, *passim*.

discussed the subject of the Ninth Party Congress set for next year?"¹⁰ This question would indicate, as one might suspect, that Chou at least is strongly committed to a return to as much organizational normalcy as possible under the prevailing conditions.

It is entirely possible that the Maoist group itself is interested in rebuilding the party in some form or other.¹¹ But it is by no means as interested as others in restoring power to the bulk of the former membership, or in rebuilding the entire former machinery, or even in restoring its position of centrality in the polity. The question would thus not be one of whether the party should be rebuilt, but how it should be rebuilt.

One may, of course, assume that the question of how the party should be built was by no means entirely theoretical. Undoubtedly, it was intertwined with the most ferocious power struggle. One would assume that former cadres would be most insistent on "party legality" and the sacred character of party structure, and that the Maoists would be infinitely less committed to the "institutional charisma" of the party. The very *Red Flag* editorial of July 9, 1967,¹² which attempts to refute the charge that the Maoists do not "desire the leadership of the party," makes it crystal clear that whatever charisma the party may possess derives solely from the person and thought of Mao Tse-tung. It is made painfully clear that the party derives its legitimacy from Mao Tse-tung and not vice versa. Any notion that Mao Tse-tung must legitimize his cultural revolution through established party procedures is, in my view, not based on a correct reading of cultural revolutionary doctrine. Mao himself is the source of legitimacy and so long as his group remains more or less at the helm, he can legitimize any structure.

¹⁰ Cited in the Hong Kong Consulate publication *Current Scene*, Vol. VI, No. 4, "The CCP—Orphan of Mao's Storm."

¹¹ One may speculate that some of the "ultra-leftists" actually may have conceived of the possibility of doing away with the party entirely.

¹² *Hung Ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 11, July 9, 1967.

In recent months the discussion of party building has again receded, and one tends to feel that there has been no resolution of the conflicts surrounding the whole issue. Instead of discussions of party building there has been a resurgence of attacks on the "right"—of those nefariously attempting to "reverse verdicts." The "revolutionary committees" formerly treated as a provisional device seem to be emerging more and more (whatever they may be in actuality) as Mao's chosen vehicle of "proletarian dictatorship." If present trends continue, they may themselves become the constituent units of any rebuilt party. Concretely, this would mean that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and proven nonparty "proletarian revolutionaries" would play a dominant role at the heart of any reconstituted party.

In discussing these matters, we find ourselves *in medias res* and it would be futile to predict the future. The crux of the matter is not whether the party survives in some form, but whether it can ever recover its central sacred character. The whole thrust of the Cultural Revolution has been to devalue and diminish its significance. The phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" has never been used more obsessively, and yet it is made crystal clear that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the Communist party are by no means interchangeable terms. Just as the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" has long since been sundered from any actual reference to industrial workers, the cultural revolution has now demonstrated that the particular "general will" which it represents is quite detachable from the particular organization known as the Communist party. For almost two years now we have been told that the dictatorship of the proletariat has been borne by the "Red Guards," by the PLA (the "main pillar of the dictatorship"), and a whole assortment of nonparty "proletarian revolutionaries." We have even been told that the battle between the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "dictatorship of the

bourgeoisie" takes place within the arena of each individual soul. Far from possessing those self-purgative and self-regenerative powers that had always been attributed to it in the past, we find that the party must be "reproletarianized" from without—by Mao Tse-tung standing above it and by the "revolutionary masses" standing below.

The fact that the PLA has become the "main pillar" of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" can, of course, be explained in quite mundane terms. In turning on the party, Mao and his supporters have been forced to fall back on the army. However, as we are all aware, it is by no means clear that the army as a whole is as solid a pillar as Mao would like it to be nor as thoroughly imbued with proletarian virtue. Assertions about the proletarian virtue of the army like many statements of this type reflect not so much the complex actuality as the normative reality—the way things ought to be and will in good time become. Whatever its actual power role, however, the faith in the army as the bearer of proletarian virtue certainly antedates the cultural revolution. We have the recent effort of the early sixties to turn the army into a model of Maoist behavior, and behind that one has the central role of the army in the whole history of the party since the early thirties. From the vantage point of the present, one is tempted to observe that Mao may have always implicitly

regarded the PLA as much of a bearer of proletarian virtue as the party itself. The isolated guerrilla fighter sacrificing his very life for the people has always been as much the epitome of higher virtue as the hard-working cadre.

It is, of course, entirely possible that with the demise of Mao or a reversal in the fortunes of the Maoist group, there will be an effort to restore the party to its central position in Chinese life and to re-establish all its sanctified organizational forms. As already indicated, men such as Chou En-lai are probably deeply conscious of the role of the party in Marxist-Leninist Communism. The fact remains that the Cultural Revolution has unmasked many truths which will not be easily forgotten, particularly by the young who have participated in recent events. The party may not have engaged in all the heinous bureaucratic crimes attributed to it in Red Guard newspapers, but its profane nature as simply another bureaucratic organization devoid of any inbuilt proletarian grace or powers of self-redemption now stands revealed. The institutional charisma will not easily be restored.*

* Since the completion of this essay, there have been significant new developments. The enlarged Twelfth Party Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress was held in October 1968 and the task of "rebuilding the party" was again placed on the agenda. It has definitely been announced that the Ninth Party Congress will be held in 1969. Again, one is tempted to speculate that some of the major pressures for this "rebuilding" may come from those opposed to the inner Maoist group (particularly from former party people). Yet as stated above, there is no reason to assume that the Maoist group is opposed to some sort of recrystallization of the "party." The crux of the matter would still be not so much whether a "party" should be rebuilt but what form such a party should take. Current statements from the mainland would indicate that if the Maoists have their way, the cult of Mao and of his thought will reign supreme. The party will derive whatever luster it may have from the leader. The party organization will be changed in significant ways and the mechanisms of election will play no great role. It is also implied that in some fashion the "revolutionary committees" will continue to function either inside or alongside of the party.

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Historic Perspectives—Western and Chinese

INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING to discern an unpredictable future, what I shall attempt in the balance of this article is an effort to see whether the notions which lie behind the Maoist attack on the CCP and behind the Cultural Revolution in general can be related to certain larger perspectives and contexts of ideas. If we are dealing with what many take to be a kind of madness, is this madness unique to Mao or does it relate in any way to a larger history of ideas—Western or Chinese? Is it indeed Western or Chinese, or may it be said to feed on both cultural traditions?

In focusing on ideas and their genealogy, there is no intention of implying that the Cultural Revolution, or the conflict between the party and the leader is solely a result of ideas in the head of Mao, or to deny the role of power struggles, psychological motives, or "objective factors." Mao's retreat to the "second line" of power during the years since 1959 may have been voluntary, or involuntary, or partially voluntary. Even if it was essentially voluntary (and I lean to the view that it was), the fact that the "first line" leaders of the party were moving in a direction that the leader regarded as radically mistaken was, of course, not only an offense to his own vision of China's future, but also an offense to an enormous swollen sense of self-esteem which had become indissolubly tied up with this vision. The vision may be only one ingredient in the total complex. It is, however, an essential ingredient, and on this ingredient we shall concentrate our attention.

Mao Tse-tung has found that the CCP, both in its human composition and as an organizational structure, has failed at least for a time to embody the qualities of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The latter phrase presumably designates the "social bearer" of certain social virtues and capacities, but in current Maoist usage it often seems to refer to the assemblage of the

virtues themselves—selflessness in the "service of the people," lack of self-interest, austerity, singularity of purpose, implacable hostility to the forces of evil however defined, etc. The question of who the actual bearers of this "general will" are has indeed become a crucial problem of the Cultural Revolution.

In seeking out the provenance of these notions I shall concentrate attention in the first instance on the possible Western origins, precisely because of the tendency among Western "pragmatic" academics to see something peculiarly Chinese in Mao's highly moralistic rhetoric. Furthermore, in dealing with Western sources, it will no longer suffice to confine our attention to the specificities of Marxist-Leninist ideology. As the Marxist-Leninist ideology moves into a period of advanced disintegration one becomes more and more conscious of some of the more general notions which lie behind Marxism-Leninism, notions which have become embodied in specific ways within the Marxist-Leninist complex (as well as in other ideologies) but whose origins go back at least as far as the enlightenment. These general notions have indeed proved more enduring than the specific ideologies within which they have found a lodging. Our particular quest here indeed leads us back as far as Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Jacobin effort to apply the doctrine of that fruitful but ambiguous thinker.

It is not at all a question of whether Mao Tse-tung was ever a profound student of Rousseau or Jacobinism. There can be little doubt that in his youth he read about both but one need not argue any intimate contact. The significance of Rousseau here is that he gives a highly vivid expression to more general tendencies which can make their way without any intimate contact with the great thinker himself. In the case of Mao, one can indeed maintain that Marxism-Leninism itself has been a bearer of the strains of thinking with which we are concerned.

Turning back to Rousseau we find that,

as Burke states, "Rousseau is nothing if not a moralist." Many of his contemporaries, such as Turgot, D'Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, were overwhelmingly concerned with the progress of the "arts and sciences" and regarded moral progress as a by-product of the accumulation of human knowledge. Rousseau, however, was overwhelmingly concerned, in the first instance, with the question of how to make society virtuous and just. Amid the sophisticated and hedonistic libertines of the enlightened aristocracy and the new intelligentsia, he felt he himself represented the essential innocence of a man of the people and the sturdy virtues of a citizen of Geneva. The others were social engineers concerned with how arts and sciences could be mobilized to render society felicitous. He was overwhelmingly concerned with society's moral progress; he had actually found in his "Discourses in the Arts and Sciences" and "Discourses on the Origins of Human Inequality" that the arts and sciences (technico-economic progress) as they had developed until his time had actually run counter to moral progress and contributed to all the corruptions of society. His own "civic morality" was not a "new morality" but a morality based on a kind of Plutarchian exaltation of ancient Roman and Spartan virtues. His good society would be peopled by men who would abnegate their private interests for the public good, men constantly inspired by a sense of duty to their country, men who would sacrifice themselves without stint, and men who would live simple and austere lives. It is interesting to note that as the spiritual father of modern nationalism (although again, the "antique" example is here of overwhelming importance) Rousseau exalts the martial virtues and even praises hatred of the national enemy as a unifying cement of the sovereign people's will.

What makes Rousseau's ethic modern and revolutionary is, however, his lack of belief in the power of the individual to realize his

potentiality for virtue through his own individual efforts and his consequent tendency to link ethics indissolubly to politics. In his own individual life he had discerned how impossible it is for a good man to realize his moral potentialities within a bad society. "I saw," he stated in his *Confessions*, "that everything depended basically on political science, and that no matter how one views the problem, every people is just what its government makes it. What form of government is most suited to produce a nation which is virtuous, enlightened and wise—in short, in the highest sense of the word, as perfect as possible?"¹³ The individual can realize his moral potential only by submerging himself in that larger "moral entity," the people. The people as a collectivity is not only the source of all sovereignty but also of all virtue. It is only when the individual will somehow become fused with the "general will" that the individual's own moral potential can be realized. The question of how—in concrete political terms—the "general will" comes to be internalized in the individual is, of course, one of the central enigmas of Rousseau's political thought and has been the subject of a vast literature. While related to the modern sociological view that the individual derives his "values" from "society" it is, of course, much more activist and political. What it asserts is that in some fashion the state is or should be the moralizing agency of human society. Its meaning is relatively clear when applied to an idealized ancient Rome and Sparta, where citizens presumably expressed their "general will" in face-to-face primary assemblies and where the decisions of majorities were, in Rousseau's view, actually inspired by virtue. Even here he was forced to introduce a transcendent element in the form of that eighteenth-century device, the all-wise "legislator." It was Lycurgus who created an all-wise constitution and system of law which shaped the Spartans to virtue.

¹³ Cited in Cassirer's *Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Beacon Press Paperback), p. 154.

"Of itself," we are told, "the people wishes the good; of itself it does not always see it."¹⁴ Many enigmas emerge, of course, when this notion is applied to the modern nation-state. The question of how the virtue of the people is achieved in these vast societies is dealt with most cursorily by Rousseau and indeed he often expresses doubt whether social virtue is attainable in societies of this size.

IN SPITE of its imprecision, the concept of a society in which the organized people would be able to crush all selfish individual group and factional interests and infuse its individual members with public virtue was to prove most powerful. The attempt to realize this ideal within the framework of the modern nation-state was, of course, to fall to Robespierre, St. Just, and Babeuf who found that the mere elimination of established vested interests and privileges as embodied in the old order did not automatically actualize the general will. Furthermore, as legislators of the general will they soon found that Rousseau's sharp distinction between the legislator who creates the general laws of the good state but who does not attempt to implement them and the "executive power" which applies them was to prove completely inapplicable in practice. Before one could even begin to create good laws, it was necessary to eliminate the manifestation of individual, group, and factional egotism as well as the cynical sophistries of vain intellectuals which interfered with the establishment of good laws.

What happens here in essence is that Robespierre, not by any intent, himself becomes the embodiment of the general will not only as a "legislator" but also as a "magistrate." It is Robespierre himself who plays this role and not the Jacobin society which itself turns out to be susceptible to selfish factionalism. It is, after all, no accident that the transcendental factor in Rousseau's

"Social Contract" is not an institution but an individual—the "legislator" who by dint of his god-like "great soul" is able to embody the indivisible public spirit. Institutions, made up as they are of many individuals, are hardly indivisible and may easily become the embodiment of "partial interests." Rousseau was not yet attuned to the notion of the dynamics of history which endow institutions with a kind of dynamic historic life of their own. He must accept Montesquieu's view that "leaders produce institutions." The Jacobin clubs were never to develop the distinctive personality later to be attributed to the Communist party and Robespierre continually stressed that his Committee of Public Safety enjoyed its authority because of the purity and incorruptibility of its members rather than as an organizational entity.

The reign of virtue, as we know, was not established by the French Revolution, and the question of why it was not established was to agitate a whole new generation of young thinkers including both the young Hegel and the young Marx. Both Hegel and Marx concluded that the "people" as a collective entity did not, in fact, embody the indivisible general virtue which Rousseau had attributed to it. It had turned out to be an agglomeration of all kinds of egoistic individual and group interests. Hegel was, of course, ultimately to find the realization of man's higher social virtue in the modern state while Marx was to find the social bearer of general virtue to be a particular segment of modern society, the industrial proletariat. It was, in the first instance, the economic origins of the proletariat which were to turn Marx's attention to the whole historic economic process that lay behind the rise of this redemptive class. However, Marx's growing interest in technico-economic progress during the forties was not wholly due to the necessity to explain the preconditions of the existence of the proletariat. His ideal of good society was no longer simply Rous-

¹⁴ "The Social Contract," Book II, Chap. 3, *Locke, Hume and Rousseau* (Oxford University Press), p. 274.

seau's ideal of civic virtue. He had developed a genuine appreciation of the values of material progress which in his good society would be a precondition of cultural richness. His new man would be socially virtuous but would also live in material comfort and appreciate his Shakespeare and Homer. The proletariat was not only the heir of Rousseau's public virtue but as a stratum deeply immersed in technical life, it would also fulfill the role of Saint Simon's industrial-scientific elite. Thus Marx's concept of the mode of production fuses together, as it were, in an unstable complex the concepts of technico-economic and moral progress.

There is, of course, implicit in Marx's class conception something like the Rousseauist conception of a class "general will." He was not, however, inclined to go into the question of how the proletarian general will would find its realization. Unlike Rousseau, he was able to invoke a new dynamic principle, the impersonal forces of history. The unfolding mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production would themselves lead the proletariat to fulfill its historic role, to actualize both its moral and technico-economic tasks. It is in this way that the later Marx avoids the problem of class organization, the problem of politics itself.

WITH LENIN, however, who devoutly accepted Marx's conception of the historic mission of the proletariat, the problem of politics comes back to the very center of the stage. The problem of how the general will of the proletariat is to be actualized becomes an immediate problem of political action. In Lenin's view, the virtues and capacities of the proletariat both in Russia and abroad had proven potential rather than actual and the impersonal forces of history had proven extraordinarily sluggish in carrying the proletariat along its destined path. The proletariat also required its "legislator" or its legislative vanguard to lead it on its destined path. Lenin probably never regarded himself as

the living incarnation of the proletarian will. Indeed, he was quite sincere in his effort to create an organization that would play this role. Unlike the Jacobin clubs, the Bolshevik party was to be a highly articulated organization with a distinct corporate life of its own.¹⁵ Grippa is quite right. To Lenin, the secret of his party lay not only in the virtues of its members but also in the efficacy of its organization. When one now scrutinizes the writings of Lenin on party organization, one is struck by his vehement defense of the importance of organizational forms and well-formulated rules against all detractors of "formalism."¹⁶ One is further struck by the fact that while Lenin's "professional revolutionaries" certainly should embody all the proletarian virtues, Lenin dwells not so much on their virtues as on their professionalism, their organizational expertise. First in the science of revolution, and then after the revolution as the technico-administrative elite of the post-revolutionary society. Lenin has shifted from "spontaneity" to "consciousness" but, as in the case of Marx, Rousseau and Saint-Simon are both present in his outlook.

Yet while Lenin was most intent on creating a party institution with its own institutional charisma, the fact remains that during his lifetime it was Lenin rather than the party who embodied the proletarian general will. Again and again he turned on his own party and found it wanting. The institution had hardly replaced the leader.

WHEN we turn to Stalin, we find that he rises to power through a manipulation of the party administrative apparatus. He thus seems to provide an instance of the "institution producing the leader." Yet the fact re-

¹⁵ To Robespierre the word "party" was a bad word. There ought to be no "parties" within the sovereign people. The Marxist conception of class struggle, however, when added to the notion that parties represented classes, provided a much firmer foundation for the concept of a party.

¹⁶ See particularly *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward*.

mains that the relationship between the leader and the party remains as problematic as ever. In the case of Stalin, with his jealous greed for power, one is tempted to see here simply a particular instance of the universal struggle between the despot and his own bureaucracy. Yet within the Marxist-Leninist context, however, this also involved an extreme reluctance to share with any individual or any group the enormous, indivisible and total moral and intellectual claims attributed to the party.

In retrospect, one is tempted to add that Stalin's *de facto* downgrading of the party organization was due not only to his own power, greed, and mistrust, but also to the fact that the party was unable to fulfill the tasks which Stalin felt the times required. The "building of socialism" with its enormous emphasis on technocratic capacities naturally led Stalin to emphasize the "social engineering" aspect of the party function rather than its moral virtues. In fact, the party bureaucracy proved incompetent to perform in this capacity. If Mao was to find the party insufficiently red, Stalin found it insufficiently expert.

Nevertheless, while Stalin diminished the actual role of the party, while he formed it into a personal machine, on the conceptual level he never veered in the slightest from the Leninist conception of the centrality of the party. He claimed to the end to derive his legitimacy from the party constitution, however much he may have flouted it in practice. What is more, he left the formal lines of party organization intact. Like Lenin, he insisted that it was the institution rather than the leader that embodied the proletarian general will. Unlike Rousseau's legislator who provides a static body of good laws for all eternity, Lenin's party is required to act within the stream of history, to provide ever fresh yet infallible guidance through all the shoals and eddies of a changing world. To admit that the party's transcendental capacities are totally dependent on the haphazard

emergence of great leaders is to render its claims precarious indeed. This was appreciated by Stalin just as much as by Lenin.

TURNING FINALLY to the Mao Tse-tung of the Cultural Revolution period we find first that the problem of leader and institution assumes entirely new proportions, and second that the Rousseauist ethical emphasis again achieves a clear ascendancy.

The institution of the Marxist-Leninist party (as a world movement) has been in existence well over half a century. Yet in China it is now reiterated *ad nauseam* that the Chinese Communist party is wholly dependent for whatever proletarian charisma it may have on the leader and his thought. What is more, the qualities of the proletarian dictatorship which find their fountainhead in Mao Tse-tung may be shared by groups, institutions, and individuals which lie outside the party. Indeed the party as such when considered apart from Mao Tse-tung and his thought, may wholly degenerate and become another "partial interest" in the Rousseauist sense. The future of Communism is not guaranteed by the existence of the party but by the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung." It is the internalization of his thought which will realize general virtue and not the existence of the party.

When we turn to Mao Tse-tung's thought itself (in its cultural revolutionary interpretation) we are struck, as stated above, by the overwhelming predominance of the social-ethical. When viewed in a Western perspective, one must say that the Rousseauist element has pushed the Saint-Simonian technocratic element well into the background. The aged Mao is bent on achieving the reign of virtue as he understands virtue and remains unprepared to accept any progress of the "arts and sciences" which is not based on virtue. This does not mean, it must be stressed again, that Mao is against modernization. On the contrary, during the Great Leap Forward he fervently hoped that the energy

of organized virtue would itself spur economic development. Maoist virtue, one might say, was to play the role of a kind of collectivistic Protestant Ethic. There is, however, no reason to believe that this ethic was regarded, either then or now, as nothing but a means to modernization any more than Weber's Calvinists regarded their own ethic as simply a means to economic ends.

Yet, however prominent the Rousseauist-Jacobin component in latter-day Maoism, key elements of the language remain Marxist-Leninist. "Proletariat," "bourgeoisie," "class struggle," and "dictatorship of the proletariat" are terms which occur in maddening iteration. The Maoist virtue remains "proletarian" and does not stem simply from the people or the masses. However capable the masses may be of proletarianization, however necessary it is for "proletarian revolutionaries" to be in contact with the masses, the source of proletarian virtue lies somehow outside, above and beyond the masses, just as the word "bourgeoisie" refers to forces of egotism on a world scale. The word "proletariat" still refers to some ill-defined transnational, transcendental historic force, and it is as the embodiment of this force that Mao confronts both his own people and the world. The Maoist dream of reconstituting a new world Communist movement centered in Peking remains indissolubly tied to this vocabulary.

We have spoken of Maoism within a Western perspective. It may well be suggested at this point that many of the dominant notions of the Cultural Revolution seem to suggest the greater cogency of a Chinese cultural perspective (in spite of the explicitly antitraditional stance of the Maoist group). If we choose to personify ideas, may not Mencius be more relevant than Rousseau?

It is interesting to note that in early Meiji Japan as well as in early twentieth-century China affinities were often noted between Mencius and Rousseau. Is it possible, in fact, to make meaningful comparisons between

the eighteenth-century political philosopher and the ancient Chinese sage? Much of the prevailing historicist and social scientific dogma would reject this possibility. Yet it seems to me that comparison (which involves both difference and similarity) is, in fact, possible. To inquire why such comparison may be possible would carry us very far afield. It might simply be noted, in passing, that for some reason the ancient Chou thinkers and the eighteenth-century philosopher do, oddly enough, confront the human situation from a similar perspective, the perspective of vicarious statesmen who have prescriptions for "society" as a whole.

One is immediately struck by certain similarities in the relationship of ethics to the political realm. As in the case of Rousseau, the majority of men in Mencius are potentially good (they possess the roots [*tuan*] of goodness) but seem incapable of realizing their goodness through their own efforts. In both cases the unfavorable social environment negates the possibility of such realization. In both cases the people's ethical potentialities can be realized only through political mediation. Yet Mencius manages to avoid many of the enigmas surrounding Rousseau's abstract conception of the general will of the people. The moralizing agency of his society is clearly an ethical elite, and the superiority of this elite resides in the moral superiority of its individual members who are somehow able to actualize through individual self-effort their own potential virtue and wisdom.¹⁷ Unlike the mass of mankind, these "chün-tze" are able to realize their own potentialities by "following that part of themselves which is great."¹⁸ They are able to transcend their environment and are thus also able to transform the people below them through the power of example, education, and proper policy. Thus Mencius accepts the

¹⁷ In the ideal society of the past, the ethical initiative had been taken by single individuals, the sage-rulers Yao, Shun, and Yü.

¹⁸ *The Book of Mencius*, Pt. I, Chap. XVII-Vol. II, p. 419 in Legge's *Chinese Classics*.

principle of hierarchy gladly and without hesitation.

Rousseau, on the other hand, sets out from a rejection of hierarchy. His ideal society is one in which all citizens fully participate as "free" and equal citizens on the idealized ancient Roman model. The attainment of the ideal is immediately cast into doubt, however, by all sorts of tragic dilemmas. There is not only the dilemma raised in the question, "How can the multitude which often does not know what it wants because only rarely does it know what is for its own good undertake an enterprise so extensive and so difficult as the formulation of a system of laws?"¹⁹ Mencius himself might have recognized this dilemma. There is also, however, Rousseau's clear realization that princes, magistrates, and all those who govern (the "executive power") are made of the same clay as the people. Rousseau can solve his dilemmas only by introducing the *deus ex machina* of the transcendent legislator, that rare genius of unaccountable "greatness of soul" who is able to create a system of general laws which educates the people to virtue.²⁰ Rousseau is, after all, an heir to Western legalism and ultimately seems to believe in the rule of law. It is the law itself which plays a determining role in forming the general will.²¹

With the Jacobins, however, this sharp distinction between the legislative and executive breaks down, and Robespierre must represent the general will as both legislator and magistrate. In Leninism it survives in the feeble guise of party constitutionality and legality. Here, however, we perceive the enormous contradiction between Rousseau's intentions and the unintended uses to which his doctrines have lent themselves.

¹⁹ *The Social Contract*, Book II, Chap. VI, p. 289.

²⁰ And even he should not rule. "When Lycurgus gave laws to his country he began by abdicating his royal power." *Ibid.*, p. 293.

²¹ Although here too we find ambiguities. Ernest Barker points out that in spite of his emphasis on law, Rousseau "felt in his bones that the nation made the law and not the law the nation." *Ibid.*, p. xxxix.

When we turn to Mencius' account of the famous sage-rulers Yao, Shun, and Yü, we find that the distinction between legislator and prince does not exist. These mythic figures are in a sense "legislators" in that they create or make manifest the sacred institutional framework of society, but they are also the active rulers of society who stand high above the institutions which they have formed. The institutions are simply the channels through which they spread their spiritual-ethical influence. The Confucian tradition even in its Mencian interpretation is hardly anti-formalistic. Even to Mencius, the virtues of rulers and of the *chün-tze* must be channeled through an institutional setting and find their objective expression in the rules of propriety. Yet in Mencius (as opposed to Hsün-tze) it is not the institutions which mold the sage-rulers and the men of virtue; it is the sage-rulers and *chün-tze* who irradiate their ethical power through the institutions.

WHEN ONE EXAMINES the idiom of the Cultural Revolution one somehow feels that the untroubled image of Mao as the fountainhead of all morality, standing high above all laws and institutions, may owe more to certain Chinese cultural perspectives than to any Western source of inspiration. One feels this also in the tremendous emphasis on the power of example attributed to such paragons as Lei Feng and Men Ho, who may, to be sure, be men of the people but who are nevertheless capable of heroic acts of ethical self-transcendence. Again, they are capable of these acts only because they draw inspiration from the ruler-sage himself.

One is further tempted to speculate that even the aged Mao's antiformalism and anti-institutionalism may have their indigenous roots in the heterodox strains of the Chinese heroic (*yu-hsia*) tradition so vividly expressed in the epic novels which were his favorite childhood reading. Here we find the heroic bands of blood-brothers fighting for the right under leaders recognized by all for their nat-

ural qualities of leadership. The ties which bind here are not the institutional forms of the corrupt traditional establishment but the moral cement of shared sentiments. These literary images must blend easily in the leader's mind with the actual experiences of the Hunan-Kiangsi and Yenan days.

In all of this the Chinese perspective may explain much which cannot be explained in terms of a purely Western perspective. There are, however, areas in which the particular Chinese perspectives and the particular Western perspectives, far from being mutually exclusive, prove to be mutually reinforcing. There are also areas where only the Western perspective can adequately account for a new reality. The concept of the masses as active and total participants in the whole political process (whatever may be the actual situation) has, of course, become an essential part of the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung." As in the case of Rousseau, Mao Tse-tung's masses are the masses not necessarily as they are but as they "ought to be" and there can be no doubt of the leader's aspiration to make them what they ought to be. They are to be made public-spirited and their virtue is no longer to be

passive and negative, but active and dynamic. It is to be a moral energy consolidated in the service of the nation. What is more, this moral energy is to be unified in a positive aggressive struggle against all the forces of evil. Here both the nationalist motif of Rousseau and transnational image of Marxism-Leninism are united into one.

One could go on in this scrutiny of Western and Chinese perspectives. Perhaps of more significance than the question of cultural origin is the fact that we are here dealing with issues that have now assumed a transcultural significance. The fact that groups of the young in heart of the modern West profess to find in the Mao of the Cultural Revolution (by a painfully selective interpretation) answers to their own discontents points to this transcultural aspect. On the one hand, they respond to the Maoist anti-institutionalism and antiformalism. On the other, they respond to the Rousseauist emphasis on morality in reaction to the preponderantly technocratic version of the theory of progress. In responding to their version of Mao, they are thus responding to an element of their own cultural past.

Marx and the Bureaucratic State

ACCORDING TO MARXISM, the state is a tool of the ruling class. The state, writes Engels in his *Origin of the Family*, is usually an agency of the strongest class, which controls the economy and therefore wins political hegemony. In this view, political relations originate in the economic relations of production and exploitation; hence, political power is a "superstructure" of economic power.

There exist, however, other passages of Marx, and especially of Engels, which postulate a clear distinction between the two modes of power. In this other, more problematic version of Marxist sociology, the state is no longer a simple excrescence of the ruling class and the explanation of its origin calls for a wider dialectic than the one which accounts for the development of classes.

The state arises independent of the classes; indeed, before society divides into classes. In primitive ("classless") societies, there arise "certain matters of common interest which must be entrusted to individuals: settlement and suppression of disputes, control of water rights, religious functions," writes Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*. Thus, the "premises of state power" are placed outside the technical and economic determinisms that bring about the formation of classes. Even before a minority appropriates the means of production, the whole society is obliged, *by the nature of things*, to give up the management of its common affairs and to entrust them to a particular group. The decisive factor is, therefore, not control of the means of production but the monopoly in the management of "common affairs" and the simultaneous atro-

phy of "collective control," an inevitable consequence of the complexity of social life (and not only of economic life). These specialized organs of the management of "common affairs" acquire an autonomy that becomes greater the more society shows itself incapable of dealing with them. When collective control proves inefficient (or vanishes altogether), the state confronts society as an autonomous and dominating power.

Hence, it is not the "economically dominant" class that creates the state. A "product of society," the state becomes an independent power through the course of its internal logic: the "representatives of common interests" learn to put themselves above the community and pursue their own interests precisely insofar as the growing complexity of social life, internal tensions, and external conflicts make collective control impossible. In the end, the state becomes the "boss" [*padrone*] of society. The state is thus not merely a simple instrument by which one class oppresses another. It is something more and different, since it forces the whole society (and hence *all* the classes) to alienate itself from the foreign power that has wedged itself between the community and the common work. "Originally," writes Engels in his introduction to the *Paris Commune*:

Society had created its own organs to look after its common interests, at first through a simple division of labor. But these organs, at whose head was the state power, had, in the course of time and in the pursuit of their own special interests, transformed themselves from the servants of society into the masters of society.

Oriental Despotism

IN *Das Kapital*, Marx attributes to a similar alienation the establishment of the "Asiatic" system, the first economic system in history, i.e. the "government-controlled" economy which prevailed in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, Peru, and all archaic societies which arose out of "the need for collective control of natural forces—especially water." The need to control water levels in areas periodically devastated by river floods made the primitive village communities ask for state intervention and so submit to its bureaucratic apparatus. Marx writes in *The Government of India*:

The same fundamental necessity to use water in common which convinced private cultivators in the West [e.g. in Italy and Flanders] to unite in joint water utilization schemes, imposed in the East [where the level of civilization was too low and where the territories were too big to permit the rise of such associations] the centralizing intervention of the government.

The regulation of water levels was thus "one of the material bases of the domination of the state over small communities," since the weakness of individual villages prevented them from establishing irrigation works. Such works, which presupposed the existence of a detailed plan of operations, required the mobilization of large masses of workers, perhaps over several generations. Only the authoritarian intervention from the center could break the isolation of the villages and only a state founded upon forced labor could offer an effective response to the great challenge of nature.

Hence, in the Asiatic system the state is "the supreme proprietor of land, and political sovereignty is agricultural property concentrated on a national scale; this is why there is no private ownership of land." But this absence does not mean, for Marx, that there is no exploitation of human labor. On the contrary, Marx asserts that the relationships of exploitation were transparent in this system of production, whereas in capitalist societies they oper-

ate in a veiled form. In the Asiatic system, "the state was the principal exploiter of the masses, the principal holder of excess and unconsumed produce."

Yet state and state ownership are only abstractions, which camouflage the activities of certain groups and the development of certain social relationships. What is the ruling class in systems founded on the state ownership of the means of production and the forced mobilization of workers? Bukharin answers this question in his *Theory of Historical Materialism*: in systems of production where the "management of production is almost identified with the administration of the state [and] the greater part of production belongs to the state," the class that ruled the people enslaved by the state was the bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, Marx did not develop his thesis, which is so topical today, on the transformation of the state into "the principal holder of excess and unconsumed produce." He believed that government control of the economy was characteristic of an extremely archaic stage of social development. And he believed also that the "ancient," "feudal," and "bourgeois" systems of production which followed the "Asiatic" system were the results of a spontaneous development of civil society, just as their systems of social stratification were formed outside the political sphere, i.e. independently of the action of the state. "Civil society," Marx concludes in the *German Ideology*, "is by now the true theater of history and the foundation of the state and of all superstructure."

Marxism inherited from liberalism the belief that the role of the state should be reduced to a minimum and that, in the future, a form of spontaneous co-operation would ensure a harmonious development of society without the need of any coercion. It went on to assert the complete autonomy of the economic order and the pre-eminence of the values which govern the area of private or "class" interests over other social needs and, especially, the needs of the state as such.

The State as Anachronism

LIBERALS HELD that the despotic bureaucratic state should be rejected as a survival of the mercantilist age, i.e. of an economy dominated by nonproducing classes. "The State," Marx says in the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State*, remains independent only in underdeveloped countries "where distinctions of rank and estate, which have vanished in more advanced countries, have not yet become completely transformed into classes and continue to perform one function of the latter; in such countries, a hybrid situation prevails, so that no single part of the population could dominate the others."

The conclusion is interesting, inasmuch as it demonstrates that precapitalist societies are not subject to those historical forces which in advanced countries Marxism considers the sole determining factors. In the first place, they have no solid economic base; the feeble economic articulations of a very weak industry and trade are ruled by judicial and political norms arbitrarily imposed by an independent state. Second, their development has been slowed due to the absence of an active class struggle. Here the two "driving forces" of history, economic base and class struggles, do not operate; therefore, the basic premises of historical materialism are valid only for "evolved" countries.

"Political estates," Marx adds, "are transformed into social estates through a *progress of history*." And since it was only the French Revolution "that accomplished the transformation of political estates into social estates," it is surprising that Marx should have so quickly forgotten the recent, for him almost contemporary, creation of civil society and said, "The civil society is *the true theater of all history* . . . [it] has been *in all ages*, the base of the state and of all superstructure." He repeats the same formulas in the famous 1859 preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*, in which he outlines the general results of his researches and describes the relations between civil society and state as relations between base and superstructure.

We may deplore the fact that Marx, for all his genius as the theoretician and critic of "ideologies," lacked the historical sense needed to understand that his theory of the state was merely an indication of perspectives necessarily limited in validity. It is true, nonetheless, that, for all the immaturity of his formulas, he did not—contrary to the intentions attributed to him by his disciples—claim to have advanced a *general* theory of the state in history. If he did not further develop his clear distinction between advanced and backward countries, it is because he believed (rightly or wrongly, it does not matter) that only the Western capitalist societies would determine the future organization of the world. For Marx, America remained the most accomplished example of the modern state: "The most modern French, English, and American writers unanimously state that, in America, the state exists only for the sake of private property."

The State in America

AMONG THESE "modern" writers is Hegel, for whom "the land of liberty" was "the land of the future," in which "the center of gravity of world history will manifest itself." Hegel, too, was impressed by the exquisitely economic structure of American life; but in his *Philosophy of History* he drew opposite conclusions from those of Marx: "Founded upon the individual and his natural propensity for acquisition and profit," American society may have started on the right road toward "the state of the future," but has not yet passed the threshold of true political life, "because a true state exists only when there is a differentiation of classes, when wealth and poverty become enormous, and when large masses are no longer able to satisfy their elementary needs." Marx attributed the "independence" of the state to the *lack* of strong class differentiation and the immaturity of social antagonisms. According to Hegel, the exact contrary occurs: the authority of the state is strengthened and placed

above society as class conflicts grow more serious. And he adds:

America is not yet threatened by such tension because the door of colonization is still open there and ever new populations spread themselves over the Mississippi plains. This has dried up the principal source of popular protest and strengthened the stability of the present political order. But it also makes impossible any comparison between the United States and the countries of Europe, because Europe, for all its migrations, does not have a similar movement of peoples. Certainly, the French Revolution would not have happened if Germany had still been covered by immense forests.

The proletarian revolution announced in the *Communist Manifesto* would probably have happened, but for the existence of the immense American prairies; the 30 million people who emigrated to the United States between 1850 and 1910 certainly helped to frustrate Marx's prophecy. In any case, America, still in the "plowing-up" stage, could not be considered an accomplished example of the modern state: "When, as is happening in Europe, the number of farmers decreases, and the inhabitants, instead of crowding the countryside, abandon it for city industries and businesses, they will form an homogeneous system of political society and will feel the need of an organic state." (Hegel.)

It will be possible to compare America to Europe only when "the immense territory of state is settled, and civil society no longer expands but turns upon itself." The subsequent development of American society has fully confirmed Hegel's diagnosis. As long as virgin lands offer new room for settlers, political life of the community can be restricted to a local democracy, without the need of a centralized state structure. The continuous increase in the number of farms sufficiently explains why "the need of an organic state" was felt so late in America. Civil society "turned upon itself," i.e. ceased to expand, only around 1920, when the city population for the first time surpassed the rural popula-

tion. And it was only during the Great Depression that, for the first time in American history, "the large masses" were "no longer able to satisfy their needs." But, as soon as "class" factors start to act upon American society, they rapidly transform it into a "compact system of political society." In America, the state—in the modern meaning of the word—was established only when Franklin D. Roosevelt occupied the White House.

America could for so long offer a pure image of a civil society because of her double isolation, which was political and economic. Hegel notes in this connection that "the free states of North America, unlike European countries, have no frontiers with a hostile state, i.e. a state against which they must maintain a permanent army." Hegel, then, was right in denying that the North American republic had the characteristics of a modern state. In his hypothesis, international relations are, and always will be, political relations, and the subordination of civil society to the state becomes necessary by virtue of the pre-eminence of international relations.

All this is the exact opposite of what Marx believed to have found in his time. Marx's view of reality inspired him to develop a concept of history in which the Saint-Simonian mystique of railways as vehicles of universal brotherhood joined with the Manchesterian faith in the coming "millennium of cotton." He derived from it an unreal picture of the social tendencies at work in a Europe of nascent nationalisms and industrial wars, which were soon to spread across the earth.

Bourgeois Cosmopolitanism

FOR MARX, as for the Saint-Simonians, peace is congenial to the industrial system. "Everything that is conquered on the industrial level is lost on the military level," said Saint-Simon, as if to exorcise the specter of Napoleon. Marx, too, saw industry as "the thermometer of the workers' progress," and the thermometer of the military power of states. Cobden declared in 1835 that "the

middle and working classes of England have no other interest than the preservation of peace"; at the very moment when the Sepoy Rebellion unchained nationalist passions, he prophesied the coming of "the day when England will no longer possess a single hectare of land in Asia."

The most generous (and utopian) theses of English liberals found their definitive formulation in Marx. Marx praised the bourgeoisie for having inaugurated a "truly universal" history by creating a united world. The uncontested domination—and he believed it to be uncontested—of the "industrial and civilized nations of the West" over "the agrarian, barbarous, or semi-civilized nations of the East"; and the universal expansion of the [English] bourgeoisie, the [anticipated] penetration of capitalism into agricultural countries [which then had nine-tenths of the world's population]—all this persuaded him to launch the hypothesis of a planetary "world economy" in which the old independent nations would become loyal economic provinces of a worldwide division of labor. "The bourgeoisie has removed industry from its national base. Old national industries have been crushed and humiliated and they are still being crushed and humiliated every day. . . . Narrowness of spirit and national exclusiveness become ever more anachronistic."

Washington's phrase, "Our first rule of conduct with regard to other nations should be to have as few political relations with them as possible, while strengthening our commercial relations," assumes for Marx a definitive value. It led him to describe the end of national antagonisms in the very year that marked the beginning of the century of nationalism: "National divisions and antagonisms between the peoples are vanishing before the growth of the bourgeoisie, the freedom of commerce, a world market, and the tendency toward a uniformity of industrial production and hence of the corresponding conditions of life."

Most likely Marx and Cobden never suspected that the union of industry and demo-

cracy was about to turn the state into the standard-bearer of economic, political, and cultural nationalism. Marx believed he attended the mystical birth of a truly ecumenic society which would eventually embrace the whole world and had already made national wars—and, more generally, national politics—superfluous and anachronistic.

This is how Marx judged the political situation of England in an article which appeared in the *New York Daily Tribune* of August 25, 1852:

The Tories, the Whigs, and the party of Peel already belong to the past. The party which officially represents modern English society is the Free Traders [the Manchesterians, reformers of Parliament and finance]. They are the party of the conscious bourgeoisie, of industrial capital, which wants to use its social force as a political force to extirpate the last arrogant vestiges of feudal society . . . By "free trade" they mean the absolute freedom of movement for capital, freed from all political, national and religious ties. . . .

So Marx wrote in 1852. A few years later, all England sang:

We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do,
We have the ships, we have the men,
And have the money, too. . . .

Meanwhile, Cobden had lost his seat in the Commons for opposing the Crimean War, while the England of Palmerston, Disraeli, and Cecil Rhodes was in the throes of excitement over its imperialist expansion. Yet Marx remained desperately attached to the notion of the state as mere superstructure, which he had borrowed from English radicals. The world in which the basic concepts of Marx were worked out belongs to the "prehistory" of the modern state.

Thus, Marx views the increase of public debt only as an indirect proof of the triumph of civil society over the state: "The state," he wrote, "has fallen completely into the hands of private proprietors. . . . with the growth of trade and industry, individual wealth increases, while the state, reduced to

mendicity, sinks ever more deeply into debt and lets itself be bought by the bourgeoisie." The demand, the wish, the dream of a certain type of European liberal—to include and absorb the political fact in the economic fact—becomes for Marx an immediate and imminent reality and the prospective center of his sociological doctrine. All the more reason, therefore, to admire the amazing perspicacity he showed when analyzing bureaucratic mentality in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State* (1843).

The Reign of the Secret

THE SECRECY OF bureaucracy under absolutism (and, in a lesser way, under parliamentary democracy) has been a constant source of indignation for both liberals and socialists. If the "bureaucratic spirit" seemed to Marx to be the exact opposite of the "political spirit," it was because of its cult of the "mystery."

The spirit of bureaucracy is the *secret*, the mystery, kept in the bosom of the hierarchy and preserved by its nature of closed corporation. Any manifestation of the political spirit is to bureaucracy a *betrayal* of its secrets. Hence authority is the foundation of its knowledge and worship of authority its mentality.

When Marx wrote this in 1843, he could not have known that formulas like "The location of the secret fortresses is known," "The secrets of the country are known," "The secrets of the King are known," recur like an obsessive *Leitmotif* in the report of a high Egyptian official on the revolutionary movements that brought about the fall of the old Empire of Memphis. Actually, from the times of the Second Dynasty, access to the "secrets of the King" was a distinctive characteristic of the official class, so much so that the prime minister was called "chief of the King's secrets, director of all of the King's works." Max Weber, who made the first systematic study of secrecy in various bureaucracies in his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (*Economics and Society*), noted the univer-

sality of the bureaucratic principle and predicted that "the rule of secrecy will be extended still further with the bureaucratization of political parties." But neither Marx nor Weber could conceive of the age of the "secretary-general" and of totalitarian parties. They could not imagine the organization of "monolithic" cadres into groups which operate without discussion. A bureaucracy of the kind Marx called "Jesuitical" is then enabled to liquidate the very roots of the political spirit and to transform public life into a gray squalor, a phenomenon external to the world of thought.

The totalitarian bureaucratic state became, like the Egyptian Dynasty, a wholesale manufacturer of secrets. It has fused the "mystery" denounced by Marx with the "commercial secret," for which the capitalists have so often been blamed. It has turned into military secrets not only the most "material" social and political facts but even—a unique phenomenon in the modern world—statistics on real wages and standards of living.* The regimes which claim to be "Orthodox Marxist" are the only ones which do not publish tables of wages and salaries. The balance sheet of the national economy is another "secret," whose divulgence is considered treasonable.

We may now understand why, for Marx, "democracy is to all other political forms as their Old Testament." Today, considering the *homines ad servitutem paratos* (men born to be slaves) who boast of their "monolithism," he would have said that democracy is to totalitarianism as the New Testament is to worship of stones.

Bureaucracy as Parasite

THIS AFFIRMATION of Marx that the liberal and proletarian perspectives are harmonious can be found again in his notes on *The History of Economic Doctrines*, which was to

* "To preserve the secrets of party and state and to be on guard in all sectors and in all circumstances" is the eleventh commandment of a good Bolshevik—"Party Regulations," *Pravda*, October 14, 1952.

become Volume IV of *Das Kapital*. There he gives ample quotes from *The Wealth of Nations*, in which Adam Smith “gives free rein to his hatred of the unproductive class”—a “class which includes employees considered superior, officials, officers, priests, judges, lawyers, etc.” And Marx comments: “Political economy in its classical period, like the bourgeoisie in its phase of expansion, is severe toward the organization of the state. All these unproductive classes are, to Smith, as they are to the industrial capitalist and the working class, merely the ‘petty expenditure’ of production, which should be reduced to a minimum.” Marx recognizes in Adam Smith’s attacks on state intervention

the language of the revolutionary bourgeoisie: All these high professions—sovereign, judge, officer, priest, etc.—are placed by Smith, from the economic point of view, on the level of the lackeys and buffoons who divert the idle rich. Persons of high rank are the servants of the public, just as lackeys and buffoons are *their* servants. They live off the production of others; hence their number should be reduced to a minimum. State and church justify their existence only as far as they manage and administer the interests of the productive bourgeoisie; by themselves and in themselves, they are the petty expenditure of production, which must be reduced to the indispensable minimum.

Hence Marx’s bitter disillusionment about France in 1852. The state “under the second Bonaparte seems to have become completely independent,” he says the day after the *coup d’état*. The optimism of his previous writings is replaced by a tragic vision of the increasing growth of the state, a state that comes out strengthened from wars and revolutions, from class struggles and class equilibrium, a state which “feeds on society and paralyzes its movements.” Marx sees it as a new alienation—as oppressive and intolerable as capitalist alienation.

MARX HAD violently driven from his intellectual horizon the idea that the state may

have its own history and development; now he discovered that the bureaucratic state, far from being weakened by the advance of capitalism, continued to develop and to extend its influence after the end of absolute monarchy and through all the bourgeois revolutions. He writes in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*:

The . . . tremendous bureaucratic and military organization . . . originated at the time of the absolute monarchy, along with the decline of feudalism, which it helped to hasten. The princely privileges of the landed proprietors and cities were transformed into so many attributes of the Executive power; the feudal dignitaries into paid office-holders; and the confusing design of conflicting medieval seigniories, into the well regulated plan of a government, whose work is subdivided and centralized as in the factory.

The state was a product of society. It arose, in the first place, to ensure order and to protect the bourgeoisie from feudal brutality and, afterward, to extend its field of action on a national scale. But driven by an insatiable appetite for “subjects,” it abolished feudal, ecclesiastical, and municipal autonomies, just as capitalism expropriated independent producers, craftsmen, and peasants. When the French Revolution smashed all local, territorial, communal, and provincial powers, it merely continued and extended the centralizing action of the monarchy. Napoleon completed this governmental machinery:

the Executive power, with its wide-spreading and artificial machinery of government—an army of office-holders, half a million strong, together with a military force of another million men—; this fearful body of parasites, that coils itself like a snake around French society, stopping all its pores. . . .

There is a deep analogy between alienation by the state and economic alienation. There is, in both, the same fatal usurpation. The same objective mystification through which the capitalist comes “to represent, to the individual worker, the unity and the will of the collective worker [the enterprise], also transforms the

state into fetishist representation of the general will." The same blind necessity that enriches the "collective worker" and impoverishes the individual worker strengthens the state and empties society of its substance. "Before the Executive power, the nation abdicates all will of its own, and submits to the orders of an outside authority. In contrast with the Legislative, the Executive power expresses the heteronomy of the nation in contrast with its autonomy."

What the citizens lose in their capacity for self-determination and collective initiative is concentrated in the powers of the state. And so the general interest of the nation is transformed into "the private property of bureaucracy," a power that oppresses the citizens. Any progress of bureaucratic centralization means an ever-deeper frustration of society. The very complexity of social life offers, day by day, "new material for the administration of the state."

The consolidation of the bureaucratic apparatus produces, for Marx, an alienation that is equivalent to that of capitalist economy since, in both cases, man is subjugated by his own products and lets himself be dominated by objective forces in which he does not recognize himself. A single conception of freedom serves as the basis of Marxist critique, whether it is directed against "the despotic form of capitalist management," the factory which denies to the worker free initiative and ties him to the order of "superior hierarchies," or against the executive power which represents "the heteronomy of the nation in opposition to its autonomy." It is a conception that sees in freedom the tool which permits the individual not only to resist all claims of the authorities but also—and most of all—to restrict and limit the bureaucracy's field of action, to enrich the spontaneity of social life, to restore to society all prerogatives usurped by state and capital. The aim of freedom is to ensure that "socialized man," i.e. "freely associated" producers, control directly all the activities of social life and become themselves

the leaders and protagonists of their liberation.

Admitting the possibility that society may dispense with bureaucracy, there are still some questions to be discussed for which there have been, so far, no answers. How could the state regress toward a situation of "independence"? What were the "class" foundations of Bonapartism? What is the historical significance of the centralization of political power? The answers are becoming ever more tangled and confused.

The Class Struggle

THE RETURN of bureaucracy, originally the tool and now the master of the bourgeoisie, must now be explained. Marx attributed the independence of the state to the immaturity of bourgeois economy and the absence of class struggle. But France was not a backward country and became, after 1830, the land of social struggles. It is obvious that class struggle did not produce the expected results. Marx thought—and said so in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*—that if the National Assembly, representative of the nation's autonomy, had "given more time to class struggles," it would have "made the executive power its dependant." But the Assembly did not do so; it "did not want to play with fire." Once again class struggle proved ineffective; it did not repel the invasion of the state; more than that, it "*seemed satisfied to see all classes, silent and impotent, on their knees before the barrels of the guns.*"

The refusal of the bourgeoisie to assert itself as the ruling class scandalized Marx: "It was burning with the wish to free itself of its political power and of the attending worries and dangers." Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie, which seemed to lose in 1848 the power it had acquired under Louis-Phillipe, had an age of splendor in the Second Empire and, all through subsequent French history, showed itself eager for political power. The working class too, temporarily paralyzed by the terror which followed the *coup d'état*, soon became strong enough to assert itself in both politics

and labor organization. Some workers, including Tolain, were candidates in the 1863 parliamentary elections. And the fact that the law of 1864, which gave the workers freedom of assembly and strike, was not won by strike action shows that the bureaucracy of Napoleon III could not be even remotely compared to a modern apparatus.

The two basic classes of civil society were in full flowering when the *coup d'état* cut their *élan*. Where then did the state get sufficient strength to smother the class struggle and thus to paralyze "the driving force" of history? The power of the state, replies Marx, does not operate in a vacuum. Its action is always determined by class aspirations, which are the true protagonists of history: "Bonaparte represents a definite class, the most numerous of French society, the small peasant proprietors."

Peasant Barbarism

UNTIL THAT MOMENT Marx and Engels had believed that the peasants, "incapable of independent action," were eternally doomed to carry out the orders of the urban population, "more concentrated, more easily convinced and aroused." For Marx, the city is the true scene of history. *Stadiluft macht frei*: city air makes men free. But now the "class of barbarians," almost put "outside civilization," was on the march; the triumph of Napoleon II was "a reaction of the countryside against the city," a revenge of the amorphous peasant mass upon the true classes.

Marx, for whom class membership and consciousness were the only titles of social nobility, refused to consider the peasants a class. To prohibit the peasants entry to his historical "club," he did not hesitate to alter his sociology and to introduce ever more intransigent ideological criteria into his theory of classes, which hitherto had been purely economic. The peasants, he said, seem a class to whoever judges things by exclusively economic criteria, "but they do not constitute a class, since free peasants have only local ties, and their community of interests does not in-

spire them to form national associations or political organizations."

But if things were seen that way, American workers would deserve still less to be called a class. The medieval bourgeois had only local ties, the slaves never created political organizations; must we therefore conclude that they were not classes? For Marx, the hybrid character of the peasants, half class and half mass, makes them "incapable of defending their class interests in persons, either through an assembly or through Parliament."

Here we have one of the worst examples of that "essentialist" method that Marx constantly abused. For him, just as the quality of "stoneness" is the essence of the stone, so the essence of the peasant masses is their incapacity for self-defense, self-determination, and participation in power. Only Marx's contempt for the peasant could explain such errors. The only societies capable of direct democracy have been peasant societies like the classical city states and the Swiss cantons. Did not Aristotle consider the class of small rural proprietors the social base of a true *politeia*? But according to Marx, the peasants weigh, like a grave menace, upon society:

They cannot represent one another, they must themselves be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that protects them from above, bestows rain and sunshine upon them. Accordingly, the political influence of the allotment farmer finds its ultimate expression in an Executive power that subjugates the commonweal to its own autocratic will.

Marx was doubtlessly right in emphasizing the French peasants' need for protection. But in this they were not much different from other classes. And when the peasants, and still more the industrialists and workers, asked for state intervention, it was not to protect them from "the other classes," but against foreign competition. The agricultural protection which France decreed in 1881 was only a warning notice of a policy of general

protection, demanded by all classes and granted by the Republic.

All these facts did not fit into Marx's free-trade conception of "world" capitalism. Yet he, who took his model of the modern state from American democracy, should have been more cautious. Jefferson, the founder of American liberalism, had an almost exclusively agricultural conception of democracy. Many of his supporters were independent farmers, stubborn opponents of urban capitalism and by no means inclined to seek the protection of the state and to fall on their knees before any "superior authority." Also, the colonizers of the American West were peasants of a special type, emigrants who renounced all the traditions of rural immobilism and servitude. And again, the peasant masses of Scandinavia showed themselves capable of economic and political initiatives that proved decisive in the formation of democratic institutions. In nineteenth-century Scandinavia, the struggle between liberals and conservatives took the form of a struggle between an urban patriciate and the country people who were the chief source of democratic sentiment. There, too, the increased political influence of the peasants produced results contrary to those that scandalized Marx. But Marx's theses on the economic bases of the bureaucratic state are no less fallacious.

The Economic Bases

IT IS SURPRISING to what point Marx misunderstood the true nature of modern democracy. True, he foresaw the growing bureaucratization of the economy; but it was only to cast a light on the "parasitic" nature of capitalism. Marx viewed the ever more extensive functions that a constantly growing bureaucracy began to claim even in private enterprises as only a "superintendence," more or less like the work of a "crew boss" in the first factories. In his polemic with Bakunin he refused to admit the possibility of the bureaucratic degeneration of political organizations, labor unions, and workers' coopera-

tives. Against all common sense, he proclaimed the theory that the bureaucratization of the modern state was an epiphenomenon of the precapitalist (land parcel) structure of agriculture:

The system of ownership, involved in the system of allotments, lends itself by nature for the groundwork of a powerful and numerous bureaucracy; it produces an even level of conditions and of persons over the whole surface of the country; it, therefore, allows the exercise of an even influence upon all parts of this even mass from a high central point downwards; it annihilates the aristocratic gradations between the popular masses and the government; it, consequently, calls from all sides for the direct intervention of the Government and for the intervention of the latter's immediate organs.

Marx has rarely been so mistaken. In all countries where terror is not an integral part of the economic policy, the behavior of peasant economy toward the state has been the opposite of what he said. Small property always tends to escape all administrative regulation and control and, far from provoking state intervention, discourages it.

Marx's surprising theory seemed rational only when his disciples plundered the barns of the so-called *Kulaks* and requisitioned their secret stores. The "independence" of the Stalinist state and the gigantic revolution which put Soviet bureaucracy in charge of agriculture were obviously not caused by the political influence of the peasants (which was nonexistent) and still less by the internal dialectics of small peasant property.

Such systematic ignorance of the true nature and origin—economic or not—of the bureaucratic state inevitably produced the falsest illusions on the coming "weakening" and disappearance of the state. Marx believed that the implacable law which doomed small peasant property to a slow but sure death also cut the ground from under the bureaucracy, making it completely superfluous: "With the progressive decay of small

peasant property, the whole edifice of the state, which had been built on it, collapses." He seems to be dreaming!

A Dialectical Necessity

JUST AS the despotism of capital was needed to impede the pulverization of productive forces and to arouse the creative forces latent in collective labor, so the state was needed to overcome medieval particularism and to engage the masses in collective work. And, just as the factory regulations are only "a caricature of the true social regulation of work," so the bureaucracy represents "the inferior and brutal form of a centralization still saturated with its opposite, i.e. feudalism."

The subjection of workers and city dwellers is a necessary but transitory effect of the irresistible tendency toward the socialization of labor. Absolute despotism (the Second Empire) was "necessary to show in its essence the existing antagonism between state and society." As the enslavement of the producers is a necessary stage of a dialectics of ascension and redemption, so the crucifixion of society by the state is the necessary precondition of its future resurrection. The same subterranean revolution which reduces the exploiting class to a few magnates, isolated from the immense proletarian masses, and prepares the expropriation of the expropriators, also isolates the state from the enslaved and terrorized population and strips it of all its tinsel: "The revolution goes to the bottom

of things. Is it still in purgatory? It is because it works with a method. It perfects parliamentary power to enable itself to overturn it later," by showing the complete impotence of the legislative with regard to the executive.

"Once this is obtained," Marx concludes, "the revolution perfects the executive power, reduces it to its simplest expression, isolates it, and directs against it all its accusations so as to concentrate against it all its destructive force. When this second part of its preparatory labor is complete, Europe will jump to its feet and rejoice, 'Well done, old mole!'" It is then that the proletarian revolution, taking its example from the Commune, "will make the slogan of the bourgeois revolution, 'to govern without waste,' a reality through the destruction of two big items of expenditure: permanent army and state bureaucracy."

Marx bestowed upon the revolutionary proletariat a heritage that included his inability to understand the problem modern bureaucracy poses for modern society, and so he condemned it to utopia and defeat. The revolutionary mole was blind, and it found seers who made it their mission to lead it to "the promised land of socialism." But we must not forget that it was by following "the line worked out in detail by Marx and Engels" for the definite extermination of bureaucracy that Lenin and his companions laid the foundations of the most formidable bureaucratic state of all history.

Translated by I. A. LANGNAS

Impressions from Beirut

In our next issue we expect to print a letter from Jerusalem which will provide another analysis of events in the Middle East.—Ed.

THE JUNE WAR and the continuing Middle East tensions have not produced the same effect in Beirut as they have in Cairo or Amman. In Beirut there is the accustomed freedom of speech, one of that city's singular virtues. There is a concentration of cosmopolitan characters from various corners of the Arab world, who congregate to conspire or to evade conspiracy. And there is a passionate interest in the Palestinian dilemma—which is not a way of avoiding use of the word "Israel," but refers to the Palestinians who are recognized as a growing force in the Arab world. In Beirut, Israel is openly discussed, and an effort of sorts is made through the libraries of the Palestine Research Institute and the Palestine Liberation Organization to educate the population about Israel and the Jewish question. Balanced material is as accessible as that which is partisan and distorted. Historical works dealing with the evolution of the Jewish question in 19th-century Europe are to be found along with Israeli periodicals and European journals dealing with Israel and the Middle East. The emphasis seems to be on opening doors which, except to the governmental elite, have remained forcibly shut for many years.

Some factions among the Lebanese intellectuals are allied to the local Establishment,

This essay, in an earlier draft, was written in the fall of 1968, shortly after a trip to Beirut. The events in the Middle East that have since occurred, while serious enough, do not, in my judgment, significantly change the impressions and conclusions noted here. In one or two instances I have added a few remarks.—I. G.

whether by taste, class, or ambition. But there are also independent writers who work for the many newspapers published in the capital. And there are individuals engaged mainly in political activity, although they are not professional politicians. Among the latter are academicians as well as lawyers, a profession which has traditionally supplied Lebanon's ruling class.

Formal organizations, such as the Cénacle Libanais, directed by the sophisticated Michel Asmar, represent a tendency both closely attuned to Western thought and representative of the concerns of Arab intellectuals. The Cénacle organizes lectures on political and literary matters, and for the past twenty years it has sought to maintain the "flame of learning and critical thought" alive in the heart of the Arab world. It does not encourage the "radical" thinking that flourishes in Beirut, let alone that found in Damascus or Cairo. Among the independent writers is the "poet of Lebanon," Adonis, alias Ali Ahmed Said, who writes for the newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* and recently launched a new journal entitled, *Mawaqif* (*Positions*). Adonis is in close touch with the Baghdadi poet Jabra L. Jabra, the writer Layla Baalbaki who scandalized Beirut with her novel *I Live*, and a host of other writers in the city. Adonis expressed the sentiments of many of his followers and associates in his eloquent "Manifesto of June 5," which appeared in Beirut and subsequently in the French liberal Catholic periodical, *Esprit*.

Cecil Hourani, best known in this country for his important essay "The Moment of Truth," which was reprinted in the November 1967 issue of *Encounter* (after having appeared in the Beirut daily, *an-Nahar*), is in a category by himself. An independent, itinerant critic, he is attacked by militant Arab nationalists who are annoyed by his criticism and who resent his irregular residence in Lebanon. Westerners are on occasion suspicious of Hourani, feeling he speaks freely only because he is a wandering intellectual. In fact, Hourani speaks in the same way whether he is in the East or the West.

Some of the intellectuals are familiar with the works of Sartre, Camus, Yevtushenko, Voznesenski, and Adam Schaaf, as well as with the writings of Egyptian realists and Abbassid poets. Though politically oriented and increasingly active, they share not so much a common political outlook as a conviction that as responsible intellectuals they must be committed to the reform of their society. More single-minded in their political activity are such men as Walid Khalidi, the Palestinian political scientist at the American University of Beirut, Constantin Zurayq, eminent historian at the same university, and Gebran Majdalany, the well-known Ba'thist lawyer who is a frequent participant in discussions between European and Arab socialists.

All these men keep returning to the Palestinian question and the impact of the June War. As in 1948, although not yet to the same extent, there is a decided relationship between military defeat and internal political developments. Some observers anticipated a dramatic change in Egypt after Nasser's gesture of resignation. Thus far, it has not yet happened. But it is axiomatic, at least among radicals encountered in Lebanon, that the Palestine question, the military defeat, and the more profound explanations for the disparity between Israeli and Arab society reflect a turning point within the Arab world. Constantin Zurayq, who published *The*

Meaning of Disaster in 1948, has come out with a new account of the most recent disaster. The long-term causes, he writes, remain the same: "the disparity of civilization is at the root" of the defeat and it can only be remedied by making Arab society "scientific." This entails a concentrated dose of what made the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution possible in Western Europe, with attention paid to the differences in the societies involved—which in turn may make impossible or extremely difficult the adaptations he proposes. That such a process of modernization will have to occur in a political environment dominated by nationalism is accepted without argument. But after all, the need to modernize and to become "scientific" was felt as a result of the very same situations which first inspired the emergence of an intense nationalism.

IN "THE MOMENT OF TRUTH" Cecil Hourani urged a reevaluation of the Arab nations' method of dealing with Israel and Zionism, suggesting what may be termed a gradualist approach. Hourani is an exponent of realism, and he exposed what he considers the unrealistic exploitation of foreign ideologies, of the Marxist variety in particular, by the more vociferous Arab regimes. His association with President Bourguiba of Tunisia has not endeared him to people who dislike Bourguiba's position on Israel, or his relations with France. Although Hourani is considered somewhat suspect in more militant circles, it is nevertheless characteristic of the post-1967 War period that there is less talk about revolution, socialism, or ideology than there was in an earlier period.

In his "Manifesto of June 5, 1967," Adonis sees the June War as provoking a crisis of conscience, and he questions the complacency and myths current in the Arab world today. Like others given to revolutionary terminology, he explains that political change could only follow upon the transformation of Arab man. For that, according to Adonis, there are three prerequisites:

the advent of liberty, creation-action, the rape of habit. . . . We live today in a world of masks. The ties that connect the Arab thinker with himself, that link him with the truth, that connect him with liberty, are all broken. Let him begin by rebuilding them. . . . But let him know that all that surrounds him is an obstacle, and that he begins from nothing, and that his own life may be one of the sacrifices which his struggle will exact.¹

"Creation-action" refers to the process by which the transformation of Arab man will take place. It involves his "participation in the movement of History":

Today, more than ever, History calls us. Art is no longer the science of formal aesthetics. Today, it is the science of meaning, the meaning of History, of society, of the truth, of the universe. And in a society deprived of meaning, the individual can only lead a life that is also deprived of meaning.²

The last prerequisite is the destruction of tradition, of habit. For this, the poet is naturally suited since all creation entails risk, struggle, and the destruction of forms that are considered obsolete. Adonis' language makes it clear that he thinks as a poet, but the context of his words makes it equally clear that the changes he seeks to inspire are themselves inspired by external conditions and, specifically, by the events of June 5.

While the references to man in History or man making History may strike a Westerner as a form of retarded sophistication, it is important to recall that Lebanon is not only a pluralist society, but also a society in which religion is not easily or publicly dismissed. In fact, the sectarian nature of Lebanese society explains in part the Lebanese response to Israel. Adonis represents the secular intellectuals, of whom there are a substantial number. But even this group acknowledges, with sadness, that the major-

ity of Lebanese are not about to abandon their religious outlooks.

There is a tradition of more than one religious outlook, and it is this familiarity with a multiplicity of gods, Muslim and Christian, that explains the traditional tension between Lebanon and its Arab-Muslim neighbors. Something of this sort also disturbs Lebanese who cannot or choose not to accept Israel as an all-Jewish state.

It is common knowledge that Lebanon was reticent in its relations with more militant Arab nationalist governments, expressing the fear among its Christian population of being absorbed in a Muslim Arab union. Not that all Christians, that is to say Lebanese Maronites and Greek Orthodox, are intolerant of Arab unity or Arab nationalism; on the contrary, exceptions are well-known. Yet the generalization remains accurate. For the same reason, Lebanon's attitude toward Israel has differed from that of her neighbors in its striking moderation. But as the populace grows more impatient with the privileged position that the Lebanese Maronites and Greek Orthodox have held, and as these two groups become more involved in the Palestine question, it is reasonable to predict that the direction of Lebanon's foreign policy may also change.

In less difficult times, there might have been a natural attraction between those Israelis and Lebanese who are concerned with the problems of secularism in nonsecular societies. At the present time, this potential concern cannot counteract the fear Israel inspires, particularly in regard to possible territorial expansion. The intellectuals who would be happy to see a secular state established in Lebanon criticize Israel for its emphasis on an exclusively Jewish population. Europeans and Americans may lament the ignorance of recent history which explains this to their satisfaction; but it is also a fact of life that the recent history Israel brings to our mind is not the same to the Lebanese.

Anti-Semitism exists in Lebanon. *The*

¹ "Le Manifeste du 5 juin 1967," *Esprit*, March 1968, p. 438.

² *Ibid.*, p. 442.

Protocols of the Elders of Zion are to be found in local bookstores along with Ford's anti-Semitic tracts. The dangers of anti-Semitism are recognized and discussed by a number of Lebanese intellectuals. Majdalany, the Lebanese Ba'thist mentioned earlier, writes and talks against it, though he is also passionately anti-Zionist and a fervent supporter of al-Fatah.

THE PUBLIC SUPPORT for Fatah is one of the more striking features of the Beirut political scene, and one that runs counter to the moderation that had thus far characterized Lebanon. To talk of the Palestinians in Beirut is not a simple matter. There are the Palestinians themselves, there are the Lebanese militants who support them, and there are the political dilettantes who latched on to them. The first issue that must be confronted is not the support of Palestinian terrorism, which is an undeniable aspect of Fatah militancy, but rather why the Palestinians have suddenly begun to loom so large on the scene. For the sake of accuracy, it should be said that public opinion in the United States remains behind the times in this respect. One has only to go to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv to hear countless discussions on what is to be done with the Palestinians. Opinions may vary, but most agree that these people have become a factor to be reckoned with. In Lebanon, as elsewhere in the Arab world, one of the results of the June War was the emergence of the Palestinians as a separate political force. Disillusioned with the promises of solidarity, which had become articles of religious faith for the past 20 years, the Palestinians, now dispersed throughout the Arab world, were forced by the defeat of June to reconsider their position.

The War destroyed the myth of Arab solidarity as well as the promise of liberation. With this new "realism," the treatment of the Palestinians at the hands of individual Arab governments is also no longer hidden.

Lebanon does not differ significantly in this regard. Palestinians are publicly endorsed, al-Fatah is admired, but Palestinians within the refugee camps in Lebanon remain under the usual surveillance; and organized activity in the city, among Palestinians who are not bound to the camps, remains under an irregular but more or less constant watch. If inconsistent, the pattern is not difficult to understand. Maintaining its traditional non-committed pose, the Lebanese government does not seek opportunities to take a radical stand on the question of Israel. It seeks good relations with its sometimes difficult Arab neighbors, which in practice means pursuing the "normal" line on Israel. Within the country, no trouble is wanted, and the Palestinians who are in the several camps of Lebanon are watched so that they will not take action that might embarrass the government. Individual Palestinians who have become members of Fatah complain that they are as much under Lebanese scrutiny as they are under that of the Israelis.

The change in the Lebanese Cabinet that followed on the Beirut raid suggests that a more lenient line will be pursued with respect to Palestinians in Lebanon. But it may be wise to bear in mind that the example of Jordan is not a tempting one to governments that do not want to be forcibly engaged in total mobilization. There is still a difference between sympathizing with Fatah, which is not new, and following the path of Hussein, who appears to have virtually lost control of his Jordanian Kingdom.

PALESTINIANS WHO JOIN Fatah and those who are engaged in political action share the same position on one key issue: not that Israel must be destroyed, but that they must achieve some form of recognition for themselves as a distinct people. It is this which they are afraid to see blurred by the Arab governments that claim to speak for them. The Lebanese intellectuals, who are sympathetic to this position, may disagree among themselves as to their stand on Israel, but

they agree that the time has come to help the Palestinians form a political community of their own.

How this is to take place, what the relationship of this future Palestinian entity will be to Jordan and to Israel, and what the form of this Palestinian community will be, are questions no one has fully answered. Among members of Fatah encountered in Beirut, some were devoted to the idea that Israel must be totally "liberated," while others spoke in terms of coexistence, and still others spoke of the creation of a pluralist state. For the first group, a political solution to the conflict appears threatening, since it implies some form of mutual recognition. For the second group, the more moderate Palestinians, such a possibility is not unwelcome provided it is accompanied by their recognition. For the third group, which includes men with a vague nostalgia for the binationalism discussed in earlier days, implementation of such a plan is unclear. The first and the third groups have something in common in that they challenge the existence of the state of Israel as it is; that is, as a Jewish state. They do not speak of accommodation, in any form, with Israel. The "moderate" Palestinians are those, then, who are prepared to begin from today. To say that they are moderate, however, should not raise false ideas as to their methods. It comes as no surprise to those familiar with resistance movements of this kind, that the more activist militants often come to the fore.

That terrorism will polarize sentiment between Israel and the Arab world at large, seems fairly obvious. The experiences of the last months confirm it. This prospect is not

regarded as unfortunate by those Palestinians who see their activity as mainly negative, that is a disruptive one, which they regard as a preliminary to positive action. In the absence of any official word of recognition or potential interest from Israel, the Palestinians appear to be convinced that their role must be to disrupt the exchanges that take place between the Israeli and Arab governments. And again, those Lebanese who support the Palestinians as a whole, do not condemn the terrorism, because they feel it is as justified as was the Algerian terrorism against the French during the war of 1954-62. They are convinced, I believe in a dangerous and erroneous way, that terrorism is the only thing that will convince Israelis to take the Palestinians seriously. On the Israeli side, my conversations with officials and concerned individuals, including Israeli Arabs, made it quite clear that terrorism would not force the government to change its position, and it might, on the contrary, turn away those who are most prepared to think in terms of the creation of some kind of Palestinian entity. In any case, those Israelis prepared to endorse such a creation are a minority, but not as insignificant as one might suppose in the United States.

This discussion, admittedly a limited one, excludes the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as it excludes the basic question of why Lebanese and Palestinians are hostile to Israel to begin with. Without entering into that historic debate, but accepting the existence of Israel and the presence of Palestinians as accomplished facts, the prospects for peace in the Middle East would seem to dictate a conciliation of some kind between these two peoples; the first a nation, the second a potential nation in search of recognition.

Lars Rydell

Poverty as a Structural Problem

I WHOLEHEARTEDLY concur with Barry Bluestone's position in "The Poor Who Have Jobs" (DISSENT, September-October 1968) that the currently popular proposals to adapt the poor to our modern industrialized economy through programs of manpower training and development are totally inadequate as solutions to relative poverty. His attempt to document this by focusing on the structural factors which perpetuate poverty—his distinction between employment in low- and high-wage industries and his analysis of the factors which cause and perpetuate these low-wage industries—is important evidence.

However, as he mentions in passing at the end of his paper, this is really a problem of "... an inequitable income distribution ..." (of which, incidentally, low wages is only one of many causal components) and that "... negative tax proposals [or one might add any redistribution mechanism outside the economic structure] must be seen as crucial to

the whole problem of the working poor [and nonworking poor] in America." The truth of this assertion and the limits of Bluestone's policy proposals are brought into sharp relief by comparing the earned income distribution in the United States with a country that has both the policies which Bluestone criticizes and those which he proposes, namely Sweden. This is done in Table 1 by looking at the share of the national income received by the bottom and top 20 per cent of the income scales in both countries.

The striking finding of the table is that the respective shares of the national income received by the top and bottom fifth for each country are the same—5 per cent for the bottom fifth, and 40 per cent for the top fifth. In addition these shares have remained constant over the past two decades, exactly when the Swedish welfare state regulations should have had their greatest impact.

The data clearly support Bluestone's original

Table 1

PER CENT OF THE TOTAL INCOME RECEIVED BY THE TOP AND BOTTOM QUINTILES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN IN SELECTED YEARS FROM 1947 TO 1964.

United States*	Quintile	Per Cent of Total Income Received in		
		1947	1953	1962
	Bottom	5%	5%	5%
	Top	43	41	42
Sweden**		1948	1955	1964
	Bottom	5.4%	5.5%	4.9%
	Top	44.6	42.3	44.3

* Based on census data on incomes for families, from Leon H. Keyserling, *Conference on Economic Progress* (Washington, D.C., 1964).

** Based on declared income of income earners,

from Goran Therborn, "Till kritiken av den blandade ekonomin," in *En ny vanster*, ed. Goran Therborn (Stockholm: Raben and Sjogren, 1966), p. 136.

assertion that relative poverty is not the result of a constellation of attributes of individuals which can be effectively manipulated to eliminate poverty. The data also show that relative poverty is not a minor structural problem which can be solved or ameliorated through minor manipulations or reforms within the present economic system. Rather, poverty appears to be an inevitable and inherent feature of a capitalist economy, even under the extensive governmental regulations and supports present in advanced welfare states such as Sweden. This does not mean that a solution to relative poverty is only possible through the socialization of the economy with restrictions placed on incomes at all levels. The findings suggest, however, that we must direct our attention and energies toward developing and implementing alternative systems to redistribute the income which the economic system inherently distributes inequitably.

The major problem in this effort is not to design a system that can have an impact on all the causes of poverty and other economic inequalities in the country, e.g. low wages, family size, absence of a male provider, disabilities, and unemployment. The negative income tax proposals or social dividend taxation schemes would work to ameliorate all of these causes. The most difficult problem is to find a rationale and an entree which is acceptable to, or which side-steps, the American value structure's emphasis on an individual's earning his own living. One possible source of such a rationale is a lacuna in America's tax structure, which when coupled with her commitment to

equality (that everyone is equally entitled to the same rights and privileges or goods and services that others in the society are *given* as a matter of course) may provide an effective entree. This lacuna is America's present system of tax deductions. The original rationale for these deductions appears to have been that only incomes over and above that spent on basic necessities—defined as \$600 per individual medical expenses, and taxes to other levels of government—should be subject to federal income taxes. This presumably fostered equality by not requiring those with very low incomes to pay taxes. However, if one changes perspectives slightly and starts with the federal government's right to tax the incomes of its citizens, then these deductions or tax-free incomes appear as a system of indirect governmental subsidies. The size of the subsidies is equivalent to the amount of tax savings accrued by taking the deductions.

From this perspective the government already has, implicit in its tax structure, a system of individual allowances, government subsidization of medical expenses, and housing allotments. Subsidization of local taxes is a form of housing allotment, since local taxes are primarily real estate taxes.

However, the formula by which these allotments and subsidies are allocated—deductions from earned income—serves to support the present maldistribution of income, rather than to foster a more equitable redistribution. This is, first of all, because low-income groups have unused deductions and thus receive no tax savings or subsidy from these deductions.

Table 2

VALUE OF INDIRECT SUBSIDY (TAX SAVINGS) IN 1967 TO A FAMILY OF FOUR FOR STANDARD PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS AND HYPOTHETICAL MEDICAL EXPENSES OF \$300 AND REAL ESTATE TAXES OF \$200.

Income Level	Value of Indirect Subsidy from Deduction					
	Standard Personal Deductions			Second Child	\$300 in Medical Expenses	\$200 in Real Estate Taxes
	Husband	Wife	First Child			
\$ 3,200	\$ 98	\$ 96	\$ 90	\$ 80	\$ 42	\$ 28
\$10,000	132	132	132	120	57	38
\$50,000	300	300	300	300	150	100

This is the inequity which forms the basis of most discussions of negative income taxes. Second, the existing formula preserves the maldistribution of income because, while deductions are ostensibly given for basic expenses, the actual tax savings are in terms of an individual's or family's highest marginal tax rate. In other words, the subsidies are progressively larger for higher income levels. Table 2 clearly shows this inequity in the case of families of four at various income levels.

THE SIZE of the allowances given through the tax structure to members of a family earning \$50,000 is three and one-half times larger than those given to a family earning \$3,200, and two to two and one-half times larger than those given to a family earning \$10,000. The same unequal ratios exist in regard to the percentage of medical expenses and local taxes subsidized.

A system of income redistribution to alleviate relative poverty could be developed in the United States by arguing that all citizens, working- and middle-class as well as the poor, should have an equal right to receive the same size of individual allowances, housing allot-

ments, and medical care subsidies that the upper income groups now receive indirectly through the federal income tax system. This could be accomplished within the present tax structure by giving equal tax credits, applied to taxes to be paid, rather than deductions from taxable income, for basic expenses, housing costs, and medical care. To enable low income groups to benefit equally from and to make effective use of these subsidies, they would have to be given the option of receiving either their unused credits in the form of a yearly tax refund or their subsidies in monthly payments. This is basically the social dividend taxation scheme proposed by Lady Rhys-Williams in England during World War II.

Thus, as Bluestone's analysis and the comparison between the United States and Sweden clearly show, the problem of relative poverty is a structural one that will not disappear by itself or through minor economic reforms or supports. The solution rests in some mechanism to redistribute income, and the task ahead is to develop rationales that lead to the implementation of such a mechanism. The analysis of our current tax system presented above will hopefully prove to be a step in that direction.

"PREVENTIVE DETENTION"—NIXON'S BABY (continued from page 194)

sary to attack the real problems. Of course, decent jobs, housing, and schools are the basic answer to "crime in the streets." But *within* the judicial system there are measures, known to everyone who has given the matter even cursory attention, which could have a major effect. They are simple, but they cost money—lots of it.

Speedy trial—Are we willing to pay the cost for the judges, court buildings, prosecutors and public defenders necessary to bring criminal defendants to trial in two days, in weeks or months, instead of two years? That would eliminate the argument for any kind of preventive detention. In addition, it would also reinforce

the *feeling* that the crime and the penalty are causally connected, and work against the feeling that the mill of justice grinds so painfully and slowly that once caught in the machinery it makes not too much difference to the victim whether he is eventually found guilty or innocent—and hence whether he actually *was* guilty or innocent of the crime charged.

Jail and Prison Reform—Are we also willing to spend the billions necessary to transform our jails, juvenile detention facilities, and penitentiaries into centers for training and rehabilitation for useful lives rather than the crime factories most of them are today?

Mikhail Bulgakov

A Russian Writer Speaks to Stalin

THROUGH MOST OF HIS CAREER, Mikhail Bulgakov, author of *The Master and Margarita*, was under attack by Party critics. By 1930 his plays were barred from the Soviet stage, and ultimately a general ban was placed upon all his publications, exposing the young writer to what he termed the stark prospects of "financial ruin, the street, and death."

In such a state of mind Bulgakov wrote a letter to the Soviet government, requesting permission to leave Russia, or, as an alternative, to work in the theater. In an unprecedented telephone call from Stalin, Bulgakov was given the verdict: no permission to leave, but a work-assignment in the Moscow Art Theater.

Bulgakov's letter to the Soviet government remained unpublished for more than 36 years. Then, in the September 1966 issue of the Soviet periodical *Voprosy Literatury* ("Questions of Literature") a literary historian, S. Liandres, published an article entitled "A Russian Writer Cannot Live in Exile." Liandres's article deals explicitly with Bulgakov, notably with Bulgakov's letter to the Soviet government, and in his article Liandres incorporates the letter or what is purported to be the original letter.

Recently, however, another version of Bulgakov's letter appeared in the United States through "underground" channels—presumably the original version. A comparison of the two reveals that the Liandres version is so radically cut that it severely distorts the primary and ultimate purpose of Bulgakov's argument.

The appearance of this "underground" version is all the more significant in that, together with the Liandres version, it points to a parallel sequence of events involving Bulgakov's novel *The Master and Margarita*. Two versions of the novel have been published in the United States, in translation: the one, the "official" Soviet version, radically expurgated; the other, an "underground" version, presenting the novel apparently in its complete form.

During the last 10 years of his life, Bulgakov was Director of the Moscow Art Theater. On occasion he participated as an actor in some of its dramatic productions.

In 1966, about 25 years after his death, the Soviet government readmitted him to the company of eminent Russian writers and published a selection of his earlier works, including a truncated version of *The Master and Margarita*. Although no new works appeared during Bulgakov's final years, there seems to be clear evidence of a considerable collection of unpublished material, including some 19 plays.

Bulgakov died in 1940 at the early age of 49, apparently the victim of a cancerous disease that resulted in partial blindness. Despite this he managed to carry his masterpiece, *The Master and Margarita*, to completion, thus, seeming to foreshadow and to realize in the world of actuality the blazing words of Paul in Robert Frost's *Masque of Mercy*:

Contemplate glory. There will be a light.

Contemplate Truth until it burns your eyes out."

—L. M. TIKOS

Bulgakov's Letter to the Soviet Government

I DIRECT THE FOLLOWING LETTER to the Government of the U.S.S.R.

After the official ban on all my works, many people who know me as a writer began suggesting that I write a "Communist play" (the quotation marks are not mine). Furthermore, I was advised to submit a letter of repentance to the Government of the U.S.S.R. renouncing the views expressed in my previous literary works, and giving assurance that henceforth I intended to work as a fellow traveler dedicated to the ideas of Communism. The aim? To save myself from persecution, poverty, and inevitable ruin.

1. I did not heed this advice. It is very doubtful whether I could have appeared in a favorable light

L. M. TIKOS translated Mikhail Bulgakov's letter.

in the eyes of the Soviet Government, had I written such a hypocritical letter, which could only have been a superficial one, and indeed a naive political trick.

Nor did I try to write a Communist play—since I was sure from the beginning that I would not be able to write such a play with any degree of success.

My wish to rid myself of my suffering as a writer has now reached a full decision and this prompts me to submit this letter to the Soviet Government telling the whole truth as I see it.

2. Leafing through my press clippings, I note that during the 10 years of my literary activity there were 300 references to me in the Soviet press. Only three of these were laudatory; 297 were hostile and defamatory and were intended, as if in a mirror, to be a self-revelation of my life as a writer.

Alexey Turbin, the hero of my play, *The Days of the Turbins*,¹ has been called in published verses a son-of-a-bitch, and the author of the play has been acclaimed as someone perpetually fascinated by “dog’s dung.” I was referred to in print as a “literary scullion living off food-scrap spat upon by a dozen dinner guests.” Or this, “My boy, Misha Bulgakov, (if you will pardon the expression) is a writer who likes to nose around in the town-dump . . . look at that mug there, brother, . . . You know, I’m a man of delicate disposition, but I could take and smack you right between the eyes. We need these Turbins like a dog needs a bra. A. Turbin, that son-of-a-bitch! Who needs him?” (*Life of Art*, No. 44, 1927.)

Bulgakov, according to the critics, remains what he has always been, “a neo-bourgeois abortion, whose mouth is foaming with a poisonous but impotent stream of saliva aimed at the working class and their Communist ideals.” (*The Red Proletarian*, No. 14, Oct. 1926.) It has also been reported that I am delighted with the atmosphere produced by the “dog-like fornications going on involving the wife of a friend” (Lunacharsky, *Izvestia*, 10/8/1926) and that my play *The Days of the Turbins* “stinks.” (Record of the meeting of the Agitation and Propaganda Department, May, 1927.) And thus on and on.

I hasten to add that I do not cite these pas-

sages merely in order to complain against criticism or to start any polemics whatsoever. My aim is much more serious. With documents in hand I am demonstrating that the entire press of the U.S.S.R. and, along with it, all the organizations that are given the assignment of controlling literary repertoire matters have unanimously and with unprecedented animosity asserted during the entire period of my literary activity that Bulgakov’s works cannot exist in the U.S.S.R.

And I declare that the press of the U.S.S.R. is absolutely correct.

3. Take, for example, my play *The Crimson Island*, to begin with. All the critics in the U.S.S.R., without exception, greeted this play with the declaration that it was “uninspired, toothless, poor,” and also a “lampoon” against the Revolution.

The unanimity was complete, but then suddenly and unexpectedly it was broken: Issue No. 12 of the *Repertoire Bulletin*, 1928, published a review by P. Novitsky in which it was stated that *The Crimson Island* dealt with “the evil and dark parody” in which the “evil spirit of the Grand Inquisitor appears, suppresses artistic creativity and strongly advocates theatrical clichés which obliterate the personality of the actor and the writer.” This review pointed out, moreover, that *The Crimson Island* dealt with “the evil and dark forces that breed morons, subservient characters and panegyrists.” It was also said that “if such dark forces do exist, then the indignation and scathing wit of the famous bourgeois playwright are justified.”

May I ask: What are the facts of the case? What is *The Crimson Island* actually? Is it a “poor, uninspired play” or is it a “witty play”? Novitsky’s review contains the truth. I do not intend to judge how witty my play is, but I admit that an evil spirit does appear in it—and it is the spirit of the Main Repertoire Committee.² It is this Committee that breeds morons, panegyrists, and terrified, spineless characters. It is this Committee that is killing the creative spirit, undermining the Soviet theater, and is in fact doing a very thorough job of it.

I have not expressed these thoughts merely privately. I have in fact incorporated them in my play, which I am also directing. The Soviet press,

¹ *The Days of the Turbins* is the dramatized version of Bulgakov’s novel *The White Guard* (1925).

² Main Repertoire Committee—Board of Censorship for the Soviet theater.

however, backing the Main Repertoire Committee, reported that *The Crimson Island* is a lampoon against the Revolution. This is nothing but stupid nonsense.

There is no parody against the Revolution in this play, and for several reasons, of which I shall mention only one for lack of space: because of the extraordinary magnificence of the Revolution, it is impossible to write a lampoon against it. A satirical play is not a lampoon and the Main Repertoire Committee is not the Revolution.

But when the German press writes that *The Crimson Island* is the first call in the Soviet Union for the freedom of the press (*Young Guard*, No. 1, 1929), then it is writing the truth. I do admit that. To fight against censorship—no matter what it consists of and no matter in what government it exists—is my duty as a writer; and appeals for freedom of the press are my concern. I am an ardent champion of this kind of freedom and dare say that if any writer thought of proving he could do without it, he would be like a fish trying to demonstrate publicly that it can do without water.

4. This concern about freedom is one of the distinctive features of my art and it seems to be quite sufficient to keep my work from staying alive in the U.S.S.R. And all the other distinguishing marks in my satirical works are offshoots of this primary one: the black and mystical colors (I am a mystical writer) which reflect the senseless abnormalities of our everyday life, the virulence with which my language is charged, the profound scepticism concerning the revolutionary process taking place at this moment in my backward country, and my favorite concern, the Great Evolution, with which I have contrasted it—but, most important, the portrayal of the terrible traits of my people, traits which, long before the Revolution, caused my teacher, Saltykov-Shchedrin the deepest suffering.³

Needless to say, the press of the U.S.S.R. did not even consider it important enough to take notice of all this since it has been so preoccupied with the hardly convincing reports about the so-called slander in Bulgakov's satires. Only once, at the beginning of my career, was the following observation made, and

even then with a trace of arrogant astonishment: "Bulgakov wants to become the satirist of our time" (*New Books*, No. 6, 1925). But alas, the wrong tense was employed, to no avail. It should have been put in the imperfect: Bulgakov *became* a satirist, and presumably at a time when any kind of genuine satire (penetrating the forbidden zones) was absolutely inconceivable in the U.S.S.R.

I do not claim the honor of formulating such a criminal thought in the pages of the Soviet press. Not at all. It was done with unmistakable clarity in V. Blume's article (*Literary Gazette*), the meaning of which can be summed up brilliantly and precisely in one terse statement: It is the aim of every satirist in the Soviet Union to destroy the Soviet regime.

Am I conceivable in the U.S.S.R.?

5. And finally, *here*—in my doomed works: *The Days of the Turbins*, *Escape*, and my novel *The White Guard*—one may find the other distinctive features of my art, for example: the persistent portrayal of the Russian intelligentsia as being the best element in our country, particularly the depiction of an intellectual family of the nobility, who by the haphazard fate of history is thrown into the Civil War, into the ranks of the White Guard, in keeping with the traditions of *War and Peace*. Such a handling of the material is completely natural for a writer who is closely connected with the intelligentsia.

But such a treatment of the problem leads to only one consequence as far as this writer is concerned (and his heroes, too): despite all his efforts to stay objective on the question of White and Red, he is in the final analysis condemned in the U.S.S.R. as a White Guard, that is to say, an enemy of the State and obviously as such can consider himself finished in the U.S.S.R.

6. My literary portrait is now finished. It is at the same time a political portrait. I cannot tell how utterly criminal the critics will find it, but I ask one thing of the witnesses: do not seek for things that are not there. The portrait is true to life; it hides nothing.

7. Now I am finished. My ruin was greeted by Soviet public opinion with undisguised

³ M. Y. Saltykov-Shchedrin (1826–1889)—well-known satirist of the 19th century.

pleasure and characterized as an "achievement." R. Pikel, in referring to my demise (*Izvestia*, 10/15/1929), expressed his attitude with great generosity: "We do not mean to say by this that Bulgakov's name is crossed off from the list of Soviet playwrights." And he offered encouragement to the ruined writer as follows: "I am talking about his previous plays." But the voice of experience, that is to say, the Main Repertoire Committee, indicates that Pikel's liberal position is not in accord with the "official" attitude, for on May 18, 1930,⁴ I received a message from the Main Repertoire Committee stating curtly that not my previous plays, but my present play, *The Bondage of Hypocrites* (Molière),⁵ was not approved for stage presentation.

To put it briefly: under two lines written on a scrap of official paper, there it lies buried: my research in the great libraries, the product of my creative imagination, a play that has received repeated and unqualified praise from qualified drama critics as being a brilliant piece of work.

R. Pikel is mistaken. Not only my previous works are doomed, but also those of the present and even those of the future. I myself, with my own hands, have cast into the fire the first draft of a novel dealing with the devil, the manuscript of a comedy, and the beginning of another novel entitled *Theater*.

All my works have been reduced to nothing.

8. I am asking the Soviet Government to take into consideration the obvious fact that I am not a politician but a writer, and that I have given all that I've written to the Soviet theater. I am not asking that consideration be given to the following two references made to me in the Soviet press. Both of them are made by sworn enemies of my plays and are therefore revealing: In 1925 *Izvestia* carried this reference concerning me: "This is a writer

who does not even fall into the pink category of the fellow traveler." (Averbakh, *Izvestia*, 9/20/1925.) And in 1929 this statement appeared: "His talent is as obvious as the politically reactionary character of his art." (Pikel, *Izvestia*, 9/15/1929.) I ask, furthermore, that this be taken into account: I would just as soon be buried alive as to be forbidden to write.

9. I herewith ask the Soviet Government, therefore, to order me to leave the domain of the Soviet Union within the shortest possible deadline.

10. I address myself to the generosity of the Soviet Government and ask that I be magnanimously released to freedom, since I am a writer who can no longer be useful in his fatherland.

11. If all that I have written here is not convincing and I should be sentenced to lifelong silence in the U.S.S.R., then I ask the Soviet Government to give me employment in accord with my special field of interest and commission me to work in the theater as a state-employed director. I shall pledge to be a scrupulously honest director and actor, without the slightest intention of creating disharmony or disorder. I would be ready and willing to direct conscientiously any play—whether Shakespeare or a contemporary play. If, however, I should not be assigned a directorship, then I ask to be a state-employed extra. If, however, I cannot qualify as an extra, then I would take the job of scene-shifter. If even this should be out of the question, then I ask the Soviet Government to do with me as it sees fit, but to do something, anything with me, since at the present moment the only prospects for me, the writer of five plays, well-known here and abroad, are complete financial ruin, the street, and death.

I ask to be directed explicitly, for no organization and no individuals have responded to my petitions.

March 28, 1930.

M. BULGAKOV

⁴ This is obviously a typographical error in the Russian version—the date most likely was March 18, ten days before Bulgakov wrote his letter.

⁵ *The Bondage of Hypocrites*—a play about Molière's life, banned by censorship because of political allusions to contemporary Russia.

Henry Pachter

Leszek Kolakowski

Jester at the Court of Marxism

TOWARD A MARXIST HUMANISM, essays, translated by Jane Zielonko Peel. New York: Grove Press, 1968. 220 pp. \$5.50.

TRAKTAT ÜBER DIE STERBLICHKEIT DER VERNUNFT, essays, translated by Peter Lachmann. Munich: R. Piper, 1967. 270 pp.

THE ALIENATION OF REASON: A HISTORY OF POSITIVE THOUGHT, translated by Norbert Guterman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968. 230 pp. \$4.95.¹

THE NAME of Leszek Kolakowski is famous outside the borders of his native Poland and far beyond the circle of professional philosophers, not because his doctrines are exciting like Sartre's or his discoveries pioneering like Galileo's, but because his much more modest achievements aroused the displeasure of the authorities. Deprived of his university chair and expelled from the Polish Communist party, he now lives in his homeland as an exile. These seem poor reasons to read a philosopher—as though one were to study *cogito ergo sum* because Descartes caught pneumonia in Queen Christina's chambers. One might enjoy Spinoza's philosophy without the knowledge of his excommunication. But in Kolakowski's case, the philosophy is so intimately interwoven with the fight against orthodoxy that one could describe it as a primer on how to be a heretic. He did not, like Galileo, just accidentally and unsuspectingly clash with the authorities; rather, the form and content of his philosophy are the strategy and tactics of nonconformist thought, particularly in countries where "The Office" provides "The Truth" for everyone.

Kolakowski's fight with "The Office" is reflected in his impish tactics, a few examples of which will lead us right into the center of his thinking. Some of these little stratagems are merely verbal hedges, permitting the author to shoot from behind a cover. Thus he complains about "remnants of petty-bourgeois ideologies," which survive even "in countries liberated from the capitalist yoke." One laughs, and the irony becomes ribald when Kolakowski, turning the tables on his critics, finds these ideologies surviving "under the guise of Marxist orthodoxy." So much for the living inquisitors whom Revelation enables "to evaluate any opinion they might encounter; [it is] the granite throne from which they pass judgment without risk of error." But what about the hallowed source of that Revelation? Can one criticize Lenin in a country liberated from capitalist dogma?

Kolakowski cannot say that, in writing his only philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin made a fool of himself; so he states clearly what the empirio-criticist's concern was, then abruptly states what

¹ The important essay on "Marx's Conception of the Truth," a lecture given at the University of Tuebingen in 1958, is the only one included in both the English and the German collections. The German translation is closer to the original, the English more readable. Unfortunately, no dates are given for the other essays. Since the positions taken in different essays differ occasionally, dating them would have allowed the reader to follow the author's evolution. Three essay collections have appeared in Poland: *Essays on Catholic Philoso-*

phy (Warsaw: 1955), *Philosophy and Everyday Life* (Warsaw: 1957), *Culture and Fetishes* (Warsaw: 1967). I have not been able to see a collection of essays which I understand the Pall Mall Press of London is preparing under the title *Marxism and Beyond*. Since I do not read Polish, I am much indebted to two articles by Mr. Leo Labedz in *Survey* and in *Encounter* (both published in London), from which I have gleaned quotations from previously untranslated essays.

Lenin argued to refute them, and trusts the reader to see that Lenin did not know what he was talking about. But for readers who don't dig it, he adds: "Stalin summarized this book in a popular article that was required reading in all Soviet schools." Still more savage is the attack in an essay that begins with two quotes by the same Soviet author, before and after the Party Congress but as different from each other as two photos in a patent medicine advertisement. His first reaction is to ask indignantly: Is this still Marxism? But then he pauses and says: Come to think of it, this *is* Marxism as it has come to be when it stopped being criticism and was converted into a state philosophy, the ideology of a party, a faith.

Kolakowski has always been fascinated by the manifestations of orthodoxy and the gyrations of theology. He began his career with studies on Christian philosophy, and later he put his knowledge to good use: in the late fifties he wrote of Thomism in such a way that it was easy to read "Stalinism," and when he attacked "the Church" for denying the autonomy of the individual, readers could not help thinking of "the Party."

But Kolakowski is not simply against the caricature of Marxism which is The Office's version of The Truth; more profoundly, he is averse to any system and even to Marxism insofar as it lends itself to the claim that it has come into possession of The Truth. Since this cannot be stated in so many words under the conditions prevailing after "liberation from the capitalist yoke," Kolakowski asks the strategic question: What did Marx mean by truth? He answers by first stating the well-known view of Engels and Lenin that our mind, with the aid of our sensory organs, can reflect, or at least approach more and more closely, a reasonably adequate picture of the "outside" world, which these masters conceived as independent of the mind.

By contrast, Kolakowski expounds the pragmatist view of William James, or rather a caricature of it which has a strong resemblance to the *partiinost's* view that true is what is useful at any given moment. Stating that this is incompatible with Marx's view, he then proceeds to show that Marx's view is even less compatible with the Engels-Lenin

hypothesis. For Marx, he explains, the truth is not something forever outside the human mind; rather it is "humanized nature" appropriated by human activity, and therefore forever changing as new social conditions permit mankind to ask new questions and to set itself new tasks. To the young Marx the objects of the world were social products, and matter separated from human *praxis* seemed as nonsensical to him as thought separated from action. Continuing, Kolakowski points out that this must be true even more of Marx's view of historical and moral objects: historical research answers questions which the historical actors did not ask; our interpretations are not forced upon us, but only suggested to us, by the facts. Similarly with value judgments: no number of true statements adds up to an insight into what is good. And above all, even the most stringent proof that an action was necessary does not make it a moral action!

There is an ambiguity here in Marxism which Kolakowski does not clarify but muddles up. Moral and immoral acts are committed by individuals, not by historical forces. An immoral act does not become moral by the fact that it was committed in the name of a historical force, or even of History or the Hegelian World Spirit. Yet patriotism, progress, and other "demiurges" have been invoked to declare certain developments "moral" or to derive a moral halo for actions that contributed to the desired result. For Kolakowski, nothing becomes moral or desirable because it is necessary; necessity itself is a matter of interpretation. I know an event was "necessary" only after it happened.

THE BEST ESSAYS in both collections are those that discuss the problem of responsibility vs. determinism. Kolakowski comes out, of course, for freedom, moral choice, and Utopia: "The existence of Utopia as Utopia is necessary for its eventually ceasing to be a Utopia. . . . The desire for revolution cannot be born only when the revolution is ripe because among the conditions for this ripeness are the revolutionary demands made of an unripe reality." Only that is inevitable which is past; the inevitability of that which does not exist is doubtful. One can determine himself as that which one

is by referring to the determining data of the past; one cannot so determine himself for the future. Therefore Kolakowski constantly eludes the Hegelian demiurge. This double nature, however—his desire to live in peace with a humanized Marxism and his conflict with the perfected system of Marxism—exact a cruel price from Kolakowski. Unlike any Western relativist or positivist who might have come to similar conclusions, he cannot see philosophy as a mere game of wits. He demands that his philosophy spell out his commitment; but he finds that this is not possible without destroying the system to which he is committed; hence those stratagems, those hints of unseriousness and of jesting.

The remarks on necessity and morality are directed first of all, of course, against the Stalinists. They repudiate, however, the one tenet that even the most critical Marxist would like to retain—the tenet on which indeed the entire edifice of “scientific socialism” must rest: the validity of Historical Materialism. Even in its most liberal version, Marxism still must recognize some measure of necessity in the development from the bourgeois to the socialist society. In rejecting this proposition Kolakowski, so it seems to me at least, steps outside the pale of even the most latitudinarian Marxism, no matter on how many other points he may still have Marx on his side. But let us not forget that it was Marx who said, “I am not a Marxist.” Just as one may say that Kolakowski is no Marxist, one may still grant him that he is thinking in the Marxian spirit.

His relation to Marx is well indicated in this passage: “The probability that unknown texts of Plato will yet come to light is small, but undoubtedly Plato’s thought, as presented in existing texts, will never cease to be interpreted in different ways, and no version will ever be final.”

Applying this insight to Marx, one understands why Kolakowski can never be a Marxist in any systematic way but must refuse to subscribe to any particular system. His originality is not in devising a new interpretation but in his devices to elude any attempt to catch him in subscribing to a definitive opinion about “what Marx really meant.” On the contrary, he has enormous fun with people

who are trying to find out; he compares them to the theologians who disputed the respective merits of Nature and Grace—he even finds that these ancient instruments of redemption are related to each other as Necessity and Freedom are today, and that the dispute between Pelagius and St. Augustine was none other than the one between Kautsky and Lenin. He maintains that the Council of Trent (1545-63) solved this question approximately as Stalin did in the famous “Summary” to which we have alluded.

What position can the Marxian critic take vis-à-vis such sterility? He can find irony in the persistence of priesthood throughout the ages and in all societies; he can have fun with past antics and derive more laughter from his own agile evasions. In fact he can praise inconsistency (“In Praise of Inconsistency,” see *DISSENT*, Spring 1964), and he calls himself a Jester, as in the superbly funny essay “The Priest and the Jester.” To be everybody’s fool is indeed the proper business of the *Philosophe* in any age, even after the revolution—and precisely if the revolution is to continue. This is brought out in the hard-hitting essay on “The Concept of the Left,” where he shows that the left is Utopian and intellectual whereas so-called “realism” permits counterrevolutionaries to take over socialism.

It is now clear that Kolakowski’s stance is Brechtian and that his philosophy is rather an antiphilosophy. I must therefore take exception to the titles which the publishers have given Kolakowski’s books. Apparently to sell a Marxist book one has to use such words as “humanism” and “alienation”; to be modern one has to deprecate Reason. It must be stated here that the word Humanism does not occur in the original title or text of any of the essays collected under this title. Nor does the word “alienation” occur either in the Polish title or in the original text of the book that appeared in 1966 as *History of Positivism from Hume to Wittgenstein*. Though the German title, *On the Mortality of Reason*, suggests an antirationalism that Kolakowski specifically repudiates, it at least reflects the mischievous spirit of Kolakowski’s antiphilosophizing. But “Marxist humanism”—a system

word that Erich Fromm,² or Herbert Marcuse, will never omit if it helps to stop further thinking—a word that must have been used by the Polish Marx-priests *ad nauseam*—is anxiously avoided by Kolakowski, who circumscribes it even in a passage where he has to call for the humanizing of Marxism.

We already have indicated in what very specific, very Marxian (as opposed to Marxist) sense Kolakowski speaks of “humanized” nature: in the profoundly revolutionary, Utopian sense Marx has in mind when he says “*vermenschlichen*.” Kolakowski is more radical than Mikhailo Markovich,³ the Yugoslav heretic who still is trying to restore a system of “Marxist humanism.” He is closer to the late Karl Korsch, whose very similar approach enjoys a vigorous revival in Europe; but apparently it is still too early for Kolakowski to acknowledge familiarity with the work of that perennial heretic.

Such radicalism has its dangers besides those that are obvious. Suppression is not the worst that can happen to the Jester; he can become socially irrelevant, his jesting can be empty or escapist. His negativism can become self-defeating nihilism. The Jester must be nimble; his dialectical skills must be constantly on the alert—else he might be trapped to become either part of the system or an accomplice of its enemies. He must not become the head of a school exercising its wits in the barren gymnastics of doubt. Criticism of the system’s immobility, in other words, must not be converted into the immobility of criticism. It is perhaps for this reason, among others, that Kolakowski had to write a history of the modern school of agnostics, positivism. He had to show where he differs from them. If he does not believe in either Necessity or Arbitrariness as a foundation for his moral

choices, what then is the basis for his commitment, and by what right does he speak of the need for a “Left socialism”?

KOLAKOWSKI’S HISTORY OF POSITIVISM betrays some of his vexations, but it does not give any answers. It expounds some modern problems in the sparse, highly disciplined language of the philosophical technician. Despite the sensational title of the American translation, the reader who expects the flowering language of Beckett, Marcuse, Laing, or Bettelheim will be disappointed. There is no moaning, wailing or breast-beating but a sober, almost heroically calm, face-the-music attitude. (Had Camus been interested in formal philosophy he would have liked this book. For Kolakowski’s story of philosophy is also that of a “penitent judge.”) The argument is immanent, following a development that was forced on philosophical thinking after David Hume had awaked epistemology from its dogmatic slumber. In passing, Auguste Comte receives a superb vindication, but the main thrust of the book takes us through the British utilitarians and the American pragmatists to the German empirio-critics and eventually to the Vienna (later Chicago) school of logical empiricism—developments that are explained almost entirely by the inner necessity of solving the problems previous solutions had left unsolved.

In some cases the social and political implications of a philosophical thought—its susceptibility of being used by ideology-makers—are mentioned briefly. A direct link, however, between the developments in philosophy and those in society is attempted only in the last chapter, which is entitled: “Logical Empiricism—A Scientific Defense of a Threatened Civilization.” Kolakowski had noted earlier that positivism not only destroys most assumptions of common sense, such as “facts” and “laws”; here he continues that it eventually develops a self-destructive tendency to ask questions that deny the very ground on which it stands. Questions of meaning, of value, of origin become irrelevant, and logic is reduced to a mere game with grammatical rules. With Wittgenstein’s famous “*Tractatus*,” philosophy seems to end in the whimper: “What we cannot speak of we must be silent about.”

² A tendency toward sentimentalism and system-building mars most contributions to Erich Fromm’s otherwise useful and interesting anthology *Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium* (Garden City: 1965).

³ Markovich (in Fromm, *op. cit.*) names the reason for the apparent sterility of Marxism in Eastern Europe: “In order to break one authority [Stalin] another, greater authority [Marx] is invoked.” The problem here, moreover, is not to justify revolution but to defend simple human rights—and the right to include “the negation of the negation” in a textbook of Dialectics.

In the days of Comte positivism had started out with the claim that scientific management can make humanity happy, the implication being that science (Reason) is capable of finding out what *ought* to make humans happy and how to achieve this happiness. Meanwhile, the sciences have refined ever more the instruments of control and manipulation; but these developments also have brought to philosophy the insight that no science can tell us what is good and desirable. The emptiness of philosophy therefore reflects the crisis of our science-based society, its inability to derive values (knowledge in the proper Socratic sense, Reason) from its scientific premises. Kolakowski can therefore define logical empiricism as "the product of a specific culture, one in which technological efficiency is regarded as the highest value It is a technocratic ideology in the mystifying guise of an anti-ideological, scientific view of the world, purged of value judgments." Kolakowski pours ridicule upon the view that problems which cannot be formulated in scientific propositions do not exist, and that we can get rid of history, anxiety, dissension and hate if we but follow the precepts of scientific analysis. These, of course, require the suppression of passion in political debate; they call for tolerance and moderation, responsibility and restraint.

In brief, when combined with a fanatical belief in education and a humanitarian aversion to bloody conflicts, these attributes describe the attitude Kolakowski recognizes as social-democratic and which he finds in representatives of the neo-positivist school such as Carnap, Ayer, Reichenbach (a one-time "ultra-leftist"), and (surprisingly) Bertrand Russell. Kolakowski himself does not believe with Socrates that virtue is knowledge and sin ignorance; he angrily asks the positivists where they acquired their values. He has no confidence in the effectiveness of science as a cure for conflicts that have their origins elsewhere, and he has only scorn for those neopositivists who, like Wittgenstein, try to invalidate all human concerns as mere figments of the imagination. Kolakowski thinks that man's century-long search for meaning, for truth and certainty, in short that which we may call "Reason," an autonomous field of intellectual

endeavor independent of technological functions and empirical data, is not simply a cancerous outgrowth of our intellectual abilities and devoid of any vital need. We are aware that Kolakowski uses the word Reason here in a specific sense, not very unlike the sense that appears in Hegel and Plato, but he admits that positivism is right: this Reason has just as little cognitive value as Poetry. But if it is to make sense, then we are forced to the conclusion that the world in which science rules and that where Reason prevails spring from two different sources that may even be hostile to each other. And he ends with the Manichaean outcry that the physical world may be a kind of malicious joke played on us by a demon.

From this brief summary it may be clear in what sense the title *Alienation of Reason* is justified and why we have to call Kolakowski a jester. He neither goes along with Fate nor can he debate with it; he can only denounce it or laugh at it. He does not offer, as others have done, a neo-Marxian system amended by Freud or Heidegger or Tillich or Russell.⁴ He does not succumb to the philosophies of the post-Marxian age, but also does not ignore them. He maintains the stance Marx assumed in front of the philosophies of his age—not just critical but using them for the two related purposes: as evidence of the ideological impasse which reveals the inner conflicts in this society, and as weapons in his arsenal of argumentation with this society. Learned Marxists have always deplored Marx's failure to write his "philosophy" and have been disappointed by his failure to disengage himself from Engels's *Anti-Duehring*. Had Marx written a philosophical book, it might have resembled the critiques of the young Lukacs, of Korsch, or of Kolakowski. Just as *Das Kapital* is a critique of economic ideas, the Marxian philosophy is a critique of philosophical ideas.

⁴ Kolakowski's book on Spinoza, *The Individual and Infinity* (Warsaw: 1958), has not been translated. From Labedz's summary I gather that Kolakowski is not interested in Spinoza's "System" but in the tension it reflects: "If [Spinoza's] solution of . . . the problem of freedom and the problem of death is fictitious, it is the most beautiful of the many fictions which philosophy feeds human minds."

Ben B. Seligman

Economic Theory Among the Czechs

PLAN AND MARKET UNDER SOCIALISM, by Ota Sik. White Plains, N. Y.: International Arts and Science Press. 382 pp. \$12.50.

TO THE RUSSIAN INVADERS, the liberal socialism of Ota Sik, one-time head of the Czechoslovakian Economic Institute, was intolerable. After the Russians entered Prague, Sik was high on the list of those to be removed from office. He happened to be in Switzerland at the time, and apparently was well-advised to remain there. He did return to Prague for a short while, but not to resume his post in the government; he has since returned to Switzerland.

When the Russians perpetrated their coup in 1948 they had promptly imposed their own version of centralized planning on what had been a fairly prosperous Western-style economy.

The Czech economy became as thoroughly Stalinist as any behind the Iron Curtain, and just as inefficient. Heavy industry was stressed to the detriment of agriculture and consumer goods, while the planners tried to decide how many shoelaces were to be produced with the output of shoes.

Meanwhile, the forced expansion of heavy industry created an illusion of prosperity. However, by 1960 the Czech economy was clearly in trouble: the key indicators signalled what Western economists called a recession. By 1963 Czechoslovakia was the only industrial nation in the world to show declines in output, national income, and real wages.

Various reports published in Czech newspapers and broadcast over Radio Prague revealed, moreover, shoddiness in production, irritating housing shortages, and the disappearance of some consumer goods from state stores. Meanwhile, whopping inventories of other goods kept piling up. Official prices were "adjusted" to move surplus items into consumers' hands while other measures were adopted to tighten belts. The frenetic efforts to achieve some semblance of economic balance were often contradictory

and to no avail. The Czech economy had begun to drift rather dangerously.

Economists, among them the author of this book, were convinced that corrective steps had to start with the elimination of the highly centralized planning apparatus taken over from the Russians. They urged decentralizing decision-making in economics, an emphasis on material, that is, *monetary* incentives rather than appeals to honor and promises, and greater reliance on market forces. By 1962, the Czech Communist party was willing to listen to the new voices, thus unwittingly providing a framework for extensive public debate on economic matters. By 1964, only diehard Stalinists were insisting that both the prices of steel ingots and spools of thread had to be decided in Prague.

Curiously, much of the ferment had been stirred up by the work of Soviet economists such as Kantorovich, Nemchinov, and Liberman who had been flirting, ever so cautiously, with "bourgeois" notions of interest, profit, and efficiency. Nemchinov, for example, had argued that a socialist price system had to allow for "profit," for in addition to rewards for socially necessary work, that is, wages, it was necessary to have some calculus to judge the effectiveness of an enterprise. Liberman would allow enterprises to set their own production plans, estimate their own costs, and fix their own prices, thus allowing for the reckoning of profit. Such thinking, not overly popular with Soviet bureaucrats, implied, in the last analysis, a market system for a socialist economy. Polish economists explored the new ideas with great interest, and they underpinned the Yugoslav system as well.

Thus, when the younger Czech economists launched their attack on centralized planning in 1963, a receptive atmosphere had already been established in Eastern Europe. Young intellectuals, knowing that reform was essential, welcomed the call for economic decentralization. Without question, the call was also one for greater freedom in the marketplace of ideas. This is what the Soviets really could not abide. Nevertheless, Czech newspapers, periodicals, and journals began to urge that the system be altered or at least modified. By 1965 few Czechs were willing to defend the Soviet system of planning. A statement of

principles for a decentralized socialism was issued, based in large part on Ota Sik's ideas: greater latitude was to be granted to individual enterprises, which now were to be permitted to earn "profit" to be used for future investment or simply to be redistributed to the workers. The central planning agency had only to work out general economic targets rather than specifying in detail the number of pots and pans to be produced. Prices were to be allowed to respond in some limited way to supply and demand (the Czech bureaucracy was not ready to let go of price-fixing for basic goods). All this was described as "creative Marxism," as if to pay obeisance to the godhead.

FROM THESE EVENTS Ota Sik's book draws its significance. There have been better, less opaque books on decentralized planning that have come from Eastern Europe, but in the light of last year's invasion, this one acquires a measure of poignancy. It has little of the esoteric mathematics characteristic of Western economics, but it is by no means easy to negotiate. Whether this is a problem of translation or native to Sik's style I cannot tell. Although an American reader may find Sik's peculiar Marxist terminology something of a bore, the central thrusts at traditional Stalinist planning are unmistakable. If a Western economist thinks of economic equilibrium, he will discover here a discussion of "material balances." There is little about monopoly (except for fulminations against capitalist monopoly), though much of what goes on in Czech, Polish, or Yugoslav economic thinking can best be understood in the language of monopolistic competition. There is a good deal of talk about "objective necessity," since it is precisely the imperatives implied in this notion that rationalize centralized planning. And much of the writing is rather Aesopian, as if to assure the reader that capitalist ideas are still beyond the pale.

Sik insists that socialism does not destroy "commodity production"—the Marxist term for the creation and appropriation of economic surplus—but transforms it rather into *socialist* commodity production. All this means is that even socialism must produce a total output in excess of immediate consumer needs.

Having established the importance of the surplus, Sik can then argue for a socialist system of exchange, one that would require prices and money in order to function with reasonable efficiency. While socialism does imply the abolition of capitalist property relations, it does not eliminate the need to produce goods "in proportions determined by the necessity to satisfy total social labor, the over-all social needs. . . ." Hence, argues Sik, socialism will generate its own "contradictions," demanding a market system for their resolution in which a number of state enterprises will compete for resources and labor. The situation, which stems from the basic fact of scarcity, hence requires an allocating mechanism in order to enable the economy to achieve a "balanced" solution. Market price is the best allocating mechanism, says Sik, and certainly superior to the arbitrary decisions of the central planning hierarchy.

Sik's chief complaint is against the Stalinist predilection for expanding production (with a stress on heavy industry) without regard to the needs of the populace, balanced output, or the use of efficient methods. The blame for the consequent drop in productivity and real wages is placed squarely at the door of the centralized command system taken from the Soviets. He insists that even a socialist planner must respond to economic signals, something that the planners had ignored prior to the general recession in 1963.

In essence, the argument supports a relatively free market in which central planners would only specify general targets. No longer would a plan represent directives to be followed strictly; rather the plan would be a rough guide to economic development. It would be somewhat like the "indicative" schemes of West European countries in which the detail is left to individual enterprises. Hence, monetary incentives based on performance must be used, says Sik, in addition to market pricing, the elimination of restrictions on imports (in order to keep home industry on its toes), interest rates (as an allocating mechanism in providing capital resources), and tax revision (especially reducing the idiotic turnover tax, one of Stalin's economic gems).

If anyone supposes that Sik is proposing a return to capitalism, I must hasten to say that this is not the case. For one thing, overall

Arthur Mitzman

**Modernism
And Weimar**

WEIMAR CULTURE: THE OUTSIDER AS INSIDER, by Peter Gay. New York: Harper & Row. 205 pp.. \$5.95.

"macro-economic" controls such as fiscal policy and decisions on investment would still remain in the hands of central planners. They would still decide on the proportions of annual output to be returned to industry and on how much would go to the consumer. The weight to be given to particular sectors of the economy—agriculture or manufacturing—would be established centrally. The shoe industry could decide which styles to produce, but its capital would have to come from above. Moreover, while the market relations advocated by Sik imply a greater measure of competition, the market would still be dominated by monopolistic enterprises, that is dominated by a few large enterprises rather than by many small ones. The central planners would have much to say about techniques of production and the distribution of manpower. And whenever necessary, Sik would not preclude the use of direct controls. Thus wages would have to be guaranteed, and excessive prices based on sudden scarcities would have to be prevented (but how does one avoid a black market under such circumstances?).

The system is socialist, argues Sik, because the means of production belong to the state. Freedom of decision-making, especially at wholesale and retail levels, does not undermine the socialist nature of the system. Yet the changes Sik proposes do not seem much different from the Liberman scheme developed in Russia, nor are they so radical as Tito's quasi-syndicalist socialism. Why then has Sik's book been placed on the Soviet Index? Aside from the sharp attacks on Russian official doctrine, the main reason, I suspect, stems from an explicit push for a more liberal political atmosphere, something that was not so clear in Soviet economic discussions. Sik's book was an important contribution to the climate of liberalization introduced when Dubcek came to power. Hence, to Moscow, Sik was not merely a revisionist, but a counterrevolutionary. Now he is an exile.

To Contributors

When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy. At all times, you must keep one copy.

And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

PETER GAY'S BOOK breathes elegance, wit, and discernment. His portrayal of the scholarly, literary, and artistic brilliance of the first German republic illuminates much that has been obscure or available only through specialized monographs. The Bauhaus, German Expressionism, the internationally important circles of historians, classical humanists, depth psychologists, and sociologists—all these appear here under the unifying imprint of a master stylist. This book should be read by all who want to sense the color, mood, and flavor of the modernist culture of Weimar Germany.

Unfortunately, in his effort to go beyond the evocation of a life-style and to penetrate the psychological and sociological significance of Weimar's plunge to disaster, Gay reveals the limitations of the historian as moralist, of the liberal enmeshed in the shibboleths of modernity, of an amateur depth psychologist who is too quick to settle for death wishes and oedipal hostilities as irreducible explanatory principles.

Gay offers three overarching theoretical constructs intended to enable us to comprehend the nature of Weimar culture and the fateful evolution of the Republic. One is the sociological subtitle of the book: *The Outsider as Insider*. The second is a Freudian theme, announced in the titles of the last two chapters: "The Revolt of the Son," and "The Revenge of the Father." The third identifies the antirepublican cultural backlash of the period—"the hunger for wholeness"—with "fear of modernity," and implies that this was the basis of Nazism.

The "outsider-insider" metaphor is useful: Gay is perfectly right in pointing out that much of what was accepted in Weimar culture had its origins as a marginal phenomenon before World War I. This is above all true for German Expressionism, but is also valid, to a degree, for the one-time marginal politics of German socialism and for the new

intellectual disciplines of sociology and psychoanalysis. The problem is that once we have left the sphere of the arts, we find that the prewar "outsider" has become not so much an "insider" as a "not-so-far-outsider."

The universities, the army and the government bureaucracy, as Gay acknowledges, remain conservative domains. Despite socialist participation in the governments of the early Weimar years, the reactionary judiciary pronounces ludicrously light sentences for the 354 political assassinations committed by the Right and savagely heavy ones for the 22 traced to the Left; the universities remain hostile to Jews, radicals, and disciplinary innovations; the army maintains a cool, conservative independence from the fragile Republic. In the face of this conservative power, the existence of *Die Weltbühne* and *Die Neue Rundschau*, and even the friendliness of the Ullstein press for literary men of radical sympathies, give only meager support to Gay's metaphor.

The Freudian interpretation holds up better, but it lacks historical and sociological context. Gay argues that the literature of early Weimar was often obsessed with the problems of rebellious sons, and that the Expressionists in particular anticipated and later mirrored a rebellion against paternal authority already inherent in the revolution of 1918; this argument indeed is one of the best in his book. The concept of the fathers' revenge, however, is less clear. Hindenburg's election as President in 1925 and Hitler's exploitation of the rootless rebels' yearning for a new and more congenial paternalism may be part of the same phenomenon, but to link them together, as Gay tries, would require either an obscure recourse to the Hegelian Cunning of Reason or a carefully thought-out social psychology of the various strata of the German people. Gay is too honest for the first and insufficiently interested (perhaps insufficiently theoretical) for the second.

This deficiency becomes annoying whenever Gay presents us with his argument on modernity and its discontents. In *Weimar Culture*, Spengler's notion of Prussian socialism, Hofmannsthal's and others' belief in the Conservative Revolution, and the Brown Bolshevik tendencies of Jünger and Niekisch are all dismissed as "testimony to a perverse pleasure in

paradox and a deliberate, deadly assault on reason."

I would be the last to maintain that Jünger, Spengler, and their friends are founts of transcendent Reason. But responding to these men with an energetic little homily based on the views of Gropius, Bacon, Descartes, and the Enlightenment—"what most Germans did not want to learn was . . . that one must confront the world and dominate it, that the cure for the ills of modernity is more, and the right kind of modernity"—hardly helps us understand their ideology. Nor does Gay reveal anything beyond a talent for invective when he comes to the conservative fear of modernity:

. . . a desperate need for roots and for community, a vehement, often vicious repudiation of reason accompanied by the urge for direct action or for surrender to a charismatic leader. The hunger for wholeness was awash with hate: the political, and sometimes the private, world of its chief spokesmen was a paranoid world, filled with enemies: the dehumanizing machine, capitalist materialism, godless rationalism, rootless society, cosmopolitan Jews, and that great all-devouring monster, the city.

Max Weber, one of Gay's heroes, also agreed that the machine was dehumanizing, rationalism led to disenchantment, *Gesellschaft* destroyed roots, and, in concurrence with his friend Simmel, the city had some most unpleasant features. Gay's psychologizing only distracts from the real problem, which is why these phenomena offended sufficient numbers of intellectuals in sufficient degree to produce an ideological Conservative Revolution in Weimar Germany, and why a mass movement that similarly fused nationalism and traditional small-town virtues into a militant loathing for internationalism and modernity should have destroyed the republic with such ease in 1933.

II

FOR ALL ITS BOMBAST and savagery, Nazism represented something immensely appealing to millions of lower-middle-class shopkeepers, artisans, and peasants. To such people, stupefied by national defeat, civil war, inflation and depression, scared out of their wits by cartelized capitalism above them and the organized proletariat below, the Nazis offered the culmination of a revolt against modernity that

had been brewing for nearly a century. As T. S. Hamerow has convincingly shown, the main thrust of the real German revolution of 1848—not the liberal conclaves in Frankfurt and Berlin but the street fighting that forced the old regimes temporarily to cede power to the liberals—was the artisan's desire for protection from the machine and for a restoration of guild controls.

This artisan uprising stands in the same relation to the final revolutionary surge against the German republic in the 1930s as the 1789–93 revolution of the *sans-culottes* to the Paris Commune. In both cases precapitalist classes, excluded from and condemned by the march of economic progress, attempt by an act of political will to defy history. Moreover, they recoup a shattered corporate status by identifying themselves with the spirit of the nation. These, after all, are the true re-revolutions, the turnings back, beside which the elaborate rhetoric of bourgeois revolution appears as little more than ideological frosting on historical inevitability, and appeals to proletarian militance seem absurdly unnecessary.

We see the revolution of the French artisanry in a favorable light, that of the German in an unfavorable one, because in France the revolutionary movement was able to mediate its drive toward national mastery by associating itself with two features of modern society to which the German *Mittelstand* (the "estate" of precapitalist townsmen) was uniformly antagonistic: the *haute bourgeoisie* (and its culture), and the metropolis.

And this is because the French Revolution stood in a rather different temporal relationship to the dominant historical trend of the modern era, toward the economic and political concentration of power (industrial society and the unified state).

In France, revolution occurred in a state unified for centuries around Paris, a powerful and populous royal city, and it was part of the logic of the revolution that it became indissolubly tied to this metropolis.

In the divided Germany of 1848, no such political center existed: the modern city represented only the cult of Mammon—capitalism—not the pride of national unity and the potentiality of national consciousness. This association with the city in turn reinforced the

other relationship which distinguished the French artisan movement from the German: its sporadic affinity with the party of bourgeois liberalism, and its consequent capacity, demonstrated in the 20th century, for joint political action with both capitalist and socialist parties. The artisanry and the representatives of the Third Estate cooperated at the outset of the French Revolution, when the old economic and social order was still intact and both groups desired its destruction. These groups only became aware of their conflicting interests after their joint revolutionary action had dismantled the old order.

But in Germany the destruction of the old corporate order had begun two generations before the revolution of 1848, with the Napoleonic conquest. By the time the revolution occurred, the *Mittelstand* and the liberal party of progress had evolved diametrically opposed views on the desirability of economic progress, and a pattern of class antagonism was established that was to undercut later efforts to unify the nation socially, both under the Second Empire and the Republic. This mutual hostility between, on the one side, capitalist, bureaucrat, and free professional, and on the other, artisan, storekeeper, and peasant contributed greatly to the political isolation of the industrial proletariat, once it appeared on the scene. Within the ranks of Germany's Third Estate, the tradition of class conflict was so sharp that the only united front that proved to be practical under the Hohenzollern was between feudal agrarians and industrialists.

Classes struggling for power tend to emulate the values of the groups whose power and status they wish to inherit. This emulation persists whether the psychology of the challenger is envy, open hatred, or *ressentiment*. In terms of the depth psychology Gay likes to use, the values of traditionally dominant classes represent a cultural superego for the relatively underprivileged groups beneath them. The struggle to overcome these traditional classes represents a personal as well as a historical mission, an equivalent, for a whole social class, of the process of personal maturing that Freud sees as commencing with the internalization of the parental ego-ideal, or superego, ending in symbolic patricide and a merging with the father's spirit.

WHEN GAY WRITES, in metapsychological language, about the son's revolt and the father's revenge in the decades from 1900 to 1933, this process is his frame of reference. But he is not at all clear about the relationship of this metapsychology to metahistory. For there were two rebellious social groups that underwent this experience in 20th-century Germany, and two varieties of cultural superegos on which they modeled themselves.

The rebellion of bourgeois intellectuals began well before the war, in figures like Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Weber, Sombart, Simmel, and Scheler. The source of their disaffection was the overpowering authoritarian rigidity of the half-bourgeois, half-feudal social order of imperial Germany. The model they strove to uphold against this order was aristocratic. At its best (and mainly before the war), it was exemplified in the elitism of Nietzsche's "good European"—a glorified vision of the aristocrat as a naive, yet fully autonomous and self-conscious personality. At its worst, it expressed a racist nationalism based on the presumably warlike virtues of the German *Volk*—really a celebration of Junker aggressiveness that carefully screened out the Junker's historic talents for sublimating his aggressiveness into bureaucratic despotism. Which of these models any individual chose to follow at any particular time depended on a combination of his own psychological development and on the historical moment. In the first years of World War I, almost all the bourgeois intellectuals succumbed to the exalted mood of the *Volks-gemeinschaft*: a nation of aristocratic soldiers for whom war was the only way of life. This ecstatic bloodlust waned during the war, but it continued to animate many intellectuals, and most of the shock troops who, as Jünger and Salomon have argued, were able to escape the mechanized, dehumanizing, ant-like conditions of trench warfare. As myth, this militarism survived in the postwar bands of ultranationalist freebooters, the Freikorps; it was also a major component both of the Conservative Revolution and National Socialism. But what gave the myth its power was the psychological reality, perceived astutely by Spengler as an ideologist of the *Mittelstand*, that the real German revolution took place in 1914.

The German bourgeoisie, the erstwhile liber-

als of Frankfurt, made their peace with Bismarck's Prussian empire in 1870. The working class, as Guenther Roth has argued, became "negatively integrated" into the imperial structure in the decades before 1914. Its social status in the empire was inferior, but through the mediating structures of the Socialist party and the trade unions, and through the government's social legislation, its social and economic position became secure. The real "outsider" group during the furious onslaught of industrialization between 1870 and 1914 was the *Mittelstand*.

Like the rebellious bourgeois intellectuals, this group was unable to struggle openly against the oppressive, though renovated Old Regime that survived until 1918. For the *Mittelstand* lacked a firm and psychologically feasible object of attack. Revolutionary struggle for the bourgeois intellectual would have involved direct combat against one's parents or their friends.

For the artisan, the value system of the Empire was so suffused with nostalgia for the *Mittelstand* that such economists as Sombart and Weber, who argued in the 1890's for the advance of capitalism at whatever the social cost to obsolete classes, were considered dangerous radicals even by their colleagues. Furthermore, because of the disastrous failure of 1848, the *Mittelstand* lacked potential allies and a tradition of successful revolt. By virtue of its amorphousness and the absence of a traditional power center, it also lacked any mode of coherent political organization.

1914 permitted a wonderful release of bottled-up aggression to all segments of German society, but for the *Mittelstand* it was also the fulfillment of a historical movement that had begun in 1848. Devoid of power, like all other strata under the Empire, the artisanry found an opportunity for heroic identification with the national will in the imperial army, through the medium of the Prussian officer—the embodiment of the old Junker order which *Mittelstand* nationalism, as Bismarck intuitively understood, wished to devour.

In France too, the artisanry had sought to liberate itself by devouring and thus fully internalizing the aristocratic spirit, but to a far greater extent than in Germany it was the spirit of aristocratic *rebellion*, the spirit of the

fronde, which inspired the mutinous Jacobins of Paris throughout the 19th century. For their German equivalents, the mood of civil war became possible only after the reluctant conquest of the state by bourgeois democrats and moderate socialists in 1918 had eliminated the apparent power of the Junker aristocracy and left in its place a government composed of alien spirits: Jews, capitalists, thinly disguised Bolsheviks.

And just as the French of the Napoleonic era extended the principles of civil war to international war—with the ultimate goal of liberation and reconciliation determining the mode of conquest—the rebellious, hitherto squashed German *Mittelstand* and its ideological exponents, the conservative revolutionaries, extended the principle of war to the death between nations, a war whose only possible outcome would be the extermination of the opponent, to the civil war of the 1920's and 1930's.

That this involved a sea of hatred is unquestionable. But so did many of the events

of the French Revolution: it was not Christian charity that led the conquerors of the Bastille to impale on pikestaffs the severed heads of the vanquished. If we stop, as Gay does, with the brutality of the scene, we are simply permitting our moral and ideological reflexes to obscure our historical understanding.

This extensive critique is perhaps unfair to *Weimar Culture* insofar as its author's main purpose, which he fulfills well, is the evocation of Republican Germany's cultural glory. But Gay's reputation and stylistic verve, as also the popularity of his subject, assure him a wide audience, and this audience deserves more of an explanation for the demise of the Republic than they will find in *Weimar Culture*. After all, contemporary America is hardly unfamiliar with the phenomenon of insecure social strata turning to thoughts of massacre because of their sense of historical obsolescence and impotence, and we cannot formulate political solutions until we have seriously begun the effort of historical and theoretical analysis.



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LETTERS

C. B. MACPHERSON *Replies:*

Elegant Tombstone

Editor:

In "Elegant Tombstones" (DISSENT, January–February 1969) Professor Macpherson's major contention is that a "moment's thought will show" Milton Friedman's view, that under capitalism transactions are voluntary, to be wrong. For Macpherson argues "the proviso that is required to make every transaction strictly voluntary is *not* freedom not to enter any *particular* exchange [Friedman's view] but freedom not to enter any exchange *at all*." (Italics supplied.) Friedman's "mistake" makes Macpherson "almost despair of logic," for "what distinguishes the capitalist economy . . . is the existence of a labor force . . . without a choice as to whether to put its labor on the market or not." Friedman's "attempted demonstration that capitalism coordinates without coercion therefore fails."

Macpherson's argument seems more Marxist than logical.

(1) Freedom is bounded under capitalism no more than under other systems. (Incidentally, Friedman's "negative income tax" would cut some of the factual ground under Macpherson's illogicalities.) "Coercion" does not refer to such boundaries—which always exist—but to available alternatives foreclosed, or imposed, by power. Certainly some (but never all) people under capitalism and socialism are favored and can avoid working. But lack of this advantage is "coercion" only if any unequal distribution—of health, education, money, or beauty—is. Which is a confusing way to talk: inequality is not coercion.

(2) How would socialism (or any other system) give people the "choice as to whether to put their labor on the market or not"? Is the lack of this choice really due to capitalism—or to our expulsion from paradise?

(3) Would we say that consumers are coerced in choosing food (and sellers in making it available) when they are able freely to select among alternatives, because consumers cannot abstain from buying on pain of starvation? They (and sellers too), no less than workers, lack "the freedom not to enter any exchange at all." Are they coerced? Or is Professor Macpherson attempting to coerce logic?

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG

Editor:

I admire brevity, except when it compresses illogic. Van den Haag's brevity does this so effectively as to preclude equal brevity in disentangling it.

His (1) consists of:

- (a) a sentence which begs the question by simply asserting what has to be shown—that there is no less freedom in capitalism than in other systems (which cannot be shown, because one "other system" is Friedman's simple exchange model, where there is more freedom);
- (b) a parenthetical sentence which is irrelevant unless my "illogicalities" are demonstrated;
- (c) a sentence defining "coercion" (acceptably) as foreclosure of alternatives by power, and then asserting incidentally, as if it were self-evident, that this always exists, whereas in Friedman's simple exchange model it does not exist.
- (d) a sentence asserting, in the guise of a concession, that in capitalism and socialism some people can avoid working, a statement which obscures the difference that this is inherent in capitalism and not inherent in socialism;
- (e) two sentences implying, wrongly, that I equate inequalities which are entirely or partly innate (health, beauty) with inequalities which are entirely or partly imposed by power (wealth, education); and containing the simple fallacy that unless all inequality is due to coercion, then no inequality is due to coercion.

The rhetorical questions in his (2), insofar as they are relevant to the point I was making about Friedman's argument, are answered by Friedman's text. The only "other system" that is directly relevant is Friedman's model of a simple exchange economy, which explicitly does give people the choice as to whether to put their labor on the market or not, and gives it to them by stipulating that every household has resources enabling it to produce on its own. As for socialism, the models now in operation do, typically, to some extent use market mechanisms (as devices subordinate to central planning) to allocate labor. To that extent, people do have to "put their labor on the market," though they do not do so in the collective farming sector, or in the cooperative enterprises. But no socialist model requires, as any capitalist model does, that people put their labor on the market in Friedman's sense of market, that is a market which sets the price of labor, and sets it at an amount that yields part of the product to private owners of capital.

The rhetorical questions in his (3) look unbeatable. Who can deny that we must eat, and that therefore in any market model, except Friedman's simple model, we "cannot abstain from

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ALL RHETORICAL
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buying on pain of starvation." The fact that in Friedman's simple market model (as well as in some nonmarket models) we *can* refrain from buying, might have given him pause. It might have suggested, what is indeed the case, that coercion is not inherent in all exchange, but only in the kind of exchange we have to enter because we have no capital and no share in joint capital (that is, the exchange comprised in the sale of our labor) and in other kinds of exchange we have to enter because we have already entered that one.

Not all people who have to buy food are coerced, and none of them are coerced *because* they have to buy. But those who have to sell their labor in order to buy food are coerced: their alternative of producing for themselves (either singly, using their own capital, as in Friedman's simple market model, or jointly, using socially owned capital, as in a socialist model) has been foreclosed by the power of other men, namely, those who have effectively cornered the land and capital.

Homage to Norman Thomas

Editor:

I would like to pay my tribute to Norman Thomas and make it part of the record.

I was the first Communist to meet with Mr. Thomas in the postwar period. It was during the Smith Act trials, in the early fifties. I came to solicit his aid in our defense. Our first meeting lasted about two hours during which we discussed the issues of the trial at great length. Not once did Thomas utter a word of criticism of the abuse we had heaped on him for a decade. He made contact with Roger Baldwin, Reverend Donald Harrington, and others, and in the course of the following weeks helped us to raise funds and reach members of the liberal community hitherto unapproachable for us.

It was an illuminating and moving experience for me and helped to alter his image in the minds of many of my associates, who had been affected by years of unremitting hostility. I recall the first occasion in which I spoke of his role at a mass meeting of the Communist party—the surprise, and yet the coolness, with a smattering of applause. In time the appreciation and the applause grew, though the "hard core" continued to frown.

In a later period Norman Thomas joined with James Wechsler and others in the campaign for the release of Junius Scales from prison. There is little doubt in my mind, having endured two trials, that his efforts contributed to ending government prosecution under the Smith Act.

In my contact with Norman Thomas, I found him a man of extraordinary gentleness and dedication. He represented as no other individual in the tumultuous epoch gone by, the social conscience of America.

GEORGE CHARNEY

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Sincerely,

Norman Thomas

Norman Thomas
Executive Director Emeritus

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P.S. If you wish to purchase a copy of *Toward a Democratic Left*, it is available through the League for \$4.95 -- a saving of \$1.00.



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